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Abstract
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos introduced the concept of pri-
vacy homomorphism and asked whether it is possible to perform arbitrary
operations on encrypted ciphertexts. Thirty years later, Gentry gave a
positive answer in his seminal paper at STOC 2009, by proposing an
ingenious approach to construct fully homomorphic encryption (FHE)
schemes. With this approach, one starts with a somewhat homomorphic
encryption (SHE) scheme that can perform only limited number of oper-
ations on ciphertexts (i.e. it can evaluate only low-degree polynomials).
Then, through the so-called bootstrapping step, it is possible to turn this
SHE scheme into an FHE scheme. After Gentry’s work, many SHE and
FHE schemes have been proposed; in total, they can be divided into four
categories, according to the hardness assumptions underlying each SHE
(and hence, FHE) scheme: hard problems on lattices, the approximate
common divisor problem, the (ring) learning with errors problem, and the
NTRU encryption scheme. Even though SHE schemes are less powerful
than FHE schemes, they can already be used in many useful real-world
applications, such as medical and financial applications. It is therefore of
primary concern to understand what level of security these SHE schemes
provide. By default, all the SHE schemes developed so far offer IND-CPA
security - i.e. resistant against a chosen-plaintext attack - but nothing is
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said about their IND-CCA1 security - i.e. secure against an adversary who
is able to perform a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack. Considering
such an adversary is in fact a more realistic scenario.
Gentry emphasized it as a future work to investigate SHE schemes
with IND-CCA1 security, and the task to make some clarity about it
was initiated by Loftus, May, Smart and Vercauteren: at SAC 2011 they
showed how one family of SHE schemes is not IND-CCA1 secure, opening
the doors to an interesting investigation on the IND-CCA1 security of
the existing schemes in the other three families of schemes. In this work
we therefore continue this line of research and show that most existing
somewhat homomorphic encryption schemes are not IND-CCA1 secure. In
fact, we show that these schemes suffer from key recovery attacks (stronger
than a typical IND-CCA1 attack), which allow an adversary to recover the
private keys through a number of decryption oracle queries. The schemes,
that we study in detail and for which we develop key recovery attacks, are
the ones in the three categories mentioned above. Our key recovery attacks
work in such a way that a malicious attacker can recover the private key of
an underlying encryption scheme completely, bit by bit, when he’s allowed
a given number of decryption oracle accesses. As a result, this dissertation
shows that all known SHE schemes fail to provide IND-CCA1 security.
While it is true that IND-CPA security may be enough to construct
cryptographic protocols in presence of semi-honest attackers, key recovery
attacks will pose serious threats for practical usage of SHE and FHE
schemes: if a malicious attacker (or a compromised honest party) submits
manipulated ciphertexts and observes the behavior (side channel leakage)
of the decryptor, then it may be able to recover all plaintexts in the system.
Therefore, it is very desirable to design SHE and FHE with IND-CCA1
vii
security, or at least design them to prevent key recovery attacks. This
raises the interesting question whether it is possible or not to develop such
IND-CCA1 secure SHE scheme. Up to date, the only positive result in
this direction is a SHE scheme proposed by Loftus et al. at SAC 2011 (in
fact, a modification of an existing SHE scheme and IND-CCA1 insecure).
However, this IND-CCA1 secure SHE scheme makes use of a non standard
knowledge assumption, while it would be more interesting to only rely
on standard assumptions. We propose then a variant of the SHE scheme
proposed by Lopez-Alt, Tromer, and Vaikuntanathan at STOC 2012, which
offers good indicators about its possible IND-CCA1 security.
In the conclusion, we finish our dissertation with some interesting future
directions which could expand from our current work.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In public-key cryptography, a sender wants to transmit a message through
a public channel to a receiver, and they have to be sure that the communi-
cation is kept hidden from eavesdroppers. The idea was first introduced
by Diffie and Hellman in [29], and the first instantiation was obtained by
Rivest, Shamir and Adleman in the breakthrough paper [70] where the
sender encrypts a message with the receiver’s public key, and the latter
decrypts with his secret key.
In 1978, Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos [69] wondered whether it is
possible to perform operations on encrypted ciphertexts, by means of what
they defined to be a privacy homomorphism. Homomorphic encryption is
therefore a form of encryption that allows computations to be carried out
on ciphertext, thus generating an encrypted result which, when decrypted,
matches the result of operations performed on the plaintext. Rivest,
Adleman and Dertouzos asked: ”can we do arbitrary computations on data
while it remains encrypted, without ever decrypting it?”. This way, data
can be kept confidential while being processed, which enables useful tasks to
be accomplished with data residing in environments which are not trusted.
This is a hugely valuable capability in a world of heterogeneous networking
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and distributed computation. Although it was immediately recognized
as a very interesting possibility in cryptography, for the next thirty years
no concrete construction was built, and finding a general method for
computing on encrypted data had been a major goal in cryptography
studies ever since. A number of homomorphic encryption schemes has
been developed during the years, but they supported essentially only one
basic operation (addition or multiplication).
Several homomorphic encryption schemes have been developed during
the years, but their homomorphic capabilites were limited to just a single
operation: this is the case, for instance, of the ElGamal cryptosystem
[32]. Other famous examples include the basic RSA cryptosystem [70],
which is homomorphic with respect to multiplication, and the Paillier
cryptosystem [66], which is homomorphic with respect to addition. In all
these cases, the encryption schemes are homomorphic with respect to a
single algebraic operation. While it is true that these simple homomorphic
cryptosystems have a wide range of applications (for example, private
information retrieval or secure voting), being restricted to a single operation
renders them incapable of evaluating more general transformations on
encrypted data. Therefore, the natural question that Rivest, Adleman,
and Dertouzous raised in [69] just after the discovery of RSA in 1978, was
whether there existed an encryption scheme that was fully homomorphic,
namely, homomorphic with respect to both addition and multiplication.
It was only in 2009 that the quest for a first viable fully homomorphic
encryption (FHE) scheme scheme ended, when Craig Gentry settled this
conjecture [37]. It turned out then that privacy homomorphisms encryption
schemes are actually possible to achieve; using modern terminology, we
call them fully homomorphic encryption, or FHE, schemes. He used ideal
3lattices to propose an ingenious approach to construct FHE schemes. These
are encryption systems that permit arbitrarily complex computations on
encrypted data. The development of FHE is a revolutionary advance: it
greatly extends the scope of the computations which can be applied to
process encrypted data homomorphically.
A natural application that we can think of FHE (and SHE, as we
will define later) is outsourcing computation to an untrusted third party,
such as a cloud server. Such a scenario arises when a client does not
have the computational resources to carry out a computation on his own,
and therefore needs to outsource or delegate the computation to a third
party, which is potentially untrustworthy. In an outsourcing computation
example using FHE, the client first encrypts his input using a given FHE
scheme; then he sends the ciphertexts to the cloud, which will perform the
computation homomorphically. Finally, the client receives the response
which is encrypted, but that he can decrypt to learn the result of the
computation. See Figure 1.1.
Fig. 1.1 An application of FHE - Outsourcing computa-
tions to Cloud
An Example: Alice’s Jewelry Store. To understand intuitively how
FHE works, let’s start from an example as explained by Gentry in [36].
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Alice is the owner of a jewelry store, and she gives precious raw materials
(diamonds, gold, silver, etc.) to her workers in order to be assembled into
rings and necklaces. However she does not trust her workers, assuming
that they could steal her jewels if given the chance. Her goal therefore is
to let the workers process the raw material into the desired finished pieces,
but without giving them access to these materials.
That’s how she solves this problems, and at the same time this solution
gives to us the intuition behind FHE schemes. She orders a transparent and
impenetrable glovebox, which is secured by a lock for which only she has
the key. After putting the precious raw materials inside the glovebox, she
locks it and let the workers access to the closed glovebox. Using the gloves,
the workers can manipulate the pieces and craft the desired necklaces and
bracelets inside the box. Now the workers can do this without having the
possibility to directly access, or steal, the precious raw materials since they
are locked inside the impenetrable glovebox. After the work is done, the
workers return the glovebox to Alice, who can then open the box thanks to
her key and get the desired necklace. To sum up, the workers process the
raw materials into the desired piece of art, without having direct access to
these materials.
For the analogy, the non penetrable glovebox, with the raw materials
locked inside, represent an encryption of some initial data m1, . . . ,mn,
which can be accessed only with Alice’s given secret decryption key sk.
The gloves represent the homomorphism, or malleability, of the encryption
scheme; they allow the ”raw” data to be manipulated while it is inside the
”encryption box”. The final piece of art (necklace or bracelet) inside the
box represents the encryption Enc(f(m1, . . . ,mn)), where f is the desired
5function of the initial data. In this case, the lack of access is represented
by the lack of physical access to the jewels.
Of course this analogy does not faithfully represent some aspects of
homomorphic encryption, but as long as it is not taken too literally, it
gives a good rough idea of how FHE works.
Since Gentry published his idea there has been huge interest in the area,
with regard to improving the schemes, implementing them and applying
them. Several other FHE schemes have been released, improving asymp-
totic efficiency; nevertheless, existing FHE all follow the same blueprint as
the one in Gentry’s original scheme. In short, ciphertexts produced by an
FHE scheme can be operated on in such a way that we obtain a cipher-
text that corresponds to the addition or multiplication of the respective
plaintexts. The ability to algebraically operate over ciphertexts is of great
importance because any algorithm can be transformed into a sequence of
additions and multiplications in Z2. Therefore, such a scheme can evaluate
any algorithm solely with access to the encryption of its input, and such
that the computation returns the encryption of the output. Since Gentry’s
work, many FHE constructions have appeared in the literature. Following
Gentry blueprint for building a FHE scheme, all the subsequent construc-
tions start with a somewhat homomorphic encryption (SHE) scheme that
can perform only limited number of operations on ciphertexts (i.e. it
can evaluate only low-degree polynomials). Then, through the so-called
bootstrapping step, we can turn this SHE scheme into an FHE scheme.
So, a SHE scheme allows a fixed number of multiplications of ciphertexts;
these schemes are building blocks for the FHE schemes and provide much
better efficiency guarantees than their FHE counterparts. Therefore, they
are used already in a number of practical applications, as we will see later
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on in this chapter. Note that researchers have proposed the concept of
leveled FHE schemes (e.g. [12, 44]), which allow third parties to evaluate
any circuits up to a certain depth. Often in the following discussion, we
treat these schemes as SHE.
Back to Alice’s Jewelry Store. In her store, Alice notices that after
a worker uses the gloves for one minute, the gloves stiffen and become
unusable. This defective glovebox can be seen as a SHE scheme. After
a given number of operations on ciphertexts have been done, no more
operations can be performedor the resulting ciphertext would fail to decrypt
to the correct plaintext. As we will see later, the way SHE and FHE
schemes work is by adding noise to ciphertexts. By performing operations
on them, this noise grows. Homomorphic multiplication increases the noise
much more than addition; a SHE scheme can evaluate only low-degree
polynomials over encrypted data, i.e. it can perform only a limited number
of additions and multiplications. Eventually, the noise makes the resulting
ciphertext so noisy that it is not possible to decrypt correctly anymore.
Back to Alice, she really would like to avoid this situation, because
some of her more complicated pieces like necklaces and bracelets may take
up to an hour to be assembled, while the gloves stiffen only after one
minute of usage. She needs to find out a way to use these defective boxes
to get the workers to securely assemble even the most complicated pieces.
She notices that the defective boxes have anyway a interesting property
that might be useful: they have a one-way insertion slot, like the ones we
can see in the post office mail bins. But they are also flexible enough so
that it is possible to put one box inside another through the slot. This
property plays a key role in the solution of this problem, which leads us to
the concept of bootstrappable homomorphic encryption scheme.
7Here is the idea: she gives a worker a glovebox, which we call box
#1, containing all the raw materials. She also gives him several extra
gloveboxes: box #2 which contains (locked inside) the key opening box #1;
box #3 which contains the key opening box #2; and so on. To assemble an
intricate piece, the worker manipulates the materials in box #1 until the
gloves stiffen. Then, he puts box #1 inside box #2, where the latter box
already contains the key opening box #1. Using the gloves for box #2, he
opens box #1 with this key, extracts the (partially) assembled piece, and
then he continues to assemble pieces within box #2 until its gloves stiffen.
In a similar fashion, he then places box #2 inside box #3, and so on he
continues in this way. When the worker finally finishes his work inside box
#n, he gives the box to Alice. Of course, this system is succesfull only
if the worker can open box #i within box #(i + 1), after which he still
has the time to make an extra progress on the assembly, before the gloves
of box #(i+ 1) stiffen. So that’s why it is important that the unlocking
operation (and the extra assembly work) takes less than a minute. If she
has enough defective gloveboxes, then it is possible to assemble any piece,
no matter how complicated they are.
In this analogy, the defective gloveboxes represent our SHE scheme,
which can perform additions and multiplications on ciphertexts for a while
until the noise becomes too large and prevents the scheme to continue
making operations on ciphertexts. What we would like to do is use this
SHE scheme to construct a FHE scheme. As before, box #1 with the
precious raw materials inside represents the ciphertexts that encrypt the
initial data. Box #(i + 1) with the key for box i inside represents an
encrypted secret decryption key. Alice understands that there is only
one thing that her workers need to be able to do in less than one minute
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with the gloves, together with performing a small operation on the piece:
unlock box #i within box #(i+ 1) and extract the piece. It will turn out
that there is only one function that our scheme (call it E) needs to be
able to handle, with a some room left over to perform one more addition
or multiplication: the decryption function (which is like unlocking the
”encryption box”). If E has this self-referential property of being able to
handle its own decryption function (augmented by a single gate), we say
that it is bootstrappable. As it turns out, if E is bootstrappable, then one
can use E to construct a FHE scheme. We will see more on this in Section
3.2.1.
However, all the proposals have a common drawback: they are not
practical. Initially, the algorithms involved in the constructions, although
having polynomial complexity, had high polynomial degree. Later, the
asymptotic complexity became much better. Indeed, we now have construc-
tions with polylogarithmic overhead per operation, but with terribly high
constants. Although FHE is not practical yet, many constructions have
been proposed recently, achieving a SHE scheme. They allow a limited
depth of operations to be performed. These constructions are indeed very
useful in practice, specially in order to provide security in the scenario of
cloud computing. A SHE scheme is important also in the implementation
of private information retrieval (PIR) protocols, which can be seen as a
building block to the solution for the privacy problem that emerges when
we give our data to the cloud. We will discuss in a moment more in detail
the practical applications of FHE and SHE schemes.
In the cloud computing scenario it is natural to imagine an attacker
having access to a decryption oracle (e.g., the cloud can feed invalid
ciphertexts to a user and monitor their behaviour). It is obvious that
9a homomorphic encryption scheme cannot have security of ciphertexts
under adaptive attacks. Hence, adaptive attacks are already a very serious
concern in this setting. But one could hope that at least the private key
remains secure in the presence of a decryption oracle.
Main Result and Contribution
With this work, we show that most - if not all - the SHE schemes built so
far are not secure even against non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks.
In Chapter 4 we will see how all the SHE and FHE schemes can be
divided into four main families, according to the hardness assumptions
they rely on. This categorization is made clear with figure 4.1. As we will
see better in Chapter 5, our Thesis is inspired by the work of [54], whose
authors were the first to observe adaptive key recovery attacks by showing
that one of the above mentioned families is vulnerable to such attacks.
Thanks to such a technique, one can completely determine the secret key
of a given SHE scheme in a CCA1 scenario attack. In this dissertation we
continue this line of work by presenting original and efficient key recovery
attacks for most of the existing SHE schemes (see figure 4.1). This shows
that IND-CCA1 security is hard to achieve in homomorphic encryption.
It is important to have a clear idea of what level of security is offered
by the known SHE schemes; in fact, adaptive key recovery attacks on
homomorphic encryption seem to be realistic in certain scenarios, so they
are potentially a serious problem in practice. The only homomorphic
encryption scheme known to resist such attacks is the a variation of a
known scheme presented by Loftus et al. [54]; however, the authors make
use of a non-standard lattice assumption, which makes this SHE scheme
not a very good candidate for a IND-CCA1 secure scheme.
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We are going to see in the next chapter a few practical applications of
FHE and SHE.
Chapter 2
Practical Applications of SHE and FHE
Even though SHE schemes are less powerful than FHE schemes, they
find already many useful interesting real-world applications, ranging from
medical to financial applications [61]. Currently homomorphic encryption
is rather slow, but it can be used already for several practical uses. Concrete
practical applications and concrete useful functions can be computed, and
most of them only require a limited number of multiplications of ciphertexts
(and a normally very large number of additions of ciphertexts). For these
applications, it is often enough to consider an implementation of a SHE
scheme.
2.1 Applications that are Feasible Today
Among the applications that we can consider by using the technology that
we have nowadays, medical applications are the most interesting. As it is
well explained in [61], consider a cloud service which manages electronic
medical records, and a scenario where the medical data of a patient is
continuously uploaded to a service provider in an encrypted form. The
cloud service constantly collect important health information (like for
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example blood pressure, heart rate, weight and blood sugar). In this case,
the user is the data owner, and therefore the data is encrypted under his
public key and only him - the user - can decrypt. The service provider
computes on the encrypted data, runs some statistics thanks to which it
can predict the likelihood of certain medical conditions that can occur, or
simply just keep track of the user’s health. Obviously, the main benefit
for the user’s perspective is to allow real-time health analysis based on
readings from various sources without having to disclose this data to any
one source. Also we have to keep in mind that, since the volume of the
data involved is generally large, it is better for the user not to store and
manage all this data locally on a given device, but instead to use cloud
storage and computation.
A scenario like the above one requires computing simple statistical
functions (i.e. mean, standard deviation, logistical regressions, etc.) that
are typically used for prediction of likelihoods of certain outcomes. For these
functions, it is enough to only consider a SHE scheme which computes many
additions and a small number of multiplications on ciphertexts: for example,
averages require no multiplications, standard deviation requires only one
multiplication, and logistical regression requires a few multiplications. For
a concrete instantiation of such an application, we can mention the actual
implementation [50] by Lauter at Eurocrypt 2015, where she described of
a heart attack prediction by Microsoft.
Among other interesting applications, one can consider consumer pri-
vacy in advertising, data mining, financial privacy, and forensic image
recognition. See [61] and [4] for further details.
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2.2 Constructions that use FHE and SHE
Schemes as Building Blocks
Homomorphic encryption schemes can be used to construct cryptographic
tools such as the following.
• Zero Knowledge Proofs: As shown by Gentry in [36], we can
use homomorphic encryption in order to build non-interactive zero
knowledge (NIZK) proofs of small size. Suppose that a user would
like to prove knowledge of a satisfying assignment of bits b1, . . . , bt
for a given boolean circuit C. The NIZK proof is as follow: generate
a public key, encrypt the bi’s, and homomorphically evaluate C on
these encryptions. A standard NIZK proof is attached to prove that
every ciphertext encrypts either 0 or 1, and that the output of the
evaluation encrypts 1.
• Delegation of Computation: Besides outsourcing data, another
important aspect of cloud computing is given by outsourcing compu-
tation. Consider the scenario in which a user want to delegate the
computation of a function f to a server. The user, however, does
not exclude the possibility that the server may be malicious, or just
not working properly. In other words, the user may not trust the
result of the server’s computation. The user demands to have a proof
that the computation was done correctly and verifying this proof
should also be significantly more efficient than the user doing the
computation. Chung et al. [21] used FHE to design schemes for
delegating computation. One example for the delegation of compu-
tation is message authenticators. Consider a user who outsources
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computation on a data set and wants to check that the return value
is really the correct result. The tag should be independent of the
size of the original data set, and only verifiable for the holder of the
private key. Gennaro and Wichs propose such a scheme in [35] based
on a FHE scheme. However, it only supports a bounded number of
verification queries.
• Multiparty Computation: Multiparty computation requires in-
teraction between participants. Damgard et al. [28] provide a
description of how a SHE scheme can be used to construct offline
multiplication during the computations. The players use the SHE
scheme in a preprocessing phase, but return to the much more ef-
ficient techniques of multiparty computation in the computation
phase.
• Signatures: Gorbunov et al. [46] presented a construction of lev-
elled fully homomorphic signature schemes. The scheme can evaluate
arbitrary circuits with maximal depth d over signed data and ho-
momorphically produce a short signature which can be verified by
anybody using the public verification key. The user uploads the
signed data x, then the server runs some function g over the data
which yields y = g(x). Additionally, the server publishes the sig-
nature σg,y to verify the computation. This work also introduces
the notion of homomorphic trapdoor functions (HTDF), one of the
building blocks for the signature construction. HTDF themselves are
based on the small integer solution (SIS) problem.
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2.2.1 Implementations of FHE schemes
Some of the FHE schemes have already been implemented. Among them
we find:
• HElib: it is a software library implementing the [12] scheme, with
optimizations to run homomorphic evaluation faster (i.e., the Smart-
Vercauteren ciphertext packing techniques [72], and the Gentry-
Halevi-Smart optimizations [43]). See https://github.com/shaih/
HElib.
• ”Stanford FHE”: it is a working implementation of the scale-invariant
leveled homomorphic encryption system in [11]. See https://crypto.
stanford.edu/people/dwu4/fhe-project.html.
• Implementation of [75] FHE scheme over the integers. Implementa-
tion is describer in [24]. See https://github.com/coron/fhe.
• Implementation SEAL of the scheme in [9]. The implementation by
Microsoft Research is described in [62].
2.3 Impact of Key Recovery Attacks
For all these reasons, it is important to have a clear idea of what security
level is offered by the known SHE schemes, and in particular to understand
whether a given SHE scheme is secure against key recovery attacks. As we
mentioned, in theory IND-CPA security may be enough for us to construct
cryptographic protocols, in particular if we assume semi-honest attackers.
However, key recovery attacks will pose serious threat for practical usage
of SHE schemes if an attacker becomes malicious (or, an honest party is
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compromised) and submits manipulated ciphertexts to observe the behavior
of the decryptor. We illustrate this point by presenting an ”attack” against
the LWE-based single-server private information retrieval (PIR) protocol
in [15].
The PIR protocol is very simple: the client has a long-term key tuple
for a SHE scheme and a secret key sk for a symmetric encryption scheme;
a PIR query is an encrypted index under sk; a PIR response is a ciphertext
under the SHE public key, generated by the server (who is given the
ciphertext of sk under the SHE public key) by homomorphically evaluating
the encrypted index and the database; the client obtains the desired bit
by decrypting the ciphertext using the SHE private key.
Clearly, if the server is malicious, then it can mount a key recovery
attack by manipulating the responses and monitoring the client’s behavior.
With the SHE private key, the server can recover all the private information
of the client. In order to prevent the attack, the client can require the
server to prove all computations are done properly. However, this might
make the server’s computational complexity very heavy and make the
protocol less efficient than others.
As we just saw, we can consider cloud among the most straightforward
applications. As more and more data is outsourced into cloud storage, often
unencrypted, considerable trust is required in the cloud storage providers.1
1The Cloud Security Alliance lists data breach as the top threat to cloud security
[47]. Encrypting the data with conventional encryption avoids the problem. However,
now the user cannot operate on the data and must download the data to perform the
computations locally. With FHE the cloud can perform computations on behalf of the
user and return only the encrypted result.
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2.4 Structure of the Thesis
In Chapter 3 we introduce the notation and the standard definitions that
we will use throughout our dissertation; in particular we will cover the
definitions of homomorphic encryption (both fully and somewhat), as well
as security definitions. Then, in Chapter 4 we present the literature review
focused on the hardness assumptions underlying the known SHE and FHE
schemes; we will also describe the original construction of the lattice-based
FHE scheme given by Gentry in [37], as well as some optimization and
modifications. Then we will continue on Chapter 5 by describing the
main results of our contributions, i.e. key-recovery attacks against all the
schemes in categories (2), (3) and (4) (see Figure 4.1). As we will see, all
the SHE schemes developed so far have been shown to be vulnerable against
key-recovery attacks, with the exception of one scheme proposed in [54].
This SHE, however, makes use of a non standard knowledge assumption.
More in particular, in Chapter 5 we continue the line of work of [54, 76]
to present key recovery attacks for the schemes [15, 14, 44, 11]. Our attacks
can also be applied to the SHE scheme in [12]. We also develop a new
key recovery attack against the SHE scheme in [75], and our attack is
more efficient and conceptually simpler than that from [76]. Our results
essentially show that the SHE schemes underlying the FHE schemes in
category (2) and (3) in the figure 4.1 are not IND-CCA1 secure. Previous
analysis had not paid much attention to the NTRU-based SHE schemes
(to be defined in Section 4.1.6), i.e. the schemes in category (4) in 4.1.
Two representative schemes in this line are those by Lopez-Alt, Tromer
and Vaikuntanathan [55] and Bos et al. [9]. We have proposed efficient
key recovery attacks against these two NTRU-based SHE schemes. This
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shows that the SHE schemes underlying the FHE schemes in category (4)
in the figure 4.1 are not IND-CCA1 secure.
It would be interesting to obtain one IND-CCA1 secure SHE scheme,
and in Chapter 6 we show how our variant of the [55] scheme offer good
indications that it is IND-CCA1 secure. More in particular, we will consider
the SHE scheme from [55] - for which we develop an efficient key recovery
attack in Chapter 5 - and we tweak its decryption step in two ways, leading
to scenarios (2) and (3) as explained in that chapter. We successfully show
a key-recovery attack for scenario (2); however, scenario (3) seems to resist
any attempt to show a key-recovery attack. We will show that our usual
strategy for key-recovery attacks does not lead to a successful attack, and
our variation of the [55] SHE scheme seems therefore to be the a good
candidate for being IND-CCA1 secure.
In Chapter 7 we conclude our work and suggest interesting future works
and directions.
Chapter 3
Notation and Standard Definitions
3.1 Preliminaries
Let N be the set of natural numbers, Z the ring of integers, Q the field
of rational numbers, and Fq a finite field with q elements, where q is a
power of a prime p. In particular, we will consider often Fp = Z/pZ = Zp.
If r ∈ Zq, we indicate as r−1 its inverse in Zq, i.e. that value such that
r−1 · r = 1 mod q. For integers a, q ∈ Z sometimes we use notation
[a]q := a mod q. For a given integer n and a ring R, we indicateMn(R) as
the ring of square n×n matrices with entries in R. For a ring R and a (two-
sided) ideal I of R, we consider the quotient ring R/I. For given vectors
v := (v1, . . . , vn),w := (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn, we let ||v|| :=
√
v21 + · · ·+ v2n
be the Euclidean norm of its coefficients, ||v||∞ := max{|v1|, . . . , |vn|} be
its maximum norm, and we indicate with < v,w >:= ∑i viwi the dot
product of v,w. For a given rational number x ∈ Q, we let ⌊x⌉, ⌊x⌋ and
⌈x⌉ be respectively the rounding function, the floor function and the ceiling
function. For a given integer n ∈ N, ⌊n+ 1/2⌉ = n+ 1. To indicate that
an element a is chosen uniformly at random from a set A we use notation
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a
$← A. For a set A, we let its cardinality be |A|. We consider also the
standard basis {ei}ni=1 of Rn, where the coefficients of ei are all 0 except
for the i-th coefficient, which is 1. We denote the map that reduces an
integer x modulo q and uniquely represents the result by an element in
the interval (−q/2, q/2] by [·]q. Therefore, we will consider the ring Zq as
Zq := {−
⌊
q
2
⌋
,−
⌊
q
2
⌋
+ 1, . . . ,
⌊
q
2
⌋
}. We extend this map to polynomials in
Z[X] and thus also to elements of R by applying it to their coefficients
separately; given a polynomial a(x) ∈ R, we define the map
[·]q : R→ R, a(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
aix
i 7→
n−1∑
i=0
[ai]qxi
Let f, g be two functions defined on some subset of R. We write
f(x) ∈ O(g(x)) (resp. f(x) ∈ Ω(g(x))) if, informally, |f(x)| ≤ g(x) · k
(resp. |f(x)| ≥ g(x) · k), for some positive k. We write f(x) = O˜(g(x)) if
f(x) = O(g(x)logkg(x)) for some k. We write f(x) ∈ ω(g(x)) if |f(x)| ≥
k ·|g(x)|, for every fixed positive number k. Finally, we have f(x) ∈ Θ(g(x))
if g(x) · k1 ≤ f(x) ≤ g(x) · k2 for some positive k1, k2.
We also recall some terminology from circuit theory. The depth of a
circuit is the maximum distance from an input gate to an output gate; the
i-th level of a circuit consists of all gates with depth i; the size of a circuit
is the number of gates it contains.
Unless otherwise specified, λ will always denote the security parameter
of the encryption schemes. In the asymmetric schemes we are going to
discuss, the secret key will be denoted as sk, and the public key will be pk.
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3.2 Homomorphic Encryption
The following definitions are adapted from [37]. We only assume bit-by-
bit public-key encryption, i.e. we only consider encryption schemes that
are homomorphic with respect to boolean circuits consisting of gates for
addition and multiplication mod 2. Extensions to bigger plaintext spaces
and symmetric-key setting are straightforward; we skip the details.
Definition 1 (Homomorphic Encryption). A public key homomorphic en-
cryption (HE) scheme is a set E = (KeyGenE ,EncryptE ,DecryptE ,EvaluateE)
of four algorithms, all of which must run in polynomial time. When the
context is clear, we will often omit the index E .
KeyGen(λ) = (sk, pk)
• input: λ
• output: sk; pk
Encrypt(pk,m) = c
• input: pk and plaintext
m ∈ F2
• output: ciphertext c
Decrypt(sk, c) = m′
• input: sk and ciphertext
c
• output: m′ ∈ F2
Evaluate(pk, C, (c1, . . . , cr)) = ce
• input: pk, a circuit C, ci-
phertexts c1, . . . , cr, with
ci = Encrypt(pk,mi)
• output: ciphertext ce
All these steps must be efficient - that is, the computational complexity
of all of these algorithms must be polynomial in security parameter λ and
the size of C.
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Definition 2 (Correct Homomorphic Decryption). The public key ho-
momorphic encryption scheme E = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Evaluate) is
correct for a given t-input circuit C if, for any key-pair (sk, pk) output
by KeyGen(λ), any t plaintext bits m1, . . . ,mt, and any ciphertexts c =
(c1, . . . , ct) with ci ← EncryptE(pk,mi), Decrypt(sk,Evaluate(pk, C, c)) =
C(m1, . . . ,mt) holds.
Definition 3. The scheme E = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Evaluate) is
homomorphic for a class C of circuits if it is correct for all circuits C ∈ C.
We say that E is a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) scheme if it is
correct for all boolean circuits.
Informally, a homomorphic encryption scheme that can perform only a
limited number of operations is called a somewhat homomorphic encryption
(SHE) scheme. We will make this point more clear now. The way known
FHE schemes work is by adding some noise ciphertexts and, by performing
operations on them, this noise grows. Therefore it is often convenient to
work with homomorphic encryption schemes that can perform only a limited
number of operations; as we have seen in Chapter 1, these are informally
called somewhat homomorphic encyption (SHE) schemes. We remark that
homomorphic multiplication increases the noise significantly more than
addition; SHE schemes can evaluate only low-degree polynomials over
encrypted data, i.e. they can perform only a limited number of additions
and multiplications. Eventually, the noise makes the resulting ciphertext
so noisy that it is not possible to decrypt correctly anymore.
A family of schemes {E (L) : L ∈ Z+} is leveled fully homomorphic
if they all use the same decryption circuit, E (L) is homomorphic for all
circuits of depth at most L (that use some specified set of gates), and the
computational complexity of E (L)’s algorithms is polynomial (the same
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polynomial for all L) in λ, L and (in the case of EvaluateE(L)) the size of
the circuit C.
As defined above, FHE can be obtained from any secure encryption
scheme by an algorithm Evaluate that attaches a description of the circuit C
to the ciphertext tuple, and a Decrypt procedure that first decrypts all the
ciphertexts and then evaluates C on the corresponding plaintext bits. Two
properties of homomorphic encryption, circuit-privacy and compactness,
avoid this solution.
Definition 4. The scheme E = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Evaluate) is
compact if there exists a fixed polynomial bound b(λ) so that for any
key-pair (sk, pk) output by KeyGen(λ), any circuit C and any sequence of
ciphertext c = (c1, . . . , ct) that was generated with respect to pk, the size of
the ciphertext Evaluate(pk, C, c) is not more than b(λ) bits (independently
of the size of C).
Moreover, we want that a FHE scheme is efficient also in the evaluation
step, i.e. the complexity of Evaluate must depend only polynomially on the
security parameter. Therefore, two extra requirements must be satisfied in
order to have a FHE scheme:
• Decrypting ce (the ciphertext output by EvaluateE) must take the
same amount of computation as decrypting c (a ciphertext output
by EncryptE). Moreover, we require that ce has the same size as c
(compact ciphertext requirement).
The size of ce, as well as the time needed to decrypt it are completely
independent of f , the evaluation function. Also the complexities of
DecryptE ,KeyGenE and EncryptE , are polynomial in λ.
24 Notation and Standard Definitions
• The EvaluateE step must be efficient, as follows (see [38]). Let Sf be
the size of a boolean circuit that computes f . Then EvaluateE is said
to be efficient if there is a polynomial g such that, for any function f
that is represented by a circuit of size Sf , EvaluateE(pk, f, c1 . . . , ct)
has complexity at most Sf · g(λ).
3.2.1 From SHE to FHE
All FHE schemes today follow the same blueprint of the scheme developed
by Gentry in 2009 [37]. Let E = (KeyGen,Encrypt,Decrypt,Evaluate) be
an homomorphic encryption scheme. For a given λ, a secret key sk and
two ciphertexts c1, c2, the set of augmented decryption circuits consists of
the following two circuits:
Cadd(sk, c1, c2) := Decrypt(sk, c1) + Decrypt(sk, c2) mod 2
Cmult(sk, c1, c2) := Decrypt(sk, c1) · Decrypt(sk, c2) mod 2
We denote this set by DE(λ) := (Cadd, Cmult). Now, for every value of the
security parameter λ let CE(λ) be a set of circuits with respect to which E
is correct. We say that E is bootstrappable if DE(λ) ⊆ CE(λ) holds for every
λ. In other words, a SHE scheme is bootstrappable if it can evaluate DE(λ);
that is, it is able to evaluate its own decryption function plus an additional
operation. This means the decryption function of the SHE scheme can be
expressed as polynomial of degree low enough to be handled within the
homomorphic capacity of the SHE scheme, with enough capacity left over
to evaluate a NAND gate.
Gentry’s blueprint comes in three points.
1. We build a SHE scheme.
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2. If the SHE is already bootstrappable, go to point (3). Otherwise,
we make it bootstrappable by squashing the decryption circuit of
the SHE scheme: we transform the scheme into one with the same
homomorphic capacity but a decryption circuit that is simple enough
to allow bootstrapping. Gentry showed a way to do this by adding
a ’hint’ about the secret key to the evaluation key: a sparse set of
values, a (secret) subset of which sums up to the secret key.
3. To obtain a FHE, there exists a bootstrapping theorem which states
that given a bootstrappable SHE scheme, one can transform it into
a leveled FHE scheme. Moreover, if the bootstrappable scheme is
semantically secure, then also the leveled FHE is. See [37] for further
details.
Furthermore, if the scheme satisfies circular security (which allow
to safely encrypt the leveled FHE secret key under its own public
key) - we obtain a pure (and not just leveled) FHE scheme. Boot-
strapping “refreshes” a ciphertext by running the decryption function
on it homomorphically, using an encrypted secret key (given in the
evaluation key; it is the hint generated in the squashing step). This
re-encryption process produces a new, more compact and less noisy
encryption of the original plaintext; this way, the ciphertext can be
evaluated in more additions and multiplications without making the
noise grow too much.
We remark that the squashing step introduces a new hardness assumption,
and therefore one might want to avoid this. It turns out that the squashing
step is not necessary, and indeed in [15, 39] the authors are able to avoid
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it. It is also possible to obtain a leveled FHE without the bootstrapping
step, see [12].
3.3 Security Definitions
We now define the main security notions used in the cryptographic schemes.
There exist several security definitions, but for FHE schemes normally one
is concerned mainly with IND-CPA and IND-CCA1 security. We do not
focus on IND-CCA2 security since it cannot be satisfied by FHE schemes.
We cover also key-recovery attacks.
The security of a public-key encryption scheme in terms of indistin-
guishability is normally presented as a game between a challenger and an
adversary A = (A1,A2). The scheme is considered secure if no adversary
can win the game with significantly greater probability than an adversary
who must guess randomly. The game runs in two stages:
• (pk, sk)← KeyGen(1λ)
• (m0,m1)← A(·)1 (pk) /* Stage 1 */
• b← {0, 1}
• c∗ ← Encrypt(mb, pk)
• b′ ← A(·)2 (c∗) /* Stage 2 */
The adversary is said to win the game if b = b′, with the advantage of the
adversary winning the game being defined by
AdvIND-atkA,E,λ = |Pr(b = b′)− 1/2|
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A scheme is said to be IND-atk secure if no polynomial time adversary
A can win the above game with non-negligible advantage in the security
parameter λ. The precise security notion one obtains depends on the oracle
access one gives the adversary in its different stages:
• If A has access to no oracles in either stage then atk=CPA (indistin-
guishability under chosen plaintext attack)
• If A has access to a decryption oracle in stage one then atk=CCA1
(indistinguishability under non-adaptive chosen ciphertext attack)
• If A has access to a decryption oracle in both stages then atk=CCA2,
often now denoted simply CCA (indistinguishability under adaptive
chosen ciphertext attack)
• If A has access to a ciphertext validity oracle in both stages, which
on input of a ciphertext determines whether it would output ⊥ or
not on decryption, then atk=CVA.
We have
IND-CCA2⇒ IND-CCA1⇒ IND-CPA
According to the definition, in order to show that a scheme is not
IND-CCA1 secure, we only need to show that an adversary can guess the
bit b with a non-negligible advantage given access to the decryption oracle
in Stage 1. Formally, in a key recovery attack, an adversary can output the
private key given access to the decryption oracle in Stage 1. In comparison,
a key recovery attack is stronger than a typical IND-CCA1 attack, and
can result in more serious vulnerabilities in practice.
A key recovery attack allows an attacker to recover the private key
of an underlying encryption scheme when given a number of decryption
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oracle accesses. In the literature, all SHE schemes have been developed
with the aim of being IND-CPA secure (resistant against a chosen-plaintext
attack). In [37], Gentry emphasized it as a future work to investigate
SHE schemes with IND-CCA1 security (i.e. secure against a non-adaptive
chosen-ciphertext attack). Up to now, the only scheme proven IND-
CCA1 secure is that by Loftus et al. [54], but it relies on some non-
standard knowledge assumptions (see [54], for details). Most works in this
direction focus on devising attacks against existing SHE schemes. Our
main contribution is to show that most existing SHE schemes suffer from
key recovery attacks, which allow an attacker to recover the private key
of an underlying encryption scheme when given a number of decryption
oracle accesses. It is clear that a key recovery attack is stronger than a
typical attack against IND-CCA1 security. At this moment, we have the
following results:
• No malleable cryptosystem (in particular, no SHE and FHE scheme)
can be IND-CCA2 secure. The reason is straightforward, based on
the fact that the adversary is allowed to manipulate the challenged
ciphertext, submit it to the decryption oracle in an IND-CCA2 attack,
and recover the plaintext.
• It is still unknown if there exists a FHE scheme which satisfy IND-
CCA1 security. However, we can already say that, if such a FHE
scheme exists, it cannot follow Gentry’s blueprint: any FHE scheme
that adopts Gentry’s bootstrapping technique cannot be CCA-1
secure, because the bootstrapping technique requires one to publish
the encryption of the secret keys: the private key is encrypted and
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the adversary is able to submit the ciphertext to the decryption
oracle.
• Loftus et al. [54] showed that Gentry’s SHE scheme [37] is not
IND-CCA1 secure and presented an IND-CCA1 attack against the
variation proposed in [40]. They also showed that the same attack
applies to the other variant by Smart and Vercauteren [71]. In fact,
the attacks are both key recovery attacks. Moreover, they modified
the SHE in [71] and proved its IND-CCA1 security based on a new
assumption.
In theory, IND-CPA security may be enough for us to construct cryp-
tographic protocols, in particular if we assume semi-honest attackers.
However, key recovery attacks will pose serious threat for practical usage
of SHE and FHE. If a malicious attacker submits manipulated ciphertexts
and observes the behavior (side channel leakage) of the decryptor, then it
may be able to recover all plaintexts in the system. Therefore, it is very
desirable to design SHE and FHE with IND-CCA1 security, or at least to
avoid key recovery attacks.
It is interesting to consider also security in the context of Plaintext
Awareness, introduced by Bellare and Rogaway [6] in the random oracle
model, and later refined into the security notions PA-0, PA-1 and PA-2
by Bellare and Palacio [5]. Intuitively a scheme is said to be PA if the
only way an adversary is able to create a valid ciphertext is by applying
encryption to a public key and a valid message. In [5] it is proven that if a
scheme is PA-1 (resp. PA-2) and at the same time IND-CPA, then it is
actually secure against IND-CCA1 (resp. IND-CCA2) attacks. Plaintext
awareness can be also explained intuitively by considering that if the
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adversary knows the plaintext underlying each ciphertext it produces, then
he has no need for a decryption oracle. Therefore, PA and IND-CPA must
imply IND-CCA1.
The advantage of the results of [5] is that we work in the standard
model to prove security of a scheme; however, this comes with the price
that we need to make a strong assumption to prove a scheme is PA-1
or PA-2. The assumption required is a so-called knowledge assumption.
For example, in the context of encryption schemes supporting a single
homomorphic operation, the authors of [5] show that the Cramer-Shoup
Lite scheme [25] and an ElGamal variant introduced by Damgard [27] are
both PA-1, and hence IND-CCA1, assuming the standard DDH (to obtain
IND-CPA security) and a Diffie-Hellman knowledge assumption (to obtain
PA-1 security). (Informally, the Diffie-Hellman knowledge assumption
is the assumption that an algorithm can only output a Diffie-Hellman
tuple if the algorithm ”knows” the discrete logarithm of one-tuple member
with respect to another.) See [5] for details, or e.g. [54] for a high-level
explanation. In [54], the authors follow work from [5] in order to show
that a variation of the Smart-Vercauteren SHE scheme [71] achieves PA1
security, therefore showing that the scheme achieves PA1 + CPA ⇒ CCA1
security. We will come back to this in a later section.
3.3.1 Circuit Privacy
An important requirement for a FHE scheme is that EncryptE and EvaluateE
have the same output distribution (computationally indistinguishable).
This is called circuit privacy: roughly, this means that the ciphertext
output of EvaluateE reveals nothing about the circuit C that it evaluates
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beyond the output value of that circuit, even for someone who knows the
secret key.
Definition 5. A homomorphic encryption scheme E is circuit-private for
given circuits in CE if, for any pair of keys (sk, pk) output by KeyGenE(λ),
any circuit C ∈ CE , and any fixed ciphertexts c1, . . . , ct that are in the
image of EncryptE for plaintexts m1, . . . ,mt the following distributions are
computationally indistinguishable:
EncryptE(pk, C(m1, . . . ,mt)) ≈ EvaluateE(pk, C, (c1, . . . , ct))
3.3.2 Circular Security: A Special Case of KDM Se-
curity.
Circular security is required in order to obtain FHE from SHE. It is a
special case of the more general notion of key dependent message (KDM)
security. Informally, an encryption scheme is KDM secure if an adversary
cannot distinguish the encryption of a key-dependent message from an
encryption of 0. Let n > 0 be an integer and let F be a finite set of
functions F := {f : Sn → M} For each function f ∈ F we require
that |f(z)| is the same for all inputs z ∈ Sn (i.e. the output length is
independent of the input).
KDM security is defined with respect to F using the following game
that takes place between a challenger and an adversary A [8]. For an
integer n > 0 and a security parameter λ the game proceeds as follows.
• The challenger chooses a random bit b $← {0, 1}. It generates
(pk1, sk1), . . . , (pkn, skn) by running KeyGen n times, and sends the
vector (pk1, . . . , pkn) to A
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• The adversary repeatedly issues queries where each query is of the
form (i, f) with 1 ≤ i ≤ n and f ∈ C. The challenger responds by
setting
y ← f(sk1, . . . , skn) ∈M and c $←

Encrypt(pki, y) if b = 0
Encrypt(pki, 0|y|) if b = 1
and sends c to A
• Finally, the adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}
We say that A is a F -KDM adversary and that A wins the game if b = b′.
Define A′s advantage as
AdvKDM(n)A,E,λ := |Pr(b = b′)− 1/2|
Chapter 4
General Introduction to Existing SHE
and FHE Schemes
As we mentioned, the SHE schemes (and by extension, the FHE schemes)
can be categorized into four main families of schemes, according to the
hardness assumptions they rely on (see Figure 4.1). In this chapter we are
going to investigate in more detail these hardness assumptions. We also
describe somehow informally in Section 4.2 the idea behind the original
FHE scheme [37], and the variation made by [71, 40].
After Gentry’s work, many SHE and FHE schemes have been proposed.
Based on the underlying hardness assumptions, these schemes can be
categorized and divided in four categories, as follows.1
(1) The first category starts with Gentry [36, 37]. A number of variations,
optimizations and implementations appear in [71, 40]. The security
of these schemes are based on hard problems on lattices, more
specifically on ideal lattices. These are the initial schemes, that still
1It is worth mentioning that Nuida [65] proposed a new framework for noise-free FHE,
based on finite non-commutative groups. This is completely different from everything
appeared in literature so far, since the ciphertext in all known schemes carry some noise.
Nevertheless, a secure instantiation has yet to be found.
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depend on the hard lattice problems, like the Sparse Subset Sum
Problem (SSSP).
(2) The second category starts with van Dijk et al. [75]. More variants,
implementation and optimizations appear in [23, 24, 20]. The security
of these schemes rely on the approximate greatest common divisor
(AGCD) problem and some variants. These schemes are based on
integers, and they are the simplest to understand.
(3) The third category starts with Brakerski and Vaikuntanathan [15,
14]. More variants appear in [61, 12, 42, 11, 44]. The security of
these schemes are based on the learning with errors (LWE) and
on the ring-learning with errors (RLWE) problems. These schemes
bring new concepts and allow better constructions in practice. We
have also asymptotically better constructions that are based on the
approximate eigenvector method [44, 16].
(4) The fourth category of schemes is based on the NTRU encryption
scheme [48]. In [55] it is shown how to obtain a homomorphic
encryption scheme in a multi-user setting, introducing the notion of
multi-key homomorphic encryption where it is possible to compute
any function on plaintexts encrypted under multiple public keys.
The multi-key FHE of [55] is based on the NTRU scheme [48] and
on ideas introduced in [12]. NTRU-based schemes permit to obtain
ciphertexts that correspond to just one ring element, simplifying
previous schemes. NTRU-based SHE offers the possibility of encoding
integers in a natural way, that can be used to solve practical problems
such as statistical applications [51, 10].
See Fig. 4.1 for a graphical visualization of the main families.
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4.1 Hardness Assumptions
Before going any further, we list the hardness assumptions that rely on
the homomorphic schemes that we are going to discuss in the next section.
(See figure 4.1.)
4.1.1 Approximate Greatest Common Divisor (AGCD)
This hardness assumption is found in the family of schemes started by van
Dijk, Gentry, Halevi and Vaikuntanathan (the DGHV10 scheme [75]). For
a specific (η-bit) odd positive integer p, and an integer ρ (the size of the
noise), consider the following distribution over γ-bit integers:
Dγ,ρ(p) = {choose q $← Z∩[0, 2γ/p), r $← Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = pq+r}
Definition 6 ((ρ, η, γ)-approximate GCD). Given polynomially many
samples from Dγ,ρ(p) for a randomly chosen η-bit odd integer p, output p.
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Here the goal is to recover a secret number p (typically a large prime
number), given polynomially many near-multiples x0, . . . , xm of p, that
is, each integer xi is of the hidden form xi = pqi + ri where each qi is
a very large integer and each ri is a very small integer. The hardness
of approximate integer common divisors problems, was introduced in
2001 by Howgrave-Graham. Several lattice-based approaches have been
developed in order to solve the approximate GCD problem. All attacks
are very inefficient if we choose the parameters wisely; namely whenever
#bits(qi)≫ #bits(p)2.
In [23], the authors use a partial version of this problem (PACD): here,
the setting is exactly the same, except that x0 is chosen as an exact multiple
of p, namely x0 = pq0 where q0 is a very large integer chosen such that no
non-trivial factor of x0 can be found efficiently: for instance, they select q0
as a rough number, i.e. without any small prime factor. More precisely, let
p be a η-bit prime integer, and let q0 a be a random square-free 2λ-rough
integer in [0, 2γ/p). Consider
D′ρ(p, q0) = {q $← Z∩[0, q0), r $← Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = pq+r} ⊆ Dγ,ρ(p)
Definition 7 (Error-free (ρ, η, γ)-approximate GCD). Given x0 := q0 · p
and polynomially many samples from D′ρ(p, q0), output p.
The version in [23] was used to build a more efficient variant of the
DGHV10 FHE scheme. In [17], Y. Chen and P.Q. Nguyen presented a new
PACD algorithm whose running time is 2ρ/2 polynomial-time operations,
which is essentially the square root of that of GCD exhaustive search
(which at the time was the best attack available). This directly leads to a
new GACD algorithm running in 23ρ/2 polynomial-time operations, and
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allowed them to experimentally break the FHE challenges proposed in
[23].2
4.1.2 Lattice-Based Assumptions
Lattice-based primitives are interesting because:
• their security can be based on
worst-case hardness assump-
tions;
• they appear to remain secure
even against quantum comput-
ers;
• they can be quite efficient;
• for FHE no other crypto-
graphic assumption is known
to suffice.
Lattice problems are in general easy to solve if the algorithm is provided
with a “good” basis (see definition later). Lattice reduction algorithms aim,
given a basis for a lattice, to output a new basis consisting of relatively
short, nearly orthogonal vectors. The LLL algorithm [52] was an early
efficient algorithm for this problem which could output an almost reduced
lattice basis in polynomial time. In the late 1990s, several new results
on the hardness of lattice problems were obtained; e.g. Ajtai [1] found a
2The AGCD problem was first studied by Howgrave-Graham [49]. In that paper, as
well as in [75], several possible lattice attacks on this problem were listed, including using
orthogonal lattices and the so-called Coppersmith’s method. Further cryptanalytic
work was done by [17, 22, 24] and, more recently, by J. Ding and C. Tao in [30]: here
the authors propose a new algorithm for solving the general approximate common
divisors (GACD) problems, which is based on lattice reduction algorithms on certain
special lattices and linear equation solving algorithms over integers. They propose an
algorithm which can solve the problem with some special parameters in polynomial
time.
However, for general parameters the AGCD problem and its variants are still believed
to be hard. See [33] for a survey on the topic and a comparison on the known lattice
algorithms for the AGCD problem.
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surprising worst-case/average-case connection for certain lattice problems.
In particular, two lattice-based public-key cryptosystems were published:
the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem (AD) [2] and the Goldreich-Goldwasser-
Halevi cryptosystem (GGH) [45]:
AD: It is provably secure unless a worst-case lattice problem (a variant of
the SVP, see later) can be solved in probabilistic polynomial time.
GGH: It relies on the CVP (see later).
There is no proven worst-case/average-case property for the GGH, but it
is more practical than AD: given the security parameter λ, key-size and
encryption times are O(λ2) and O(λ4) for GGH and AD respectively.
Nguyen showed in [63] that the GGH cryptosystem is insecure: any
ciphertext reveals information on the plaintext, and decrypting ciphertexts
can be reduced to a particular CVP, easier than the general one. He was
able to solve four out of five numerical challenges proposed by the authors
of [45]; they also proposed a modified secure scheme, but impractical.
We start by recalling some notions from lattice theory. For more details
see, for instance, [64]. A lattice of Rn is a discrete subgroup of (Rn,+).
Let b1, . . . ,bm be arbitrary vectors in Rm. Denote by L(b1, . . . ,bm) the
set of all integral linear combinations of the bi’s: Λ := L(b1, . . . ,bm) =
{∑mi=1 nibi : ni ∈ Z}. Λ is a lattice if bi ∈ Qn, ∀i or bi ∈ Rn are linearly
independent. When Λ = L(b1, . . . ,bm) is a lattice, we say that Λ is
spanned by the bi’s, and that the bi’s are generators. When the bi’s are
further linearly independent, we say that (b1, . . . ,bm) is a basis of the
lattice Λ. In practice, we will usually restrict to integral lattices, so that
the underlying matrices are integral matrices. The dimension or rank of a
lattice Λ in Rn, denoted by dim(Λ), is the dimension d of its linear span
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denoted by span(Λ). The lattice is said to be full-rank when d = n: in the
following, we will consider only full-rank lattices (dimension n). It can be
shown that |det(Bi)| is constant for all basis Bi of Λ, and we call it the
determinant det(Λ) of Λ. To a basis B of a lattice Λ it can be associated
the half-open parallelepiped
P(B) = {
n∑
i=1
xibi : xi ∈ [−1/2, 1/2)}
P(B) is called the fundamental parallelepiped associated to B. Moreover,
every element of Rn/Λ has a unique representative in P(B). We have that
vol(P(B)) =det(Λ).
In lattice problems it is particular important a specific basis of a lattice,
the so called Hermite normal form (HNF) basis. Every full-rank lattice
has a unique HNF basis: a non-singular square matrix H = (hi,j) with
integer entries is in HNF if
• H is lower triangular: hi,j = 0 for all i < j
• its diagonal entries, are positive: hi,i > 0 for all i,
• in a given column, the entries below the diagonal are non-negative
and less than the diagonal: for j > i, hi,i > hj,i ≥ 0.
Given any basis B of Λ, one can compute HNF(Λ) efficiently via
Gaussian elimination. Given a specific basis B of a lattice Λ, in lattice
problems often one is asked to reduce a vector c ∈ Rn modulo this basis;
we denote it with c mod B. It is the unique vector c′ ∈ P(B) such that
c− c′ ∈ Λ. Given c and B, c′ mod B can be computed efficiently as
c− ⌊c ·B−1⌉ ·B = [c ·B−1] ·B
40 General Introduction to Existing SHE and FHE Schemes
In lattice problems, shortest vectors are of central importance. The
length of the shortest nonzero vector in a lattice Λ is denoted λ1(Λ).
Generalizing, one can define the successive minima: for any lattice Λ and
integer k ≤ rank(Λ), let λk(Λ) be the smallest r > 0 such that Λ contains
at least k linearly independent vectors of length bounded by r.
Ideal Lattices
Gentry’s SHE scheme is a scheme over ideal lattices. Let f(x) be an integer
monic irreducible polynomial of degree n, e.g. f(x) = xn + 1, where n
is a power of 2. Let R be the ring of integer polynomials modulo f(x),
R
def= Z[x]/(f(x)).
Each element of R is a polynomial of degree at most n− 1, therefore it
can be associated to a coefficient vector in Zn: each element of R can be
viewed as being both a polynomial and a vector. For v(x), we let ||v|| be
the Euclidean norm of its coefficient vector.
Let I be an ideal of R, a subset of R that is closed under addition
and multiplication by elements of R. Since I is additively closed, the
coefficient vectors associated to elements of I form a lattice. I is called
an ideal lattice: it is both an algebraic ideal and a lattice. Ideals have
additive structure as lattices, but they also have multiplicative structure.
The product IJ of two ideals I and J is the additive closure of the set
{v × w : v ∈ I,w ∈ J}, where ’×’ is ring multiplication.The principal
ideal (v) generated by v ∈ R corresponds to the lattice generated by the
vectors {vi def= v× xi mod f(x) : i ∈ [0, n− 1]}; this is called the rotation
basis of the ideal lattice (v).
Let K be a field containing the ring R; e.g. K = Q[x]/(f(x)). The
inverse of an ideal I ⊆ R is I−1 = {w ∈ K : ∀v ∈ I,v × w ∈ R}. The
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inverse of a principal ideal (v) is given by (v−1), where the inverse v−1 is
taken in the field K.
Lattice Problems
The main problem in lattice theory is related to short vectors. We introduce
here a few fundamental problems; for more lattice problems, see [58].
• Shortest Vector Problem (SVP): Given a basis B ∈ Zm×n, find
a non-zero lattice vector Bx (with x ∈ Zn\{0}) such that ||Bx|| ≤
||By|| for any other y ∈ Zn\{0}.
• Approximate SVP: Given a lattice basis B find a non-zero lattice
vector of length at most γ · λ1(L(B)). The exact version of the
problem is obtained setting the approximation factor to γ = 1, and
asking for a vector of length λ1(L(B)).
• GapSVPβ : This problem consists of differentiating between the
instances of SVP in which the answer is at most 1 or larger than β,
where β can be a fixed function of n, the number of vectors. Given a
basis for the lattice, the algorithm must decide whether λ1(L(B)) ≤ 1
or λ1(L(B)) > β.
• Closest Vector Problem (CVP): Find a closest lattice point to
a given point in the ambient space. See [58] for a more detailed
description and variations.
• Bounded distance decoding problem (BDDP): Given a basis
B of lattice Λ, a vector c very close to some lattice point of Λ, the
aim is to find the closest point to c in Λ. In the promise problem
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γ-BDDP, we have a parameter γ > 1 and the promise that
dist(Λ, c) def= minv∈Λ{||c− v||} ≤ det(Λ)1/n/γ
(BDDP is often defined with respect to λ1 rather than with respect
to det(Λ)1/n.)
• Small Principal Ideal Problem (SPIP): Given a principal ideal
in either Hermite Normal Form or its two element representation
(see Section 4.2.4), of finding a ’small’ generator for it. If the SPIP is
sufficiently hard, that would thwart a key recovery attack, wherein
an adversary who knows the public key tries to find the secret key.
• Polynomial Coset Problem (PCP): [71] The problem of distin-
guishing between a random element of Z/dZ and an element of the
form f(r) mod d, where f(x) ∈ Z[x] is random (and unknown) with
small coefficients and r is the common root of F (x) and v(x) mod d
(in the notation of Section 4.2.4).
• Sparse Subset-Sum Problem (SSSP):Gentry, Smart-Vercauteren
and Gentry-Halevi bootstrap their SHE schemes into FHE schemes
using a re-encryption algorithm. Making this cryptographically se-
cure requires an additional security assumption, namely the difficulty
of a decisional version of the SSSP, i.e., it should be difficult to
distinguish between random subsets of Z/dZ and those that have
sparse subsets that sum to 0. Here, bootstrapping augments the
public key with a hint about the secret key, namely, with a large set
of vectors that has a very sparse subset that sums to the secret key.
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4.1.3 The Learning with Errors (LWE) problem
All recent lattice-based cryptographic schemes are based on one of two
natural average-case problems that have worst-case hardness guarantees:
the short integer solution (SIS) problem (which we are not going to discuss
here; see [1]) and the learning with errors (LWE) problem.
The LWE problem was first proposed by Regev in [68], and can be
described as follows. Consider a vector s ∈ Znq , and a probability distribu-
tion χ on Zq, let As,χ be the distribution obtained by choosing a vector
a $← Znq uniformly at random and a noise term e ← χ, and outputting
(a, < a, s > +e) ∈ Znq × Zq.
Definition 8 (LWE Problem). For an integer q = q(n) and an error
distribution χ = χ(n) over Zq, the learning with errors problem LWEn,m,q,χ
is defined as follows: given m independent samples from As,χ (for some
s ∈ Znq ), output s with noticeable probability.
The (average-case) decision variant of the LWE problem, denoted
DLWEn,m,q,χ, is to distinguish (with non-negligible advantage) m sam-
ples chosen according to As,χ (for uniformly random s $← Znq ), from m
samples chosen according to the uniform distribution over Znq × Zq. We
denote by DLWEn,q,χ the variant where the adversary gets oracle access to
As,χ, and is not a-priori bounded in the number of samples.
For cryptographic applications, one is primarily interested in the average
case decision problem DLWE, where s $← Znq . There are known quantum
[68] and classical [67] reductions between DLWEn,m,q,χ and approximating
short vector problems in lattices. See also [13] for further details.
We only note here that the best known algorithms for these problems
run in time nearly exponential in the dimension n [3, 60]. More generally,
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the best algorithms that approximate these problems to within a factor of
2k run in time 2
∼
O(n/k).
4.1.4 The Ring-Learning with Errors (RLWE) prob-
lem
Let R be a ring. Intuitively, the Ring-LWE Problem is to find s, given
polynomially many (ai, bi) ∈ R× R with bi = ais+ ei where the ai’s are
uniformly random in R, s is random in R, and the ei’s are ’small’ in R. In
the decisional version of Ring-LWE, one needs to distinguish such ordered
pairs (ai, bi) from uniformly random (ai, ui) ∈ R×R.
For our purposes, we describe a variant of the ring learning with errors
assumption of Lyubaskevsky, Peikert and Regev [56], called polynomial
LWE (or, PLWE). This is the hardness assumption used in [14]. Breaking
the PLWE assumption leads to an algorithm to solve worst-case ideal
lattice problems.
Definition 9 (The PLWE Assumption - Hermite Normal Form). For all
k ∈ N, let f(x) = fk(x) ∈ Z[x] be a polynomial of degree n = n(k), let
q = q(k) ∈ Z be a prime integer, let the ring R := Z[x]/ < f(x) > and
Rq := R/qR, and let χ denote a distribution over the ring R.
The polynomial LWE assumption PLWEf,q,χ states that for any l =poly(k)
it holds that
{(ai, ai · s+ ei)}i∈[l] c≈ {(ai, ui)}i∈[l]
where s is sampled from the noise distribution χ, ai are uniform in Rq,
the ”error polynomials” ei are sampled from the error distribution χ, and
finally, the ring elements ui are uniformly random over Rq.
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Notice that the PLWE assumption is defined as a decisional assumption.
One could also define the search assumption which requires an adversary
to find s ∈ Rq, given any polynomial number of samples (ai, ai · s + ei).
The search and decisional assumptions are equivalent for some range of
parameters, as shown in [56].
4.1.5 The General Learning with Errors (GLWE) Prob-
lem
For completeness, following [12] we report here the GLWE Problem. The
LWE and the RLWE problems are syntactically identical, aside from using
different rings (Z versus a polynomial ring) and different vector dimensions
over those rings (n = poly(λ) for LWE, but n is constant - namely, 1 - in
the RLWE case). A General Learning with Errors (GLWE) Problem is
introduced to simplify discussion and describe a single GLWE- based FHE
scheme, rather than presenting essentially the same scheme twice, once for
each of the two concrete instantiations. (This will be used in the scheme
[12].)
Definition 10 (GLWE). For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ) be an
integer dimension, let f(x) = xd + 1 where d = d(λ) is a power of 2, let
q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be a prime integer, let R = Z[x] = (f(x)) and Rq = R/qR,
and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is to
distinguish the following two distributions:
• one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from Rn+1q .
• one first draws s← Rnq uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ Rn+1q by
sampling ai ← Rnq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi =< ai, s > +ei.
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The GLWEn,f,q,χ assumption is that the GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is simply GLWE instantiated with d = 1. RLWE is GLWE instan-
tiated with n = 1. Interestingly, as far as we know, instances of GLWE
between these extremes have not been explored. One would suspect that
GLWE is hard for any (n, d) such that n · d = Ω(λ log (q/B)), where B
is a bound (with overwhelming probability) on the length of elements
output by χ. For fixed n · d, perhaps GLWE gradually becomes harder as
n increases (if it is true that general lattice problems are harder than ideal
lattice problems), whereas increasing d is probably often preferable for
efficiency.
The GLWE assumption implies that the distribution {(ai, < ai, s >
+t ·ei)} is computational indistinguishable from uniform for any t relatively
prime to q. This fact is convenient for encryption, where, for example,
a message m may be encrypted as (a, < a, s > +2e + m), and this
fact can be used to argue that the second component of this message is
indistinguishable from random.
4.1.6 NTRU
NTRU is a patented and open source public-key cryptosystem that uses
lattice-based cryptography to encrypt and decrypt data. It consists of two
algorithms: NTRUEncrypt, which is used for encryption, and NTRUSign,
which is used for digital signatures. Unlike other popular public-key
cryptosystems, it is resistant to attacks using Shor’s algorithm and its
performance has been shown to be significantly better.
The first version of the system, which was called NTRU, was developed
in 1996 by J. Hoffstein, J. Pipher, and J.H. Silverman [48]. That same
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year, the developers of NTRU joined with D. Lieman and founded the
NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc., and were given a patent on the cryptosystem.
In 2013, D. Stehle and R. Steinfeld created [74] a provably secure version
of NTRU [48] which is being studied by a post quantum crypto group
chartered by the European Commission. We describe here this version
from [74].
For a security parameter λ, the scheme is parametrized by the following
quantities:
• an integer n = n(λ),
• a prime number q = q(λ),
• a degree-n polynomial φ(x) = φλ(x),
• a B(λ)-bounded error distribution χ = χ(λ) over the ring R def=
Z[x]/(φ(x)).
The parameters n, q, φ(x) and χ are public and we assume that given
λ, there are polynomial-time algorithms that output n, q and φ(x), and
sample from the error distribution χ. The message space is M = {0, 1},
and all operations on ciphertexts are carried out in the ring Rq (i.e. modulo
q and φ(x)). The algorithms of the encryption schemes are as follows.
• Keygen(λ): Sample polynomials f ′, g ← χ and set f := 2f ′ + 1 so
that f ≡ 1 mod 2. If f is not invertible in Rq, resample f ′. Set
pk := h = 2gf−1 ∈ Rq, sk := f ∈ R
• Enc(pk,m): Sample polynomials s, e← χ. Output the ciphertext
c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq
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where all operations are done modulo q and φ(x).
• Dec(sk, c) : Let µ = fc ∈ Rq. Output m′ := µ mod 2.
It is easily seen that this scheme is correct as long as there is no wrap-around
modulo q. To decrypt a ciphertext c, we compute in Rq:
fc = fhs+ 2fe+ fm = 2gs+ 2fe+ fm
If there is no wrap-around modulo q then
fc mod 2 = 2gs+ 2fe+ fm mod 2 = fm mod 2 = m
One possible setting which ensures that there is no wrap-around modulo
q is to set φ(x) = xn + 1. To see why this helps, notice that since the
coefficients of g, s, f, e are all bounded by 2B + 1 (the coefficients of g, s
and e are bounded by B and that of f is bounded by 2B + 1). We can
say that the coefficients of gs (mod xn + 1) and fe (mod xn + 1) are
both bounded by n(2B + 1)2. Thus, the coefficients of fc are bounded
by 4n(2B + 1)2 + B < 36nB2 < q/2. In other words, as long as we set
q > 72nB2, a fresh ciphertext generated by Enc is guaranteed to decrypt
correctly. From here on, we refer to µ = fc ∈ Rq as the error in a
ciphertext c.
For more details and for the security analysis of this scheme, we refer
to [74] or [55].
Remark 1. D. Bernstein, T. Lange et al. released in 2016 NTRU Prime
[7] which adds defenses against potential attacks to NTRU by eliminating
some worrisome algebraic structure. At equivalent cryptographic strength,
we know that NTRU performs costly operations on the private key much
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faster than RSA does. The time of performing an RSA private operation
increases as the cube of the key size, whereas that of an NTRU operation
increases in a quadratic way.3
4.2 Lattice Based FHE Schemes
Following exposition in [40], we are going now to describe shortly Gentry’s
original scheme [37], and then we will proceed describing a few variations
made by Smart-Vercauteren [71] and Gentry-Halevi [40].
4.2.1 First Approach: Lattice-based Cryptosystems
We start by describing a typical construction for a lattice-based encryption
scheme, the GGH lattice-based cryptosystem [45] in the improved version of
Micciancio [57]; Gentry’s scheme is based on the same idea. Given a lattice
Λ, the secret and public keys are a ”good” and a ”bad” base (respectively)
of Λ. Namely, a good basis Bsk consists of short, ”nearly orthogonal”
vectors, while the public key is the HNF of Λ, Bpk def= HNF(L(Bsk)). (See
Figure 4.2.)
3There are other reasons for considering NTRU cryptography as a good candidate
for post-quantum cryptography. Unlike RSA and Elliptic Curve Cryptography, NTRU
is not known to be vulnerable to quantum computer based attacks. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology wrote in a 2009 survey that among the viable
alternatives for both public key encryption and signatures that are not vulnerable to
Shor’s Algorithm, the NTRU family of cryptographic algorithms appears to be the most
practical. The European Union’s PQCRYPTO project (Horizon 2020 ICT-645622) is
evaluating the provably secure Stehle–Steinfeld version of NTRU (not original NTRU
algorithm itself) as a potential European standard. However the Stehle-Steinfeld version
[74] of NTRU is significantly less efficient than the original scheme.
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Fig. 4.2 Good and bad bases
A ciphertext in a GGH-type cryptosystem is a vector c close to the
lattice L(Bpk), and plaintext message is embedded in the distance from c
to the closest lattice vector. To encrypt a message m, the sender chooses
a short error vector e that encodes m, and then computes the ciphertext
as c← e mod Bpk. To decrypt, one recovers e with e← c mod Bsk, and
then recovers m from e.
The idea behind the correctness is that the fundamental parallelepiped
P(Bsk) related to the secret key is a “full rounded shape” parallelepiped
that contains a sphere of radius bigger than ||e||, so that e is the point inside
P(Bsk) that equals c modulo Λ. On the other hand, the parallelepiped
P(Bpk) related to the public key is very skewed, and does not contain a
sphere of large radius, making it useless for solving BDDP.
4.2.2 Gentry’s Scheme
We are going to present the scheme at a high level; see the original paper
[37] for details. Gentry’s SHE scheme can be seen as a GGH-type scheme
over ideal lattices. The public key consists of a bad basis Bpk of an ideal
lattice J , along with some basis BI of a “small” ideal I (which is used to
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embed messages into the error vectors). For example, the small ideal I
can be taken to be I = (2), the set of vectors with all even coefficients.
A ciphertext in Gentry’s scheme is a vector close to a J-point, with
the message being embedded in the distance to the nearest lattice point.
More specifically, the plaintext space is {0, 1}, which is embedded in
R/I = {0, 1}n by encoding 0 as 0n and 1 as 0n−11. For an encoded bit
m ∈ {0, 1}n we set e = 2r +m for a random small vector r, and then
output the ciphertext c← e mod Bpk.
The secret key in Gentry’s scheme (that plays the role of the ’good
basis’ of J) is just a short vector w ∈ J−1. Decryption involves computing
the fractional part [w× c]. Since c = j+ e for some j ∈ J , then w× c =
w × j + w × e. But w × j is in R and thus an integer vector, so w × c
and w× e have the same fractional part, [w× c] = [w× e]. If w and e
are short enough - in particular, if we have the guarantee that all of the
coefficients of w× e have magnitude less than 1/2 - then [w× e] equals
w× e exactly. From w× e, the decryptor can multiply by w−1 to recover
e, and then recover m← e mod 2. The actual decryption procedure from
[37] is slightly different, however. Specifically, w is ”tweaked” so that
decryption can be implemented as m← c− [w× c] mod 2 (when I = (2)).
4.2.3 Gentry’s Fully Homomorphic Scheme
The scheme is SHE: given two ciphertexts c1 = j1 + e1 and c2 = j2 + e2,
their sum is j3 + e3 where j3 = j1 + j2 ∈ J and e3 = e1 + e2 is small.
Similarly, their product is j4+e4 where j4 = j1× (j2+e2)+e1× j2 ∈ J and
e4 = e1 × e2 is still small. Gentry’s SHE scheme can evaluate low-degree
polynomials but not more. Once the degree (or the number of terms)
is too large, the error vector e grows beyond the decryption capability
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of the private key. Gentry solved this problem using bootstrapping: in
[37] he showed that a scheme that can homomorphically evaluate its own
decryption circuit plus one additional operation, can be transformed into
a fully-homomorphic encryption. In more details, fix two ciphertexts c1, c2
and consider the functions
DAddc1,c2(sk)
def= Decsk(c1) +Decsk(c2)
DMulc1,c2(sk)
def= Decsk(c1)×Decsk(c2)
We said earlier that a SHE scheme is bootstrappable if it is capable of
homomorphically evaluating the functions DAddc1,c2 and DMulc1,c2 for any
two ciphertexts c1, c2. Given a bootstrappable scheme that is also circular
secure, it can be transformed into a fully-homomorphic scheme by adding
to the public key an encryption of the secret key, c∗ ← Encpk(sk). Then
given any two ciphertexts c1, c2, the addition/multiplication of these two
ciphertexts can be computed by homomorphically evaluating the functions
DAddc1,c2(c∗) or DMulc1,c2(c∗).
This SHE scheme is not bootstrappable. Gentry showed how to squash
the decryption circuit, transforming the original SHE scheme E into a
scheme E∗ that can correctly evaluate any circuit that E can, but where
the complexity of E∗’s decryption circuit is much less than E’s. In the
original SHE scheme E, the secret key is a vector w. In the new scheme
E∗, the public key includes an additional ’hint’ about w - namely, a big
set of vectors S = {xi : i = 1, 2, . . . , S} that have a hidden sparse subset
T that adds up to w. The secret key of E∗ is the characteristic vector of
the sparse subset T , which is denoted σ =< σ1, σ2, . . . , σS >.
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Whereas decryption in the original scheme involved computing m←
c− [w× c] mod 2, in the new scheme the ciphertext c is ’post-processed’
by computing the products yi = xi × c for all of the vectors xi ∈ S. The
decryption in the new scheme can be done by computing c− [∑j σjyj ] mod
2, and this computation can be expressed as a polynomial in the σi’s of
degree roughly the size of the sparse subset T . With appropriate setting
of the parameters, the subset T can be made small enough to get a
bootstrappable scheme.
4.2.4 Variations of Gentry’s Scheme
We describe now two variations on Gentry’s SHE schemes. These are
• Smart and Vercauteren in [71]
• Gentry and Halevi in [40]
The [71] scheme has smaller message expansion and key size than Gentry’s
original scheme. The authors implemented the SHE scheme, but were not
able to implement the bootstrapping functionality. The authors of [40]
improved the scheme with, among others, a better key-generation method
for SHE scheme which reduces the asymptotic complexity from O˜(n5/2) to
O˜(n3/2) when working with dimension-n lattices (and practically reducing
the time from many hours/days to a few seconds/minutes). This allowed
them to implement all aspects of the scheme, including the bootstrapping
functionality.
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4.2.5 [SV10] and [GH11b] Variations
To simplify the presentation we present the two versions as schemes that
encrypt elements in the message space F2 = {0, 1}. Let also, for a positive
value t and integer N ,
B∞,N(t) :=
{
N−1∑
i=0
aix
i : −t ≤ ai ≤ t, ai ∈ Z
}
= {a(x) ∈ Z[x] s.t. ||a(x)||∞ ≤ t}
We will consider parameters (N, η, µ). Typically, N = 2n for some dimen-
sion n, η = 2
√
N and µ small integer, for instance µ = 1 (or in any case
µ ≤ √N).
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SV Scheme
KeyGen(1λ)
• choose a monic ir-
reducible polynomial
F (x) ∈ Z[x] of degree
N
• repeat:
– S(x) $← B∞,N(η/2)
– v(x)← 1 + 2 · S(x)
– d← resultant(v(x), F (x))
• until d is prime. Let
p := d.
• D(x) ←gcd(v(x), F (x))
over Fp[x]
• let r ∈ Fp denote the
unique root of D(x)
• compute w(x) =∑N−1
i=0 wix
i ∈ Z[x] s.t.
w(x)·v(x) = p mod F (x)
• B ← w0 mod 2p
• pk← (p, r, µ)
• sk← (p,B)
Encrypt(m, pk)
• u(x) $← B∞,N(µ/2)
• a(x)← m+ 2 · u(x)
• c← [a(r)]p
Decrypt(c, sk)
• m← (c− ⌊c ·B/p⌉) mod
2
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GH Scheme
KeyGen(1λ)
• choose a monic ir-
reducible polynomial
F (x) := xN + 1 ∈ Z[x]
• repeat:
– pick v(x) =∑N−1
i=0 vix
i $←
B∞,N(η/2)
– consider the matrix
V generated by v(x)
as given in (4.1)
– let d =det(V ) =
Resultant(v(x), F (x))
• until v(x) is a good gen-
erating polynomial. (We
consider v(x) to be good
if HNF(V ) has the same
form as in (4.2). It was
observed by N. Smart
that this happens if d is
odd and square-free.)
• let r be the unique com-
mon root of F (x) and
v(x) modulo d
• compute the polynomial
w(x) = ∑N−1i=0 wixi ∈
Z[x] such that w(x) ·
v(x) = d mod F (x)
• sk ← w, where w is one
of odd coefficients of w(x)
• pk← {r, d, µ}
Encrypt(m, pk, µ)
• generate a random
noise vector u :=
(u0, u1, . . . , uN−1), where
ui ≤ µ
• set a := 2u+m · e1
• let a = (a0, a1, . . . , aN−1)
• let a(x) := ∑N−1i=0 aixi
• let the ciphertext be the
integer c := [a(r)]d =
[m+ 2∑N−1i=1 uiri]d
Decrypt(c, sk)
• m← [c · w]d mod 2
4.2 Lattice Based FHE Schemes 57
For a vector v := (v0, . . . , vN−1), consider the matrix
V :=

v0 v1 · · · vN−1
−vN−1 v0 · · · vN−2
· · ·
−v1 −v2 · · · v0

∈MN(Z) (4.1)
Also, for d the unique common root of F (x) and v(x), letting ri = ri mod d,
the HNF of the ideal lattice J = (v) is
B = HNF(J) :=

d 0 0 · · · 0
−r1 1 0 · · · 0
... ... ... . . . ...
−rN−1 0 0 · · · 1

∈MN(Z) (4.2)
We remark that in [39], Gentry and Halevi build a bootstrappable
SHE by replacing the SSSP hardness assumption with the decision Diffie-
Hellman. Therefore, they achieve a leveled FHE scheme without the
squashing step; moreover, exactly as in Gentry’s blueprint, a pure FHE is
achieved by assuming circular security.
The authors of [71] also show how to obtain a FHE scheme from their
SHE scheme. See the original paper for further details.
Security
Gama and Nguyen performed several experiments with lattices in dimen-
sions 100-400 [34]. They concluded that for those dimensions it is feasible
to solve γ-BDDP when γ > 1.01n ≈ 2n/70. The best algorithms for solving
the γ-BDDP in n-dimensional lattices take time exponential in n/log γ:
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currently known algorithms can solve dimension-n γ-BDDP in time 2k up
to γ = 2
µn
k/log k , where µ is a parameter that depends on the exact details
of the algorithm. (Extrapolating from the Gama-Nguyen experiments,
µ ∈ [0.1, 0.2].)
The primary known attacks on FHE schemes are variants of the LLL
lattice basis reduction algorithm [52]. The security of almost all currently
known schemes is based on the presumed difficulty of some lattice problem,
such as finding an approximately shortest (non-zero) vector in a high
dimensional lattice.
As we saw, a number of FHE schemes use ideal lattices rather than
arbitrary lattices. Since these are very special lattices, it might turn out to
be the case that lattice attacks are easier for ideal lattices than for generic
lattices. This is an open question. At the moment, special attacks that
work better for ideal lattices than for general lattices are not yet known.
The security of these schemes is based on the simultaneous difficulty of
problems like SPIP, PCP, or SSSP.
Chapter 5
Key-Recovery Attacks against Existing
SHE Schemes
We present in this chapter the main contribution of our dissertation. In
Chapter 4 we learned under which hardness assumptions we divide the
known SHE schemes, and in Chapter 1 we saw what can be the impact
of a key-recovery attack on a SHE scheme that can be used in a real-case
scenario. We therefore describe here our key-recovery attacks.
Definition 11. Consider a scenario in which an attacker is attempting
a non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attack to a given SHE scheme. We say
that we can perform a successful key-recovery attack if we can completely
determine all the bits of the secret key sk.
5.1 Related Work
Our starting point is the work of [54], whose authors were the first to
observe key recovery attacks by showing that the SHE schemes falling in
the category (1) in Figure 4.1is vulnerable to such attacks.
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5.1.1 Initial Attempt
In 2011, Loftus, May, Smart and Vercauteren [54] showed that the basic
Gentry scheme [37] is not IND-CCA1; indeed a lunchtime attack allows
one to recover the secret key. They then showed that a minor modification
to the variant of the SHE scheme [71] of Smart and Vercauteren will allow
one to achieve IND-CCA1, indeed PA-1, in the standard model assuming
a lattice based knowledge assumption.
We informally present the attack; for the details of the attack, see [54].
The decryption algorithm is m← [c · w]d mod 2. This decryption will be
valid as long as c · w/d ≤ 1/2. Therefore, for a certain key set (w, d), the
maximum value c′ allowed is a fixed integer. The adversary picks several
different ’ciphertexts’, and pass them to the decryption oracle to check if
they can be decrypted correctly. Eventually, the attacker will recover the
threshold c′ which is the maximum integer that can be decrypted correctly.
Then it is easy for the attacker to recover w, the secret key.
Recovering the secret key will require O(log d) calls to the oracle. The
attack is highly efficient in practice and recovers keys in a matter of seconds
for all parameter sizes in [40].
To stop this attack, in [54] the authors proposed a ciphertext check
procedure. The ciphertext that is to be decrypted, will be disassembled
into the generating polynomial a(x). Recall that a(x) = m+ 2u(x), hence,
for valid ciphertexts, ||a(x)||∞ is bounded by a certain threshold smaller
than T - where T > 14 ||a(x)||∞ - while for invalid ’ciphertexts’ (i.e., integers
picked by attacker), the corresponding a(x) can have arbitrary coefficients.
Therefore, in the latter case, an error ⊥ is generated, and the decryption
5.1 Related Work 61
stops. For the details of the ciphertext-checking SHE (ccSHE) scheme, see
[54, p. 8].
The authors show that the ccSHE scheme is PA-1 secure assuming a
particular lattice knowledge assumption (see [54]). This is the only IND-
CCA1 secure SHE scheme known so far; but it makes use of a non-standard
lattice knowledge assumption.
5.1.2 Follow-Up Work
Zhang, Plantard and Susilo showed [76] an IND-CCA1 attack against the
SHE scheme [75], therefore showing that family in (2) is not IND-CCA1
secure. Given O(λ2) decryption oracle queries, an attacker can recover the
private key. Let η be the bit-length of the secret key p, O(λ2) = 3(η+3) in
the best case. We will describe a more efficient and conceptually simpler
key recovery attack. Our attack is optimal in the sense that it recovers
directly the secret key with at most η oracle queries.
Loftus, May, Smart, and Vercauteren showed in [54] that the schemes in
the family (1) in Figure 4.1 are not IND-CCA1 secure. With our work, we
show that the remaining families (2), (3) and (4) are also not IND-CCA1
secure.
Recently, Galbraith et al. [53] explore a new approach to achieving
security against adaptive attacks, which does not rely on a notion of ”valid
ciphertexts” (see also Remark 2). The idea is to generate a ”one-time”
private key every time the decryption algorithm is run, so that even if
an attacker can learn some bits of the one-time private key from each
decryption query, this does not allow them to compute a valid private key.
They show an implementation of their idea on the [44] SHE scheme.
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5.2 Framework of Key Recovery Attacks
This is the general framework of how our key-recovery attacks work. First
of all, notice that most of the SHE schemes considered work by encrypting
only one bit at a time; therefore, also the decryption will reveal in general
only one bit. We can therefore see that for every ciphertext submitted
to the decryption oracle, this will return us the corresponding plaintext
bit. Now, the idea is that we are not necessarily forced to submit to
the decryption oracle a correctly-generated ciphertext; without proper
ciphertext-validity check (see Remark 2), we can actually submit to the
decryption oracle any value picked from the ciphertext domain (namely,
if C ⊆ C is the set of all possible ciphertexts, we can choose and submit
to the decryption oracle any value c′ ∈ C). The decryption oracle will
compute and return the value d = Decrypt(sk, c′) ∈M , for a known set of
’plaintexts’ M . The key idea here is that, whatever value c′ ∈ C we are
submitting to the decryption oracle, it will return a value d ∈M (normally
a single bit) which is a function of the secret key sk. Therefore the idea
is to submit to the decryption oracle specifically-chosen ’ciphertexts’ in
order to obtain, after every single query, a different bit of the secret key
sk. By studying how the decryption step works we can repeat and vary
our queries and finally recover completely all the bits of the secret key.
Remark 2. One can argue that it is enough to provide the decryption
step in a SHE scheme with an extra ”ciphertext-validity check” in order
to thwart this specifically-chosen ciphertext approach. However, it can
be seen that implementing such an extra check is not easy task. After
attacking the SHE schemes as we will see in this chapter, we tried to device
extra validity checks but we also found out that we can always modify
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slightly our attacks in order to prevent these extra checks to take effect.
The only exception is given by a modification of the [55] SHE scheme
which we developed, and that so far seems to resist key-recovery attacks.
This gives us good indicator that our variation of the SHE scheme [55] is
actually resistant to key-recovery attacks, even though further investigation
is needed. We will come back to this topic in Chapter 6.
Often in the following discussion we will say that our key-attacks are
optimal. Let’s explain what do we mean with this. Let u be the number
of bits revealed by the decryption oracle after each query, and let N be
the number of bits of the secret key sk. Then, assuming that the bits of
the secret key can be considered - at least from the attacker’s perspective -
uniformally chosen at random, the minimum number of decryption queries
to perform in order to obtain all the bits of the secret key is vmin := N/u.
Definition 12. Consider a SHE scheme for which we have devised a key-
recovery attack. Let v be the number of oracle decryption queries that we
have to perform in order to fully recover the secret key. We say that our
key-recovery attack is optimal for this SHE scheme if v = vmin.
It is often the case that u = 1 and therefore v = N or v ≈ N .
Remark 3. We can also notice that one does not need to recover completely
all the bits of the secret key; if our task is to beat the IND-CCA1 security,
then it may be enough to recover only a given number of bit of sk in order
to have a working CCA1 attack. (Which, we remember, is weaker than a
key-recovery attack.) Precisely, for a given SHE scheme consider the secret
key sk = s. Let N = #bits(s). Let 0 ≤ n ≤ N the number of bits of s
that we have learned through a given number of oracle decryption queries.
Then obviously we have that
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• if n = 0 we have no information whatsoever about s, and therefore
can cannot beat CCA1 security;
• if n = N then we have completely recovered s, and in particular we
can beat CCA1 security;
The interesting situation is when 0 < n < N . There is a value t := f(s) ∈ N
which is function of s such that
• if n < t then we cannot beat CCA1 security;
• if n > t then we can beat CCA1 security;
This is material for an interesting future work. We will come back on this
topic in Section 7.1.
5.2.1 The Framework of Key-Recovery Attacks
According to the given SHE scheme to attack, we have devised two main
approaches:
• for SHE schemes like [75, 11, 55, 9], we recover sk by gradually
reducing (halving) the key space
• for SHE schemes like [15, 14, 12, 44], we recover sk bit-by-bit, from
least to most significant bit
As we already mentioned, in general our attacks are optimal, in the sense
of definition 12.
In this chapter we will describe all the Key-Recovery attacks that we
have developed against the SHE schemes in categories (2), (3) and (4) as
in Figure 4.1; more precisely against the SHE schemes [75, 15, 14, 12, 11,
44, 55, 9].
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5.3 Key Recovery Attack against the DGHV10
Scheme
In [76], Zhang, Plantard and Susilo presented a key recovery attack against
the SHE scheme [75]. Given O(λ2) decryption oracle queries, an attacker
can recover the private key. Let η be the bit-length of the secret key p,
O(λ2) = 3(η + 3) in the best case.
In this section, we describe a more efficient and conceptually simpler key
recovery attack. Our attack is optimal in the sense that it recovers directly
the secret key with at most η oracle queries. Note that the decryption
oracle outputs one bit at a time.
5.3.1 The DGHV10 SHE Scheme
We start by presenting the (asymmetric) SHE scheme as presented in [75].
For this SHE scheme - as well for the ones we will describe subsequently -
we will omit the evaluation step; for a complete description of the scheme,
see the original papers. The FHE scheme from [75] is perhaps the simplest
and easiest to understand since it relies only on simple arithmetics.The
message space is M = Z2. The scheme is parametrized by γ (bit-length of
the integers in the public key), η (bit-length of the secret key), ρ (bit-length
of the noise), and τ (the number of integers in the public key). We also
consider a secondary noise parameter ρ′ = ρ + ω(logλ). For a specific
(η-bit) odd positive integer p, consider the following distribution over γ-bit
integers:
Dγ,ρ(p) = {choose q $← Z∩[0, 2γ/p), r $← Z∩(−2ρ, 2ρ) : output x = pq+r}
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The algorithms of the DGHV10 SHE scheme are defined as follows:
KeyGen(λ)
• sk: odd η-bit integer
p
$← (2Z+ 1) ∩ [2η−1, 2η).
• sample xi $← Dγ,ρ(p) for i = 0, . . . , τ
• relabel so that x0 is the largest
• restart unless x0 odd, rp(x0) even (rp(x) = x − ⌊x/p⌉ · p ∈
(−p/2, p/2])
• pk = (x0, x1, . . . , xτ ).
Encrypt(pk,m ∈M)
• choose a random subset S ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , τ}
• choose a random integer r in (−2ρ′ , 2ρ′)
• output c = [m+ 2r + 2∑i∈S xi]x0
Decrypt(sk, c)
• output m′ = (c mod p) mod 2
5.3.2 The New Key Recovery Attack
Since η = #bits(p), we immediately obtain odd lower and upper bounds
lp and up, respectively, for p:
lp = 2η−1 + 1 ≤ p ≤ up = 2η − 1
Notice explicitly that p can only assume the odd values 2η−1 + 1, 2η−1 +
3, . . . , 2η − 3, 2η − 1. In particular, between 2η−1 and 2η there are 2η−2
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candidate values for p. We can also argue that between lp and up there
are (up− lp)/2 = 2η−2− 1 even integers. Let H(lp,up) = {0, 1, . . . , 2η−2− 2},
these integers can be denoted as lp + 2h+ 1 for h ∈ H(lp,up).
Now, the idea of the key-recovery attack is as follows: consider the
‘ciphertext’ c = lp + 2h + 1 for a given h ∈ H(lp,up). Submit c to the
decryption oracle OD; we will obtain a bit b← OD(c) = (c mod p) mod 2.
There are two cases to distinguish:
b = 0 ‘Decryption is correct’ (since c is even); hence p > c, i.e. p ≥
lp + 2h+ 2.
Update lp ← lp + 2h+ 2.
b = 1 ‘Decryption is not correct’; hence p < c, i.e. p ≤ lp + 2h.
Update up ← lp + 2h.
Next, we repeat the decryption query with the updated values for lp, up
and with another even ‘ciphertext’ c ∈ [lp + 1, up − 1], and we stop when
up = lp. In particular, for efficiency we always choose c as the even integer
in the middle of the interval [lp+1, up−1]. It is easy to see that this attack
leads to a full recovery of the secret key p with at most log(2η−2 − 2) ≈ η
oracle queries.
5.3.3 Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack can be described by Algorithm 1. It takes as input
an integer η ∈ N and outputs the secret integer p. Let
OD(c) = Decrypt(c, sk) = (c mod p) mod 2 (decryption oracle)
⌊x⌋o = max{n ∈ N s.t. n is odd and n ≤ x}
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Algorithm 1 Key Recovery Attack
input: η
lp ← 2η−1 + 1
up ← 2η − 1
while up ̸= lp do
h← (up − lp)/2 {h ∈ N is the number of even values in [lp, up]}
c← lp + ⌊h⌋o
if OD(c) = 0 then
lp ← lp + ⌊h⌋o + 1
end if
if OD(c) = 1 then
up ← lp + ⌊h⌋o − 1
end if
end while
return up
5.4 Key Recovery Attack against the BV11b
Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme
from [15].
5.4.1 The BV11b SHE Scheme
The message space is M = Z2. Let f be a polynomial in λ, i.e. f(λ) =
poly(λ). Consider n = f(λ) ∈ N and let ϵ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ R. Assume an odd
integer q ∈ N such that q ∈ [2nϵ , 2 · 2nϵ), and an integer m ≥ nlog q + 2λ.
5.4 Key Recovery Attack against the BV11b Scheme 69
Let χ be a noise distribution over Zq (it produces small samples, all of
magnitude not greater than n). Finally, let L ∈ N be an upper bound on
the maximal multiplicative depth that the scheme can homomorphically
evaluate, say L ≈ ϵlog n.
KeyGen(λ)
• pick s0, . . . , sL $← Znq
• pick a matrix A $← Zm×nq
• pick a vector e← χm
• compute b = As0 + 2e
• sk = sL
• pk = (A,b)
Encrypt(pk, µ ∈M)
• pick r $← {0, 1}m
• set v = ATr ∈ Znq
• set w = bTr+ µ ∈ Zq
• ciphertext c = ((v, w), l).
Decrypt(sk, c = ((v, w), L))
µ = (w− < v, sL > mod q) mod 2
Notice that the vectors s1, . . . , sL−1 are used in order to compute
the evaluation key, which we omit here. We remark that during the
homomorphic evaluation, the scheme generates ciphertexts of the form
c = ((v, w), l), where the tag l indicates the multiplicative level at which
the ciphertext has been generated (fresh ciphertexts are tagged with l = 0).
Note that it always holds that l ≤ L due to the bound on the multiplicative
depth, and that the output of the homomorphic evaluation of the entire
circuit is expected to have l = L. As described in [15], the SHE scheme is
only required to decrypt ciphertexts that are output by the evaluation step
(which we omit here), and those will always have level tag L. Therefore,
we always expect a ciphertext of the form c = ((v, w), L) and decryption
is correct.
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Apparently, we cannot decrypt level l ciphertexts c = ((v, w), l), for
1 ≤ l < L, since we are only allowed to decrypt level L ciphertexts.
However, we can compute L− l fresh encryptions of 1, namely c1, . . . , cL−l.
Then, we compute c∗ = Evaluate(pk,MUL, c, c1, . . . , cL−l) based on the
homomorphic property, where MUL is the multiplication circuit. The
resulting ciphertext c∗ will encrypt the same message as c does, and with
a tag level L. In particular, we can decrypt fresh ciphertexts.
5.4.2 Our Key Recovery Attack
We are going to recover the secret key sL ∈ Znq component-wise, and bit
by bit. For ease of notation, we will write s instead of sL. More precisely,
we write s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Znq . For every 1 ≤ j ≤ n, we have sj ∈ Zq
and therefore sj can be written with a maximum number N of bits, where
N = ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1. We are going to recover the i-th bit of sj, for all
1 ≤ i ≤ N and for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n.
Intuitively, our attack works as follows. We start by finding the first
bit of sj for every 1 ≤ j ≤ n; then we will recover the second bit of sj for
every 1 ≤ j ≤ n; and we stop until we reach the N -th bit. In order to do
so, we have to choose a ‘ciphertext’ c to be submitted to the decryption
oracle. Instead of submitting c = (v, w) for honestly-generated v ∈ Znq
and w ∈ Zq, we submit c∗ = (x, y) for some specifically-picked x ∈ Znq and
y ∈ Zq. We omit to write the level tag since we can always obtain a level
tag L from any l ≤ L.
For any 1 ≤ j ≤ n, let (sj)2 := aj,Naj,N−1 · · · aj,1 be the binary repre-
sentation of sj (bits ordered from most significant to least significant). We
have aj,i ∈ {0, 1}, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
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Recovering aj,1
We have to choose x ∈ Znq and y ∈ Zq in such a way that y− < x, s >
mod q = sj. To do so, pick y = 0 and x = (0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0)
(where -1 is in position j). Then, we have 0 − (−1)sj mod q =
sj mod q = sj . As a result, by modding out with 2, this will return
the last bit aj,1 of sj.
Recovering aj,2
Now that we know the last bit aj,1 of sj, we want to obtain s(1)j :=
(sj − aj,1)/2 ∈ Zq whose bit decomposition is the same as the bit
decomposition of sj, but with the last bit removed from it. Then,
modding out by 2, we will get the desired bit. This translates
to the following condition: find x ∈ Znq and y ∈ Zq such that
y− < x, s > mod q = (sj − aj,1)/2. Let x = (0, . . . , 0, xj, 0, . . . , 0)
(with xj in j-th position). We have to find y and xj such that
2y − sj(2xj + 1) = −aj,1 mod q. Clearly, the solution is given
by xj = −2−1 mod q and y = −2−1aj,1 mod q. By querying the
decryption oracle with the ‘ciphertext’ c∗ := (x, y), we obtain the
second-to-last bit aj,2 of sj.
Recovering aj,m, for 1 ≤m ≤ N
Based on the above two cases, we generalize the procedure. Suppose
we have found all bits aj,i, for 1 ≤ i ≤ m− 1. In order to recover the
bit aj,m, we choose x := (0, . . . , 0, xj, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Znq and y ∈ Zq as
follows: xj = −(2m−1)−1 mod q and y = −(2m−1)−1(∑m−1i=1 2i−1aj,i).
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5.4.3 Algorithmic Description and Efficiency Analy-
sis
We denote the decryption oracle OD(c) := Decrypt(sk, c). The ciphertext c
is of the form c = (x, y) (the level tag is omitted), with x ∈ Znq , y ∈ Zq. For
ease of notation, we have also considered the standard vectors e1, . . . , en ∈
Znq : for every i = 1, . . . , n, ei is the 0-vector except in position i, where it
has value 1, i.e. ei = (ei,1, . . . , ei,n) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), ei,i = 1, ei,j =
0 for j ̸= i. Formally, the attack from Section 5.4.2 can be described by
Algorithm 2. It takes as input the integers n, q and returns the secret key
vector s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Znq .
Algorithm 2 Key Recovery Attack
input: n, q ∈ N
N ← ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+1
for j = 1 to n do
for m = 1 to N do
xj ← −(2m−1)−1 mod q
x← xj · ej
y ← xj ·∑m−1i=1 2i−1aj,i mod q {if m = 1, y ← 0}
aj,m ← OD(x, y)
end for
sj ← ∑Nm=1 2m−1aj,m
end for
s← (s1, . . . , sn)
return s
The secret key vector s = sL ∈ Znq has n coefficients sj, and each one
of them has length of at most N bits. Now, n = f(λ) for a polynomial
function f(λ) = poly(λ), and N = ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋ + 1. We have that
q ∈ [2nϵ , 2nϵ+1), with ϵ ∈ (0, 1) ∩ R a constant, and
⌊log2(q−1)⌋+1 < ⌊log22n
ϵ+1⌋+1 = ⌊nϵ+1⌋+1 = ⌊f(λ)ϵ+1⌋+1 = g(λ)
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where g(λ) = poly(λ)ϵ. Therefore, the total number of queries we must
perform to recover s is n×N < f(λ) · g(λ) = poly(λ)ϵ+1. Since each query
to the decryption oracle reveals one bit of s, our attack is optimal and
ends in polynomial time.
5.5 Key Recovery Attack against the BV11a
Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the symmetric-key
SHE scheme from [14]. The attack also applies to the asymmetric-key SHE
scheme.
5.5.1 The BV11a SHE Scheme
Consider primes q = poly(λ) ∈ N, t = poly(λ) ∈ Z∗q. Let n = poly(λ) ∈ N
and consider a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] with deg(f) = n+ 1. The message
space isM = Rt = Z[x]/(f(x)). Namely, a message is encoded as a degree
n polynomial with coefficients in Zt. Let χ be an error distribution over the
ring Rq := Zq[x]/(f(x)) and let D ∈ N, which is related to the maximal
degree of homomorphism allowed (and to the maximal ciphertext length).
Parameters n, f, q, χ are public.
Keygen(λ)
• sample s← χ
• s = (1, s, s2, . . . , sD) ∈ RD+1q
• sk = s
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Encrypt(sk, µ ∈M)
• sample a $← Rq and e← χ
• compute (a, b := as+ te) ∈ R2q
• compute c0 := b+ µ ∈ Rq, c1 := −a
• output c = (c0, c1) ∈ R2q
Decrypt(sk, c = (c0, . . . , cD) ∈ RD+1q )
µ = (< c, s > modq) mod t
We remark that while the encryption algorithm only generates cipher-
texts c ∈ R2q , homomorphic operations (as described in the evaluation
algorithm which we omit here) might add more elements to the cipher-
text. Thus, the most generic form of a decryptable ciphertext in this
scheme is c = (c0, . . . , cd) ∈ Rd+1q , for d ≤ D. Notice that ‘padding with
zeros’ does not affect the ciphertext. Namely, (c0, . . . , cd) ∈ Rd+1q and
(c0, . . . , cd, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RD+1q encrypt the same message µ ∈ Rt.
5.5.2 Our Key Recovery Attack
We can write s = s0 + s1x + · · · + snxn ∈ Zq[x]/(f(x)) with coefficients
sj ∈ Zq, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. We will recover each coefficient sj separately. Now,
each sj has at most N := ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1 bits; therefore #bits(s) ≤ (n+
1)×N = (n+1)×(⌊log2(q−1)⌋+1) and each query to the oracle decryption
will reveal a polynomial µ(x) = µ0 + µ1x+ · · ·+ µnxn ∈ Zt[x]/(f(x)); we
have #bits(µ) ≤ (n + 1) × (⌊log2(t − 1)⌋ + 1). Therefore, the minimum
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number of oracle queries needed is given by
⌈
#(bits(s))
#(bits revealed by an oracle query)
⌉
=
⌈
(n+ 1)× (⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1)
(n+ 1)× (⌊log2(t− 1)⌋+ 1)
⌉
=
⌈⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1
⌊log2(t− 1)⌋+ 1
⌉
We are going to query the decryption oracle with ‘ciphertexts’ of the form
c∗i := (hi, yi, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RD+1q for some hi, yi ∈ Rq. We will describe in
detail our attack in the case t = 2. An easy generalization for t ≥ 2 is
discussed later.
An easy case: t = 2.
We expect to query the decryption oracle at least ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1 times
and recover sj, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, bit by bit. Let N = #bits(sj) =
⌊log2(q − 1)⌋ + 1, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n; and let (sj)2 = aj,Naj,N−1 · · · aj,1 be the
binary representation of sj, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n (i.e., aj,i ∈ {0, 1},∀1 ≤ i ≤ N and
bits ordered most significant to least significant). For ease of notation, we
write c∗ = (h, y) instead of c∗ = (h, y, 0, . . . , 0).
Recovering aj,1, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n
For a submitted ’ciphertext’ c∗ = (h, y), decryption works as follows:
< c∗, s > mod2 = h+ ys mod 2. We choose h = ∑nj=0 0xj = 0 ∈ Rq
and y = 1 +∑nj=1 0xj = 1 ∈ Rq. The decryption oracle outputs
s mod 2 = (s0 mod 2) + (s1 mod 2)x+ · · ·+ (sn mod 2)xn
= a0,1 + a1,1x+ · · ·+ an,1xn
Therefore, we obtain the last bits aj,1 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n, which are n
bits of s.
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Recovering aj,2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n
With aj,1 for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n, we are going to recover aj,2, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n,
as follows. We want to obtain
s(1) := s− (a0,1 + a1,1x+ · · ·+ an,1x
n)
2
= s(1)0 + s
(1)
1 x+ · · ·+ s(1)n xn ∈
Zq[x]
(f(x))
for which the bit decomposition of the coefficients s(1)j is the same
as the bit decomposition of sj, but with the last bit removed from
it, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. Then, by modding out with 2, we will
get the desired bits. This translates to the following condition:
find c∗ = (h, y) = (h, y, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RD+1q such that < c∗, s >=
s(1) := s−(a0,1+a1,1x+···+an,1x
n)
2 , from which we obtain 2h+ s(2y− 1) =
−(a0,1 + a1,1x+ · · ·+ an,1xn). A solution is given by y = 2−1 ∈ Rq
and h = −2−1(a0,1 + a1,1x+ · · ·+ an,1xn) ∈ Rq. Then, by modding
out with 2 the ‘decrypted ciphertext’ µ =< c∗, s >, we recover the
second-to-last bits aj,2, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n.
Recovering aj,m, for 1 ≤ m ≤ N , 0 ≤ j ≤ n
Suppose we have found all bits aj,i, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1 and ∀0 ≤
j ≤ n. We want to recover aj,m, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. By a recursive
argument, we find that we have to submit a ’ciphertext’ c∗ = (h, y)
such that y = (2m−1)−1 ∈ Rq and h = −(2m−1)−1
(∑n
j=0 djx
j
)
with
dj =
∑m−1
i=1 2i−1aj,i.
This concludes the attack for the case t = 2. Efficiency-wise, the total
number of oracle queries is N = ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1, which is optimal.
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The general case: t ≥ 2.
We consider now the general case in which t ≥ 2 is a prime number in
Z∗q. We want to find s = s0 + s1x+ · · ·+ snxn ∈ Zq[x]/(f(x)) and expect
to query the decryption oracle
⌈ ⌊log2(q−1)⌋+1
⌊log2(t−1)⌋+1
⌉
times. With each query to
the decryption oracle, we are going to recover M = ⌊log2(t − 1)⌋ + 1
bits of sj, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. The idea is that we are going to recover sj, for
all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. In its representation in base t, sj can be represented
with N figures aj,i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}: (sj)t = aj,Naj,N−1 · · · aj,1 where
N = ⌊logt(q − 1)⌋+ 1; each aj,i is bounded by t− 1, which explains the
value M = ⌊log2(t− 1)⌋+ 1.
Recovering aj,1, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n
For a submitted ‘ciphertext’ c∗ = (h, y) = (h, y, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ RD+1q ,
decryption works as follows: < c∗, s > modt = x + ys mod t. We
choose h = 0 ∈ Rq and y = 1 ∈ Rq. Then, the decryption oracle
outputs
s mod t = (s0 mod t) + (s1 mod t)x+ · · ·+ (sn mod t)xn
= a0,1 + a1,1x+ · · ·+ an,1xn
as we wanted.
Recovering aj,m, ∀1 ≤ m ≤ N , ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n
Suppose we know aj,i, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ m − 1, ∀0 ≤ j ≤ n. We want to
recover aj,m, for all 0 ≤ j ≤ n. To do so, we submit to the decryption
oracle a ‘ciphertext’ c∗ = (h, y) such that y = (tm−1)−1 ∈ Rq, h =
−(tm−1)−1
(∑n
j=0 djx
j
)
, dj =
∑m−1
i=1 t
i−1aj,i. It is straightforward to
verify that it works and we skip the details here.
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5.5.3 Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack from Section 5.5.2 can be described by Algorithm 3. It
takes as input integers q, t, n,D ∈ N and a polynomial f(x) ∈ Z[x] of degree
n. It outputs the secret key vector s = (1, s, s2, . . . , sD) ∈ RD+1q , where
Rq := Zq[x]/(f(x)). Let OD(c) := Decrypt(sk, c) be the decryption oracle,
where c ∈ RD+1q . For given h, y ∈ Rq, let OD(h, y) := OD((h, y, 0, . . . , 0)).
Algorithm 3 Key Recovery Attack
input: q, t, n,D ∈ N; f(x) ∈ Z[x]
N ← ⌊logt(q − 1)⌋+ 1
for m = 1 to N do
y ← (tm−1)−1 in Rq
h← −y ·∑m−1i=1 ti−1ri in Rq {if m = 1, h← 0}
rm ← OD(h, y)
end for
s← ∑Ni=1 ti−1ri
s← (1, s, s2, . . . , sD) ∈ RD+1q
return s
5.6 Key Recovery Attack against the BGV12
Scheme
The SHE scheme from [12] is closely related to the SHE schemes from
[14, 15]. This implies that the attacks from Section 5.5.2 and 5.4.2 can be
directly applied against the SHE scheme from [12].
We first remark that the LWE and RLWE problems are syntactically
equivalent. They only use different rings (Z for LWE, and a polynomial
ring Z[x]/(xd + 1) for RLWE), as well as different vector dimensions over
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these rings (n = poly(λ) for LWE, n = 1 for RLWE). For this reason and
to simplify the presentation, the authors of [12] introduced the general
learning with errors (GLWE) problem, which is a generalized version of
LWE and RLWE.
Definition 13 (GLWE problem). For security parameter λ, let n = n(λ)
be an integer dimension, let f(x) = xd + 1 where d = d(λ) is a power of 2,
let q = q(λ) ≥ 2 be a prime integer, let R = Z[x] = (f(x)) and Rq = R/qR,
and let χ = χ(λ) be a distribution over R. The GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is to
distinguish the following two distributions:
• one samples (ai, bi) uniformly from Rn+1q .
• one first draws s← Rnq uniformly and then samples (ai, bi) ∈ Rn+1q by
sampling ai ← Rnq uniformly, ei ← χ, and setting bi =< ai, s > +ei.
The GLWEn,f,q,χ assumption is that the GLWEn,f,q,χ problem is infeasible.
LWE is GLWE when d = 1, and RLWE is GLWE when n = 1. Let’s
review the GLWE-based encryption scheme.
Setup(λ):
• use bit b ∈ {0, 1} to determine whether we are setting parame-
ters for a LWE-based scheme (d = 1) or a RLWE-based scheme
(n = 1).
• choose µ-bit modulus q and d, n,N, χ (all polynomials in λ, µ, b)
in order to have a GLWE-based scheme with 2λ security against
known attacks.
• Let R = Z[x]/(xd + 1)
• Let params = (q, d, n,N, χ).
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SecretKeyGen(params):
• choose s′ ← χn.
• set sk = s← (1, s′[1], . . . , s′[n]) ∈ Rn+1q .
PublicKeyGen(params, sk) :
• input: params and sk = s = (1, s) with s[0] = 1 and s′ ∈ Rnq .
• generate matrix A′ $← RN×nq
• generate a vector e← χN
• set b← A′s′ + 2e.
• set A to be the (n+ 1)-column matrix consisting of b followed
by the n columns of −A′. (Remark: A · s = 2e.)
• set pk = A.
Enc(params, pk,m): • input: message m ∈ R2
• set m← (m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Rn+1q
• sample r← RN2
• output ciphertext c←m+AT r ∈ Rn+1q .
Dec(params, sk, c): Output m← (< c, s > modq) mod 2.
The SHE scheme from [12] uses the above GLWE-based encryption scheme
as the main building block, and we only need to show attacks against the
latter. Depending on which instantiation is chosen (either LWE or RLWE),
we can apply one of the key recovery attacks against [15, 14] to the basic
GLWE-based encryption scheme.
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• If b = 0, then d = 1, R = Z[x]/(x+ 1) ∼= Z, and
c :=m+ ATr =m+ (b | −A′T)r =
m+ bTr
−A′Tr

which can be written as c =
(
w
−v
)
∈ Zn+1q . For decryption we have
m := (< c, s > modq) mod 2
= (m+ bTr+ < −A′Tr, s > modq) mod 2
which is (w− < v, sL > modq) mod 2. The secret key can be re-
covered by directly applying the key recovery attack from Section
5.4.2.
• If b = 1, then n = 1, R = Z[x]/(xd + 1). The scheme is slightly
different from the BV11a SHE scheme just for the encryption part,
but the setup, the key generation and the decryption steps are the
same. Therefore, our key recovery attack can be applied. Precisely, to
recover the secret polynomial s := s(x) = s0+ s1x+ · · ·+ sd−1xd−1 ∈
Z[x]/(xd + 1), one could directly use our key recovery attack from
Section 5.5.2 with the following settings: D ← 1, n← d− 1, t← 2.
5.7 Key Recovery Attack against the Bra12
SHE Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme
from [11]. The scheme uses, as a building block, Regev’s [68] public-key
encryption scheme. It is then enough to show a key recovery attack on
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Regev’s scheme since the full [11] can be attacked exactly as the basic
Regev’s encryption scheme (the only differences between the two schemes
are in the evaluation step which is missing in Regev’s scheme).
Let’s first recall Regev’s encryption scheme. In this scheme, let n := λ
be the security parameter.
5.7.1 The Bra12 SHE Scheme (Regev’s Encryption
Scheme)
Let q be a prime number and let χ = χ(n) be a distribution ensemble over
Z. The message space is M = {0, 1}. As claimed in [68], choosing q such
that n2 ≤ q ≤ 2n2 is enough for security (in particular, q = poly(n); for
other parameters settings, see [68]).
SecretKeyGen(n) : • Sample s := (s1, . . . , sn) $← Znq
• Output sk = s
PublicKeyGen(s): • Let N := (n+ 1) · (log q +O(1))
• Sample A $← ZN×nq
• Sample e← χN
• Compute b := A · s+ e mod q
• Define P := [b| −A] ∈ ZN×(n+1)q
• Output pk = P
Encrypt(pk,m ∈ {0, 1}): • Sample r ∈ {0, 1}N
• Let m := (m, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ {0, 1}n+1
c := PT · r+ ⌊q/2⌋ ·m ∈ Zn+1q
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Decrypt(sk, c):
m :=
⌊
2
q
· (< c, (1, s) > modq)
⌉
mod 2
5.7.2 Our Key Recovery Attack
Recall that we defined the rounding function ⌊·⌉ such that ⌊m+ 1/2⌉ :=
m + 1 for every m ∈ N. The following attack works also, with trivial
modifications, in case we define ⌊m + 1/2⌉ := m. In this section, for a
given ciphertext c we use notation D(c) instead of Decrypt(sk, c).
We will start by describing how to recover s1. An easy generalization
will allow to recover sj, ∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n. We are going to submit to the
decryption oracle ’ciphertexts’ of the form c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn+1) ∈ Zn+1q . It
holds
< c, (1, s) > modq = c1 + c2s1 + c3s2 + · · ·+ cn+1sn mod q
Choose c = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), i.e. c2 = 1 and ci = 0, for i = 1, . . . , n+ 1 and
i ̸= 2. Then < c, (1, s) > modq = s1 mod q = s1. (Recall that sj ≤ q − 1,
∀j = 1, 2, . . . , n.) Then
D(c) =
⌊
2
q
s1
⌉
mod 2
Now, since 0 ≤ s1 < q, we have 0 ≤ 2qs1 < 2q q = 2. Let u =
⌊
2
q
s1
⌉
; then we
have u ∈ {0, 1, 2}. In particular, it is easy to see that
• u = 0⇔ 0 ≤ s1 < q4
• u = 1⇔ q4 ≤ s1 < 3q4
• u = 2⇔ 3q4 ≤ s1 ≤ q − 1
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Remember that q is prime, so in particular q4 ,
3q
4 /∈ N. Since D(c) =
u mod 2, we have
• D(c) = 1⇔ q4 < s1 < 3q4
• D(c) = 0⇔ 0 ≤ s1 < q4 or 3q4 < s1 ≤ q − 1
Having these considerations in mind, we recover s1 like follows.
Recovering s1.
Select c = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q , i.e. c2 = 1 and ci = 0, ∀i = 1, . . . , n+ 1,
i ̸= 2. Submit c to the decryption oracle. We have two case to consider.
Case 1: D(c) = 1. Then we know that
q
4 < s1 <
3q
4 (5.1)
Now select c = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q . Then < c, (1, s) >= 1 +
s1 mod q. There are two cases to consider:
1.1 if D(c) = 0, then it must be
3q
4 < 1 + s1 (5.2)
Conditions 5.1 and 5.2 together imply that s1 is the biggest
integer smaller than 3q4 , i.e. s1 = ⌊3q4 ⌋.
1.2 if D(c) = 1, then we still have
q
4 < 1 + s1 <
3q
4 (5.3)
We then select c = (2, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q and submit it to the
decryption oracle. Similarly as above, we have < c, (1, s) >=
2 + s1 mod q. Again, there are two cases to consider:
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1.2.1 if D(c) = 0, then it must be
3q
4 < 2 + s1 (5.4)
Conditions 5.3 and 5.4 together imply that 1 + s1 = ⌊3q4 ⌋,
i.e. s1 = ⌊3q4 ⌋ − 1.
1.2.2 if D(c) = 1, then we still have
q
4 < 2 + s1 <
3q
4
We keep reasoning this way, submitting to the decryption oracle
’ciphertexts’ ci = (c1,i, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q , for increasing values c1,i =
1, 2, 3, . . . until we obtain D(ci) = 0. Then we will have
s1 = ⌊3q4 ⌋ − c1,i + 1
We notice that, in the worst case, i.e. when s1 = ⌈ q4⌉, we have
to query the decryption oracle at most M1 := ⌈3q4 ⌉ − ⌈ q4⌉ times.
Therefore, in the worst case the total number of oracle queries is
T1 := 1 +M1 = 1 + ⌈3q4 ⌉ − ⌈
q
4⌉ ≈
q
2
Case 2: D(c) = 0. Then we know that s1 is such that
(2.1) 0 ≤ s1 < q4 or
(2.2) 3q4 < s1 ≤ q − 1
We use techniques as before, but we have to be more careful since
now we have to understand in which case we are among (2.1) or (2.2).
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As before, we select c = (1, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q . Then < c, (1, s) >=
1 + s1 mod q.
The idea is similar to case 1: we keep submitting to the decryption
oracle ’ciphertexts’ ci = (c1,i, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q , for increasing values
c1,i = 1, 2, 3, . . ., until D(ci) = 1. When we will receive D(ci) = 1,
we will know that s1 + c1,i > q4 . The exact value c1,i will tell us in
which of the cases (2.1) or (2.2) we were at the beginning. In fact,
• in case (2.1) we will get D(ci) = 1 after a number of oracle
queries M ′2 such that
1 ≤M ′2 ≤
⌈
q
4
⌉
where M ′2 = 1 when s1 =
⌊
q
4
⌋
and M ′2 =
⌈
q
4
⌉
when s1 = 0.
• in case (2.2) the number M ′′2 of oracle queries needed in order
to obtain D(ci) = 1 is such that
1 +
⌈
q
4
⌉
≤M ′′2 ≤ q −
⌈3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
where M ′′2 = 1+
⌈
q
4
⌉
when s1 = q − 1 and M ′′2 = q −
⌈
3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
when s1 =
⌈
3q
4
⌉
.
Therefore, consider the first value c1,i such that D(ci) = 1.
• if 1 ≤ c1,i ≤
⌈
q
4
⌉
, we are in case (2.1) and
s1 =
⌊
q
4
⌋
− c1,i + 1
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• if 1 +
⌈
q
4
⌉
≤ c1,i ≤ q −
⌈
3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
we are in case (2.2) and
s1 = q − c1,i +
⌈
q
4
⌉
We notice that, in the worst case (i.e., when s1 =
⌈
3q
4
⌉
) we need to
query the decryption oracle M0 := q −
⌈
3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
times. (Notice
that M0 = q −M1.) Therefore, in case 2, in the worst case the total
number of oracle queries is
T2 := 1 +M0 = 1 + q −
⌈3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
≈ q2
So in both cases 1 and 2, the total number of oracle queries needed to
recover s1 is ≈ q2 .
Remark 4. We can provide an exact simpler formula for T1 and T2. Recall
that q ≥ 2 is prime; we can reasonably assume q odd. Then one can check
that
• if q ≡ 1 mod 4
M1 =
q − 1
2 ,M0 =
q + 1
2 , T1 =
q + 1
2 , T2 =
q + 3
2
• if q ≡ 3 mod 4
M1 =
q + 1
2 ,M0 =
q − 1
2 , T1 =
q + 3
2 , T2 =
q + 1
2
In particular, the total number Ttot of oracle queries needed to recover s1
is Ttot ≤ q+32 .
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An optimization. We could optimize the previous algorithm like
follows. Let b := D(c) ∈ {0, 1}, where c = (0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q . Our
previous strategy was to submit ’ciphertexts’ ci := (c1,i, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ Zn+1q
for increasing values c1,i = i, for i = 1, 2, . . . ,Mb.
We modify our strategy and choose the first value c1,1 in the middle
of the interval [1,Mb]. Then, if D(c1) = 1 + b mod 2 we choose c1,2 in the
middle of the interval [1, c1,1]; otherwise, if D(c1) = b mod 2, we choose
c1,2 in the middle of the interval [c1,1 + 1,Mb]. Keep reasoning this way,
we will obtain s1 in ⌊log2(Mb) + 1⌋ ≈ log2(q/2) oracle queries.
Recovering sj, for j = 1, . . . , n.
Similarly, and more in general, we can recover sj, for j = 1, 2, . . . , n. In
this case, the ’ciphertext’ to submit is c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn+1) ∈ Zn+1q with
ck =

0 if k = 1 and it is the first query to the decryption oracle
c1,i if k = 1 and it is not the first query, 1 ≤ c1,i ≤Mb
1 if k = j + 1
0 if k /∈ {1, j + 1}
5.7.3 Algorithmic Description and Efficiency
For a given vector c = (c1, . . . , cn+1) ∈ Zn+1q , we denote the decryption
oracle as OD(c) := Decrypt(sk, c). For ease of notation, we define the
following function. Let j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a, b ∈ Zq; define the function
fj : Z2q → Zn+1q such that fj(b1, b2) = (a1, . . . , an+1) with a1 = b1, aj+1 = b2
and ak = 0 for k ̸= 1, j+1. Algorithm 4 takes as input the integers n, q and
returns the secret key s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Znq . Algorithm 5 is the optimized
version of it.
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Algorithm 4 Key-Recovery Attack
input: q, n ∈ N
for j = 1 to n do
c← fj(0, 1), b← OD(c), b′ ← b, i← 0
while b′ = b do
i = i+ 1
c← fj(i, 1)
b′ ← OD(c)
end while
if b = 1 then
sj ←
⌊
3q
4
⌋
− i+ 1
else if b = 0 then
if 1 ≤ i ≤ ⌈ q4⌉ then
sj ←
⌊ q
4
⌋− i+ 1
else if 1 +
⌈ q
4
⌉ ≤ i ≤ q − ⌈3q4 ⌉+ ⌈ q4⌉ then
sj ← q − i+
⌈ q
4
⌉
end if
end if
end for
return s := (s1, . . . , sn)
Notice that max(M0,M1) = (q + 1)/2 =: M . Therefore, in the
worst case the total number Ttot of oracle queries needed to recover
s = (s1, . . . , sn) ∈ Znq is
Ttot ≤ n · (1 +M) = n · q + 32 ≈ n ·
q
2
In the optimized version, the total number T opttot of oracle queries is
T opttot ≤ n · (1 + ⌊log2(M) + 1⌋) ≈ n · (1 + log2(q/2))
Therefore, our optimized key recovery algorithm is indeed optimal since
the number of oracle queries needed to recover the secret key is not greater
than the bits of the secret key (and one oracle query reveals on bit at a
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Algorithm 5 Optimized Key-Recovery Attack
input: q, n ∈ N
if q ≡ 1 mod 4 then
M1 ← q−12 , M0 ← q+12
else if q ≡ 3 mod 4 then
M1 ← q+12 , M0 ← q−12
end if
for j = 1 to n do
c← fj(0, 1), b← OD(c), L← 1, U ←Mb
while L ̸= U do
i←
⌊
L+U
2
⌋
c← fj(i, 1)
b′ ← OD(c)
if b′ ̸= b then
U ← i
else if b′ = b then
L← i+ 1
end if
end while
if b = 1 then
sj ←
⌊ 3q
4
⌋
− L+ 1
else if b = 0 then
if 1 ≤ L ≤
⌈
q
4
⌉
then
sj ←
⌊
q
4
⌋
− L+ 1
else if 1 +
⌈
q
4
⌉
≤ L ≤ q −
⌈ 3q
4
⌉
+
⌈
q
4
⌉
then
sj ← q − L+
⌈
q
4
⌉
end if
end if
end for
return s := (s1, . . . , sn)
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time). In fact:
#bits in sk = n · (1 + ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋)
T opttot ≤ n ·
(
1 +
⌊
log2
(
q + 1
2
)
+ 1
⌋)
=
(
1 +
⌊
log2
(
q + 1
2 · 2
)⌋)
= n · (1 + ⌊log2(q + 1)⌋)
In particular the above algorithm is polynomial in the security parameter
n: recall that the suggested parameters in Regev’s encryption scheme [68]
for q are n2 ≤ q ≤ 2n2; therefore we have T opttot = O(nlog n).
5.8 Key Recovery Attack against the GSW13
SHE Scheme
In this section, we describe a key recovery attack against the SHE scheme
from [44]. We first give some useful preliminary definitions. Let q, k ∈ N.
Let l be the bit-length of q, i.e. l = ⌊log2q⌋+1, and let N = k · l. Consider
a vector a := (a1, . . . , ak) ∈ Zkq , and let (ai)2 := ai,0ai,1 . . . ai,l−1 be the
binary decomposition of ai (bit ordered least to most significant), for every
i = 1, . . . , k. We define
BitDecomp(a) := (a1,0, . . . , a1,l−1, . . . , ak,0, . . . , ak,l−1) ∈ ZNq
For a given a′ := (a1,0, . . . , a1,l−1, . . . , ak,0, . . . , ak,l−1) ∈ ZNq , let
BitDecomp−1(a′) := (
l−1∑
j=0
2j · a1,j, . . . ,
l−1∑
j=0
2j · ak,j) ∈ Zkq
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We notice explicitly that a′ does not necessarily lie in {0, 1}N , but when
it does then BitDecomp−1 is the inverse of BitDecomp. For a′ ∈ ZNq , we
define
Flatten(a′) := BitDecomp(BitDecomp−1(a′)) ∈ ZNq
When A is a matrix, let BitDecomp(A),BitDecomp−1(A),Flatten(A) be the
matrix formed by applying the operation to each row of A separately.
Finally, for b := (b1, . . . , bk) ∈ Zq let
PowersOf2(b) := (b1, 2b1, . . . , 2l−1b1, . . . , bk, 2bk, . . . , 2l−1bk) ∈ ZNq
It is easy to see that, for a,b ∈ Zkq and for a′ ∈ ZNq ,
< BitDecomp(a),Powersof2(b) > = < a,b >
< a′,Powersof2(b) > = < BitDecomp−1(a′),b >
= < Flatten(a′),Powersof2(b) >
5.8.1 The GSW13 SHE Scheme
The message space isM = Zq for a given modulus q with # bits(q) = κ =
κ(λ, L). Let n = n(λ) be the lattice dimension and let χ = χ(λ) be the
error distribution over Zq (chosen appropriately for LWE: it must achieve
at least 2λ security against known attacks). Choose m = m(λ) = O(nlogq).
So the parameters used in all algorithms are n, q, χ,m. We have that
l = ⌊log q⌋+ 1 is the number of bits of q, and we let N = (n+ 1) · l.
Keygen(λ):
• sample t := (t1, . . . , tn)← Znq
• sk := s← (1,−t1, . . . ,−tn) ∈ Zn+1q
5.8 Key Recovery Attack against the GSW13 SHE Scheme 93
• let v = Powersof2(s) ∈ ZNq ; see 1
• sample a matrix B $← Zm×nq
• sample a vector e← χ, e ∈ Zmq
• set b := B · t+ e =: (b1, . . . , bm) ∈ Zmq .
• set A to be the (n+ 1)-column matrix consisting of b followed
by the n columns of B
A = (b | B) ∈ Zm×(n+1)q
• pk := A.
We remark that A · s = e.
Encrypt(pk, µ ∈M):
• sample a matrix R $← {0, 1}N×m
• output the ciphertext
C = Flatten(µ · IN + BitDecomp(R · A)) ∈ ZN×Nq
Decrypt(sk, C):
• observe that the first l coefficients of v are 1, 2, . . . , 2l−2
• among these coefficients, let vi = 2i be in (q/4, q/2]
• let Ci be the i-th row of C
• compute xi :=< Ci,v >
1v = Powersof2(s) = (s1, 2s1, . . . , 2l−1s1, s2, . . . , 2l−1s2, . . . , sn+1, 2sn+1, . . . , 2l−1sn+1)
= (1, 2, . . . , 2l−1,−t1,−2t1, . . . ,−2l−1t1, . . . ,−tn,−2tn, . . . ,−2l−1tn) ∈ Z(n+1)lq =
ZNq
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• output µ′ := ⌊xi/vi⌉
The Decrypt algorithm can recover the message µ when it is in a ‘small
space’ (q = 2, i.e. M = Z2). For an algorithm that can recover any µ ∈ Zq,
we refer to the MPDec algorithm as described (as a special case) in [44]
and in [59]. If the ciphertext is generated correctly, it is not difficult to
show that C · v = µ · v+R · A · s = µ · v+R · e ∈ ZNq .
Now, the Decrypt algorithm uses only the i-th coefficient of the vector
C ·v ∈ ZNq , i.e. < Ci,v >= µ·vi+ < Ri, e >∈ Zq. Moreover, in the Decrypt
step, i has to be such that vi := 2i ∈ (q/4, q/2], with i ∈ [1, 2, . . . , 2l−1].
Now remember that l = ⌊log q⌋+ 1 equals the number of bits of q. Hence
we have
2l−3 ≤ q4 < 2
l−2 ≤ q2 < 2
l−1 ≤ q < 2l
Therefore the only possible value for 2i ∈ (q/4, q/2] is 2l−2. For this reason,
Decrypt can be simply rewritten as
Decrypt(sk, C):
• let Cl−2 be the (l − 2)-th row of C
• compute xl−2 :=< Cl−2,v >
• output µ′ := ⌊xl−2/2l−2⌉
One could think of outputting as ciphertext only the (l − 2)-th row Cl−2
of the matrix C; this is actually not possible since the full matrix is still
needed in order to perform the homomorphic operations (in particular, the
multiplication of two ciphertexts). We will not discuss them here; see [44].
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5.8.2 Our Key Recovery Attack
We are going to recover bit by bit each coefficient ti of the secret vec-
tor t := (t1, . . . , tn) ∈ Znq . For every 1 ≤ i ≤ n, let BitDecomp(ti) :=
(ti,0, ti,1, . . . , ti,l−1) ∈ Zlq bits ordered from least to most significant. We
explicitly remark that ti =
∑l−1
j=0 2jti,j. We will proceed as follows: start
with i = 1 and recover, in this order, the bits from most to least signif-
icant. Then continue with i = 2, and so on until i = n. Let x ∈ Zq.
Since #bits(q) = l, we have x ≤ q − 1 ≤ 2l − 2. Moreover, we have
#bits(x) ≤ ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1 := l∗. We have l∗ = l if q is not a power of
2, i.e. if q ̸= 2h, for any h ∈ {1, 2, . . . , l − 1}. Otherwise, l∗ = l − 1. We
will not distinguish between these two cases: just remark that if l∗ = l− 1,
then ti,l−1 = 0 for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Recovering BitDecomp(t1)
We start by recovering BitDecomp(t1). The trickiest part is to recover the
most significant bit. We start by recovering t1,l−1, t1,l−2, t1,l−3. We have to
choose, and submit to the decryption oracle, a matrix C ∈ ZN×Nq . Then
the oracle will compute x =< Cl−2,v > and will output the rounded value
µ = ⌊x/2l−2⌉. Our attack works also, with a trivial modification, in the
case we define the rounding function such that ⌊n+ 1/2⌉ := n, for every
n ∈ N. Our strategy is to submit a matrix C whose entries are all 0 except
for the (l − 2)-th row Cl−2. Let y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ ZNq be the vector
representing Cl−2.
We select y = (0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq where −1 is in l + 1-th
position, i.e.
yi =

−1 if i = l + 1
0 otherwise
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Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >= −vl+1 = t1 ∈ Zq
and µ = ⌊t1/2l−2⌉. There are two cases.
1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t12l−2 < 12 i.e. t1 < 2l−3 =∑l−4
j=0 2j + 1. Then it must be t1,l−1 = t1,l−2 = t1,l−3 = 0 .
2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 4. In particular, 2l−3 ≤ t1 ≤ 2l − 2. Then we have
(t1,l−1, t1,l−2, t1,l−3) ∈ {0, 1}3\{(0, 0, 0)} (5.5)
Next, query the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
with −1 in (l − 2)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l − 2 or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >= t1 − 2l−3 ≥ 0
and µ =
⌊
t1−2l−3
2l−2
⌉
. There are two cases:
2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t1−2l−32l−2 < 12 i.e. 2l−3 ≤
t1 < 2l−2 =
∑l−3
j=0 2j + 1. Then it must be t1,l−1 = t1,l−2 = 0 .
Condition (5.5) implies that t1,l−3 = 1 .
2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 3. In particular, 2l−2 ≤ t1 ≤ 2l − 2. Then we have
(t1,l−1, t1,l−2) ∈ {0, 1}2\{(0, 0)} (5.6)
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Next, query the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−1, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
with −1 in (l − 1)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l − 1 or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >= t1 −
2l−2 ≥ 0 and µ =
⌊
t1−2l−2
2l−2
⌉
. There are two cases:
2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t1−2l−22l−2 < 12 and 2l−2 ≤ t1 <
2l−2 + 2l−3 < 2l−1. This means that t1,l−1 = 0 . Therefore,
condition (5.6) implies that t1,l−2 = 1 . Moreover, since we
have 0 ≤ t1 − 2l−2 < 2l−3, we have that t1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2. In particular, 2l−3 + 2l−2 ≤ t1.
Next, query the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−1,−1, 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
with −1 in (l − 2)-th, (l − 1)-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l − 2, i = l − 1 or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >=
t1 − (2l−3 + 2l−2) ≥ 0 and µ =
⌊
t1−(2l−3+2l−2)
2l−2
⌉
. There are
two cases:
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2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t1−2l−3−2l−22l−2 <
1
2 , i.e. 2
l−3+2l−2 ≤ t1 < 2l−1. This implies t1,l−1 = 0 .
Therefore, condition (5.6) gives t1,l−2 = 1 . Moreover,
we have 2l−3 ≤ t1 − 2l−2 < 2l−2; hence t1,l−3 = 1 .
2.2.2.2. µ = 1. We have 2l−1 ≤ t1 ≤ 2l − 2. This implies
t1,l−1 = 1 . We now have to recover t1,l−2, t1,l−3.
Next, query the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
with −1 in l-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >=
t1 − 2l−1 ≥ 0 and µ =
⌊
t1−2l−1
2l−2
⌉
. There are two cases:
2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t1−2l−12l−2 < 12 , i.e. 0 ≤
t1 − 2l−1 < 2l−3 = ∑l−4j=0 2j + 1.
This implies t1,l−2 = t1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2.2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 3. In particular, 2l−3 ≤ t1 − 2l−1. Then we
have
(t1,l−2, t1,l−3) ∈ {0, 1}2\{(0, 0)} (5.7)
Next, query the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−1, 0,−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
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with −1 in (l − 2)-th, l-th and (l + 1)-th positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l − 2, i = l or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =< y,v >=
t1 − (2l−1 + 2l−3) ≥ 0 and µ =
⌊
t1−2l−1−2l−3
2l−2
⌉
. There
are two cases:
2.2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case, we have 0 ≤ t1−2l−1−2l−32l−2 <
1
2 , i.e. 2
l−3 ≤ t1− 2l−1 < 2l−2. This means that
t1,l−2 = 0 . Condition (5.7) then implies t1,l−3 = 1 .
2.2.2.2.2.2. 1 ≤ µ ≤ 2. In particular, 2l−2 ≤ t1 − 2l−1 ≤ 2l −
2− 2l−1 = 2l−1− 2. Then, we have t1,l−2 = 1 . We
still have to find t1,l−3. Next, query the decryption
oracle with y = (0, . . . , 0,−1,−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈
ZNq , where −1 is in (l − 1)-th, l-th and (l + 1)-th
positions:
yi =

−1 if i = l − 1, i = l or i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Through the decryption oracle, we have x =<
y,v >= t1−(2l−1+2l−2) ≥ 0 and µ =
⌊
t1−2l−1−2l−2
2l−2
⌉
.
There are two cases:
2.2.2.2.2.2.1. µ = 0. In this case,
0 ≤ t1 − 2
l−1 − 2l−2
2l−2 <
1
2 , i.e.
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i.e. 0 ≤ t1 − 2l−1 − 2l−2 < 2l−3. This implies
that t1,l−3 = 0 .
2.2.2.2.2.2.2. µ = 1. Then 2l−3 ≤ t1−2l−1−2l−2. This implies
that t1,l−3 = 1 .
At this point, we know the first three significant bits t1,l−1, t1,l−2, t1,l−3
of t1. Notice that we have recovered the first three most significant bits
with at most 7 oracle queries. Next, we are going to recover t1,l−4. Query
the decryption oracle with
y = (0, . . . , 0,−t1,l−3,−t1,l−2,−t1,l−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
where −t1,i is in (i+ 1)-th position. Then
x =< y,v >= t1 − (t1,l−12l−1 + t1,l−22l−2 + t1,l−32l−3)
Now, we have 0 ≤ x < 2l−3. Therefore, µ = ⌊x/2l−2⌉ = 0, and so not
useful at all to learn t1,l−4. The idea is to ‘shift’ the bits ‘to the left’, i.e.
towards the most significant. So, let us instead choose
y = 2 · (0, . . . , 0,−t1,l−3,−t1,l−2,−t1,l−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
So now x =< y,v > is such that 0 ≤ x < 2l−2. After submitting y to
the decryption oracle, it will compute and output µ = ⌊x/2l−2⌉. Then
t1,l−4 = µ .
Now we can generalize and recover t1,k, for all k = l − 4, l − 5, . . . , 1, 0.
This will complete the recovery of t1. Suppose that, for a given k, we
recovered already t1,m, ∀m ∈ [k + 1, . . . , l − 1]. We then recover t1,k by
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recurrence. Choose
y = 2l−k−3(0, . . . , 0,−t1,k+1,−t1,k+2, . . . ,−t1,l−1,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
with −t1,i in (i+ 1)-th position; i.e.
yi =

−2l−k−3t1,i−1 for i ∈ [k + 2, . . . , l]
−2l−k−3 for i = l + 1
0 otherwise
Then we have x =< y,v >= 2l−k−3
(
t1 −∑l−1j=k+1 t1,j2j) with 0 ≤ x < 2l−2.
Then, t1,k = µ .
We recover completely t1 after at most 7+ (l− 3) = l+4 oracle queries.
Recovering BitDecomp(tr), for every r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n]
We can now generalize and recover BitDecomp(tr), for every r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n],
in a way analogous to what has been done for the case r = 1. The only
difference is that, when choosing y ∈ ZNq , we set −1 in position rl + 1. So,
for a given r ∈ [1, 2, . . . , n], we have the following.
• Recovering the first three most significant bits tr,l−1, tr,l−2, tr,l−3. This
is done exactly as in the case of t1, with the only modification yl+1 = 0
and yrl+1 = −1 always.
• Recovering tr,k, for all k = l − 4, l − 5, . . . , 1, 0. Suppose that, for a
given k, we recovered already tr,m, ∀m ∈ [k + 1, . . . , l − 1]. We then
recover tr,k by recurrence. Choose
y = 2l−k−3(0, . . . , 0,−tr,k+1,−tr,k+2, . . . ,−tr,l−1, 0, . . . , 0,−1, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ ZNq
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with −tr,i in (i+ 1)-th position and −1 in (rl + 1)-th position; i.e.
yi =

−2l−k−3tr,i−1 for i ∈ [k + 2, . . . , l]
−2l−k−3 for i = rl + 1
0 otherwise
Then we have x =< y,v >= 2l−k−3
(
tr −∑l−1j=k+1 tr,j2j) with 0 ≤
x < 2l−2. Then, tr,k = µ .
In summary, we can recover the secret key t ∈ Znq with at most (l+4) ·n
oracle queries.
5.8.3 Algorithmic Description
Formally, the attack from Section 5.8.2 can be described by Algorithm
6. For a given vector y = (y1, . . . , yN) ∈ ZNq , we let Cy ∈ MN×N(Zq) be
the square N ×N matrix whose entries are all 0 except for the (l − 2)-th
row Cl−2, which is y. We have denoted the decryption oracle OD(Cy) :=
Decrypt(sk, Cy) =
⌊
<y,v>
2l−2
⌉
. For ease of notation, we have also considered
the standard vectors e1, . . . , eN ∈ ZNq : for every i = 1, . . . , N , ei is the
0-vector except in position i, where it has value 1:
ei = (ei,1, . . . , ei,N) = (0, . . . , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0), ei,i = 1, ei,j = 0 for j ̸= i
We put di := −ei, for all i.
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Algorithm 6 Key Recovery Attack against GSW13 SHE
input: q, n
l← ⌊log2q⌋+ 1; N ← (n+ 1) · l
for r = 1 to n do
y← drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−1, tr,l−2, tr,l−3 ← 0
else
y← dl−2 + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−1, tr,l−2 ← 0; tr,l−3 ← 1
else
y← dl−1 + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−1, tr,l−3 ← 0; tr,l−2 ← 1
else
y← dl−2 + dl−1 + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−1 ← 0; tr,l−2, tr,l−3 ← 1
else
tr,l−1 ← 1; y← dl + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−2, tr,l−3 ← 0
else
y← dl−2 + dl + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−2 ← 0; tr,l−3 ← 1
else
tr,l−2 ← 1; y← dl−1 + dl + drl+1
if OD(Cy) = 0 then
tr,l−3 ← 0
else
tr,l−3 ← 1
end if
end if
end if
end if
end if
end if
end if
for k = l − 4 to 0 do
y← 2l−k−3 · (drl+1 +∑li=k+2 tr,i−1di)
tr,k ← OD(Cy)
end for
end for
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for i = 1 to n do
ti ← BitDecomp−1(ti,0, ti,1, . . . , ti,l−1)
end for
t← (t1, . . . , tn)
return t
We now focus on the NTRU-based SHE schemes. Gentry’s original FHE
scheme is based on ideal lattices and it is implemented using cyclotomic
rings. NTRU is a practical lattice-based cryptosystem, which is also based
on cyclotomic rings, that remained without a security proof for a long time.
NTRU was recently put on a stronger foundation by Stehle and Steinfeld
[74], and NTRU-based cryptosystems returned to become an interesting
research area. Scale-invariant homomorphic encryption was proposed by
Brakerski [11], presenting a construction that avoids the utilization of
modulus switching technique, considerably simplifying the scheme. We
now present original adaptive key recovery attacks on NTRU-based SHE
schemes. In particular, we attack the scale-invariant proposal [9, 55].
5.9 Attack against the LTV12 SHE Scheme
We start by recalling the LTV12 SHE Scheme [55]. Let λ be the security
parameter, consider an integer n = n(λ) and a prime number q = q(λ) ̸= 2.
Consider also a degree-n polynomial φ(x) = φλ(x): following [55], we will
use φ(x) = xn+1. Finally, let χ = χ(λ) a B(λ)-bounded error distribution
over the ring R := Z[x]/(φ(x)). The parameters n, q, φ(x) and χ are public
and we assume that given λ, there are polynomial-time algorithms that
output n, q and φ(x), and sample from the error distribution χ. The
message space is M = {0, 1}, and all operations on ciphertexts are carried
out in the ring Rq := Zq[x]/(φ(x)).
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KeyGen(λ) :
• sample f ′, g ← χ
• set f := 2f ′ + 1 so that
f ≡ 1 mod 2
• if f is not invertible in Rq,
resample f ′
• pk := h = 2gf−1 ∈ Rq
• sk := f ∈ R
Encrypt(pk,m):
• sample s, e← χ
• output ciphertext c := hs+ 2e+m ∈ Rq
Decrypt(sk, c):
• let µ = f · c ∈ Rq
• output µ′ := µ mod 2
Since we don’t need the evaluation step, we omit it in the description.
In the original paper [55], the somewhat homomorphic encryption scheme
is multi-key, i.e. one can use several secret keys sk1 = f1, . . . , skM = fM in
order to decrypt. By analyzing the original decryption step, one can see
that, in order to decrypt the plaintext message, we need to multiply secret
keys sk1 = f1, . . . , skM = fM together, and then multiply the result with the
ciphertext and reduce. For this reason, it is enough to retrieve, as the secret
key, the polynomial f1 · · · fM =: s = s(x) = s0+s1x+s2x2+· · ·+sn−1xn−1 ∈
Rq, with si ∈ (−q/2, q/2] for all i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. For this reason, it is
enough to present the scheme as we saw it, with only one secret key.
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Remark 5. In [55], the authors do not explicitly state how the decryption
behaves if µ mod 2 is not a constant. We consider three scenarios: (1)
output directly µ mod 2; (2) output the constant of µ mod R2; (3) output
an error. In the following, we describe here a key recovery attack for
scenario (1) and it can be easily extended to scenario (2), which we will
show later on in Chapter 6. It is likely that we can adapt our attack to
scenario (3), but we have not succeeded so far. We will include a discussion
about scenario (3) in Chapter 6.
5.9.1 Attack Preview
Generally, suppose the secret key is in the form of the polynomial f =
s(x) = s0 + s1x + s2x2 + · · · + sn−1xn−1 ∈ Rq. Now, since we assume q
odd, and si is an integer, we have −q/2 < si < q/2, and in particular
−
⌊
q
2
⌋
≤ si ≤
⌊
q
2
⌋
, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Each coefficient si can have⌊
q
2
⌋
− (−
⌊
q
2
⌋
)+1 = q possible different values. We remark that there exists
a bit representation of the si’s such that #bits(si) = ⌊log2(q−1)⌋+1 =: N ,
and #bits(s) = n · #bits(si) = n · (⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1). The decryption
oracle reveals a polynomial µ′(x) = µ(x) mod 2 = µ′0+µ′1x+· · ·+µ′n−1xn−1,
with µ′i ∈ {0, 1} for i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1. Hence, decryption oracle reveals n
bits at a time. Therefore, the minimum number of oracle queries needed
to recover s is N . As we will see, our attack needs N oracle queries,
plus at most n− 1 oracle queries necessary to determine the signs of the
coefficients of the secret key. We remark that the scheme as described in
[55] has message space M = {0, 1}. When the oracle decryption receives
an honestly-generated ciphertext, it returns either 0 = ∑n−1i=0 0 · xi ∈ Rq or
1 = 1 +∑n−1i=1 0 · xi ∈ Rq. However, in principle the oracle decryption can
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return any polynomial in {0, 1}/(xn + 1) and we will use this fact as basis
to build our attack.
Here is the workflow of our key recovery attack. First of all, we are
going to determine the parity of each coefficient si ∈ (−q/2, q/2]. Then,
we are going to find si by gradually reducing (halving) the interval in
which it lies. At some point, si will be reduced to belong to some interval
with at most two consecutive integers; the absolute value of si will be
deduced by its (known) parity. At this point, we will know the secret key
coefficient si in absolute value; in the last step, we are going to query
the oracle decryption at most n times in order to recover the sign of the
coefficients si, for i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, relative to the (unknown) sign of
s0. So in the end, we will end up with two possible candidate secret keys
s1(x) and s2(x) = −s1(x). We have then s(x) = s1(x) or s(x) = s2(x),
and recovering which one of the two is trivial with an extra oracle query.
In our description, we consider the coefficients si in the interval
(−q/2, q/2] and can recover the private key with at most ⌊log2q⌋ + n
decryption oracle queries. However, we could consider the stricter interval
[−B,B], with B the bound on coefficients given by the distribution χ from
which the coefficients are picked from. In this case, we can see that the
total number of queries needed to be submitted to the decryption oracle
are actually at most ⌊log2B⌋+ n.
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5.9.2 Detailed Attack
Preliminary Step
Submit to the decryption oracle the “ciphertext" c(x) = 1 ∈ Rq. The oracle
will compute and return the polynomial D(c(x) = 1) = s(x) mod 2 =∑n−1
i=0 (si mod 2)xi, which tells us the parity of each si, i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1.
Step 1.
Choose and submit to the decryption oracle the “ciphertext" c(x) = 2 ∈ Rq.
It will compute and return the polynomial D(c(x) = 2) = (2s(x) ∈
Rq) mod 2 =
∑n−1
i=0 [(2si mod q) mod 2]xi. For all i ∈ [0, n− 1] we have
−q + 1
2 ≤ si ≤
q − 1
2 , and so − q + 1 ≤ 2si ≤ q − 1 (A)
For each i, we have two cases to distinguish:
Case A1: (2si mod q) mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (A) implies that −q+12 ≤
2si ≤ q−12 , i.e. −q+14 ≤ si ≤ q−14
− q + 1 ≤ 4si ≤ q − 1 (A1)
Case B1: (2si mod q) mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (A) implies that q−12 + 1 ≤
2|si| ≤ q − 1, i.e. q+14 ≤ |si| ≤ q−12
q + 1 ≤ 4|si| ≤ 2q − 2 (B1)
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Step 2.
Choose and submit to the decryption oracle the “ciphertext" c(x) = 4 ∈ Rq.
It will compute and return the polynomialD(c(x) = 4) = [s(x)·4]q mod 2 =∑n−1
i=0 [[4si]q mod 2]xi. For each i, we have four cases to distinguish:
Case A2: In Step 1 case A1 held, and [4si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (A1)
implies that −q+12 ≤ 4si ≤ q−12 , i.e. −q+18 ≤ si ≤ q−18
− q + 1 ≤ 8si ≤ q − 1 (A2)
Case B2: In Step 1 case A1 held, and [4si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (A1)
implies that q−12 + 1 ≤ 4|si| ≤ q − 1, i.e. q+18 ≤ |si| ≤ q−14
q + 1 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 2q − 2 (B2)
Case C2: In Step 1 case B1 held, and [4si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (B1)
implies that q + 1 + q−12 ≤ 4|si| ≤ 2q − 2, i.e. 3q+18 ≤ |si| ≤ q−12
3q + 1 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 4q − 4 (C2)
Case D2: In Step 1 case B1 held, and [4si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (B1)
implies that q + 1 ≤ 4|si| ≤ 3q−12 , i.e. q+14 ≤ |si| ≤ 3q−18
2q + 2 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 3q − 1 (D2)
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Step 3.
Choose and submit to the decryption oracle the “ciphertext" c(x) = 8 ∈ Rq.
It will compute and return the polynomialD(c(x) = 8) = [s(x)·8]q mod 2 =∑n−1
i=0 [[8si]q mod 2]xi. For each i, we have four cases to distinguish:
Case A3: In Step 2 case A2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (A2)
implies that −q+12 ≤ 8si ≤ q−12 , i.e. −q+116 ≤ si ≤ q−116
− q + 1 ≤ 16si ≤ q − 1 (A3)
Case B3: In Step 2 case A2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (A2)
implies that q−12 + 1 ≤ 8|si| ≤ q − 1, i.e. q+116 ≤ |si| ≤ q−18
q + 1 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 2q − 2 (B3)
Case C3: In Step 2 case B2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (B2)
implies that 3q+12 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 2q − 2, i.e. 3q+116 ≤ |si| ≤ q−14
3q + 1 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 4q − 4 (C3)
Case D3: In Step 2 case B2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (B2)
implies that q + 1 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 3q−12 , i.e. q+18 ≤ |si| ≤ 3q−116
2q + 2 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 3q − 1 (D3)
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Case E3: In Step 2 case C2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (C2)
implies that 7q+12 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 4q − 4, i.e. 7q+116 ≤ |si| ≤ q−12
7q + 1 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 8q − 8 (E3)
Case F3: In Step 2 case C2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (C2)
implies that 3q + 1 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 7q−12 , i.e. 3q+18 ≤ |si| ≤ 7q−116
6q + 2 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 7q − 1 (F3)
Case G3: In Step 2 case D2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 0. Then, condition (D2)
implies that 2q + 2 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 5q−12 , i.e. q+14 ≤ |si| ≤ 5q−116
4q + 4 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 5q − 1 (G3)
Case H3: In Step 2 case D2 held, and [8si]q mod 2 = 1. Then, condition (D2)
implies that 5q+12 ≤ 8|si| ≤ 3q − 1, i.e. 5q+116 ≤ |si| ≤ 3q−18
5q + 1 ≤ 16|si| ≤ 6q − 2 (H3)
Final step.
We continue in this fashion and finally we obtain integers s′i := |si| ∈ [0, q−12 ],
for i = 0, 1, . . . , n−1. This is obtained in the last step, where all coefficients
|si|, in absolute value, can assume at most only two (consecutive) values;
the known parity will then determine |si|. It is easy to see that in order to
achieve this we need ⌊log2q⌋ steps.
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The strategy now is to find out whether si · sj < 0 or si · sj > 0 holds,
for every i, j with si, sj ̸= 0. Let sm be the first non-zero coefficient. This
way, we will obtain two possible candidates of the secret key, one with
sm > 0 and the other with sm < 0. A trivial query to the oracle decryption
will allow us to determine which is the correct secret key.
We have to choose an appropriate “ciphertext" c(x) = c0 + c1x+ · · ·+
cn−1xn−1 to submit to the decryption oracle. Choose c0 = 1, c1 = 1 and
cj = 0 for j ̸= 0, 1. Oracle decryption will compute and return the
polynomial
D(c(x)) = s(x) · c(x) = [s0 − sn−1]q mod 2 +
n−1∑
i=1
([si + si−1]q mod 2)xi
Fix i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1 such that si, si−1 ≠ 0. Let bi := [si+ si−1]q mod 2 be
the coefficient of xi, and let b′i := [s′i + s′i−1]q mod 2. There are two cases
to consider:
• s′i + s′i−1 ≥ q+12 . Then
• if bi = b′i, then si and si−1 have the same sign;
• if bi ̸= b′i, then si and si−1 have different signs.
• 0 ≤ s′i + s′i−1 ≤ q−12 . Then we need to make an extra query to
understand whether si and si−1 have the same sign or not.
Now, for each one of the i of the previous case (i.e. such that 0 ≤ s′i+s′i−1 ≤
q−1
2 , i = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1, and si, si−1 ̸= 0) we choose and submit to the
decryption oracle the polynomial c(x) = αi|si−1|+ αi|si|x, i.e. we choose
c0 = αi|si−1|, c1 = αi|si|, c2 = c3 = · · · = cn−1 = 0, where αi is chosen
such that
αi|si−1 · si| ∈
(
q − 1
4 ,
q − 1
2
]
(5.8)
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(it is always possible to find such an αi). The oracle decryption will return
the polynomial
D(c(x)) = s(x) · c(x) = [αi|si−1|s0 − αi|si|sn−1]q mod 2 +
+
n−1∑
j=1
([αi|si−1|sj + αi|si|sj−1]q mod 2)xj
Let’s focus on the coefficient of xi, i.e. βi := [αi|si−1|si+αi|si|si−1]q mod 2.
Now, there are two cases:
• if si, si−1 have different signs, then βi = 0;
• if si, si−1 have the same sign, then βi = 1 (trivial to verify: 5.8 holds,
and therefore [2αi · |si · si−1|]q) is odd.
By repeating this idea for every i = 1, 2, . . . , n−1 such that 0 ≤ s′i+s′i−1 ≤
q−1
2 we will know which one of the following relations si · si−1 < 0 ∨ si ·
si−1 > 0 holds, for every consecutive non-zero coefficients si, si−1.
Now, we have one more thing to consider: we have to be careful in case
one of the coefficient si is zero. In this case in fact, no information can be
given about the sign of si−1 if we compare it to si. To solve this problem,
we have to choose and submit to the decryption oracle a polynomial
c(x) = a+bxj for appropriates a, b, j. Let 0 ≤ m1 ≤ n−1 be an integer such
that sm1 is the first non-zero coefficient of the secret key s(x). If there exists
i1 > m1 such that si1 = 0, then let m2 be the first non-zero coefficient such
that i1 < m2 ≤ n−1. Then we want to compare the relative signs of sm1 and
sm2 by choosing the polynomial c(x) with c0 = α|sm1|, cm2−m1 = α|sm2|,
cj = 0 for j ̸= 0,m2−m1. So we have c(x) = α|sm1|+α|sm2|xm2−m1 , with
α such that α|sm1sm2| ∈
(
q−1
4 ,
q−1
2
]
. The oracle decryption will return the
polynomial D(c(x)) = s(x) · c(x) = β0 + β1x+ · · ·+ βn−1xn−1. Consider
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the m2-th coefficient βm2 = [α|sm1|sm2 + α|sm2|sm1 ]q mod 2. As before, we
can conclude that if sm1 , sm2 have different signs, then βm2 = 0, and if
sm1 , sm2 have the same sign, then βm2 = 1.
Now, similar to what just discussed, if there exists i2 > m2 such that
si2 = 0, then let m3 be the first non-zero coefficient such that m3 > i2. We
will in a similar fashion compare the relative signs of sm1 and sm3 . We keep
proceeding this way, and in the end we will know, for every 0 ≤ i, j ≤ n−1
such that si ≠ 0, sj ̸= 0, whether si ·sj > 0 or si ·sj < 0 occurs. This allows
us to determine two possible candidates for the secret key s(x) (assume sm
is the first non-zero coefficient; then one candidate has sm < 0, the other
has sm > 0). A trivial oracle decryption query will reveal which one of the
two is the correct secret key. The total number of queries needed to be
submitted to the oracle decryption query is then at most ⌊log2q⌋+ n.
5.10 Attack against the BLLN13 SHE Scheme
We start by recalling the BLLN13 SHE Scheme [9]. For a given positive
integer d ∈ N>0, define the quotient ring R := Z[x]/(Φd(x)), i.e. the
ring of polynomials with integer coefficients modulo the d-th cyclotomic
polynomial Φd(x) ∈ Z[x]. The degree of Φd is n = ϕ(d), where ϕ is Euler’s
totient function. As considered by the authors of [9], for correctness of
the scheme, let d be a power of 2; in this case, we have Φd(x) = xn + 1
with n also a power of 2. Therefore R = Z[x]/(xn + 1). The other
parameters of the [9] SHE scheme are a prime integer q ∈ N and an
integer t ∈ N such that 1 < t < q. Let also χkey, χerr be two distributions
on R. The parameters d, q, t, χkey and χerr are public and we assume
that given λ, there are polynomial-time algorithms that output d, q, t and
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φ(x), and sample from the error distributions χ. The message space is
M = R/tR = Zt[x]/(xn + 1), and all operations on ciphertexts are carried
out in the ring Rq := Zq[x]/(φ(x)).
KeyGen(λ) :
• sample f ′, g ← χkey
• let f = [tf ′ + 1]q
• if f is not invertible in Rq, resample f ′
• set pk := h = [tgf−1]q ∈ Rq
• set sk := f ∈ Rq
Encrypt(pk,m):
• for a message m+ tR, choose [m]t as its representative
• sample s, e← χerr
• output ciphertext c = [⌊q/t⌋[m]t + e+ hs]q ∈ Rq
Decrypt(sk, c):
• output m =
[⌊
t
q
· [fc]q
⌉]
t
∈ Rt
Since we don’t need the evaluation step, we omit it in the description.
5.10.1 Attack Preview
We are going to recover the secret key f(x) = f0 + f1x + f2x2 + · · · +
fn−1xn−1 ∈ Zq [x](xn+1) , where fi is an integer in (−q/2, q/2] for all i =
0, 1, . . . , n−1. In order to recover f(x), we are going to submit specifically-
chosen ’ciphertexts’ of the form c(x) = c0 + c1x+ c2x2 + · · ·+ cn−1xn−1 ∈
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Zq [x]
(xn+1) , with integers ci ∈ (−q/2, q/2]. Choose c(x) = 1 = 1 + 0x+ 0x2 +
· · ·+ 0xn−1. We have
D(c = 1) =
[⌊
t
q
· [f · 1]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
·
(
[f0]q + [f1]qx+ [f2]qx2 + · · ·+ [fn−1]qxn−1
)⌉]
t
∗=
[⌊
t
q
·
(
f0 + f1x+ · · ·+ fn−1xn−1
)⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
f0
⌉
+
⌊
t
q
f1
⌉
x+ · · ·+
⌊
t
q
fn−1
⌉
xn−1
]
t
Equality ∗= holds since the integer coefficients fi are already reduced
modulo q. Now, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 we have −q/2 < fi ≤ q/2. We
have that q > 2 since in [9] it is claimed that 1 < t < q, with t, q integers.
In particular, q is a prime integer greater than 2, and therefore q/2 /∈ N.
So we have −q/2 < fi < q/2. In particular we have that − t2 < tq · fi < t2 .
For every 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, let u(1)i :=
⌊
t
q
fi
⌉
. We have
⌈
− t2
⌉
≤ u(1)i ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
.
Each u(1)i can have
⌊
t
2
⌋
−
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ 1 = 2
⌊
t
2
⌋
+ 1 =

t if t is odd
t+ 1 if t is even
possible different values, i.e. u(1)i can have t different possible values if t
is odd, and can have t+ 1 different possible values if t is even. Now, for
every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, we have that [u(1)i ]t ∈ (−t/2, t/2] and therefore
• [u(1)i ]t ∈= [− t2 + 12 ,− t2 + 32 ,− t2 + 52 , · · · , t2 − 12 ] =: T1 if t is odd;
• [u(1)i ]t ∈
[
− t2 + 1,− t2 + 2, . . . , t2
]
=: T2 if t is even.
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We have that #(T1) = #(T2) = t. Let v(1)i := [u
(1)
i ]t for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1.
It is clear that if u(1)i = −t/2, i.e. if u(1)i = ⌈−t/2⌉ and t is even, then
v
(1)
i = t/2. We have
D(c(x) = 1) =
[
u
(1)
0 + u
(1)
1 x+ u
(1)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(1)n−1xn−1
]
t
= [u(1)0 ]t + [u
(1)
1 ]tx+ · · ·+ [u(1)n−1]txn−1
= v(1)0 + v
(1)
1 x+ v
(1)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ v(1)n−1xn−1
where, ∀i = 0, 1, . . . , n− 1, we have
v
(1)
i =

t
2 if u
(1)
i = − t2(i.e. if u(1)i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
and t is even)
u
(1)
i otherwise
In particular, if t is odd, then D(c = 1) = u(1)0 + u
(1)
1 x + u
(1)
2 x
2 + · · · +
u
(1)
n−1x
n−1.
We have, ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1,
if t is odd, − t2 +
1
2 ≤ v
(1)
i ≤
t
2 −
1
2; if t is even, −
t
2 + 1 ≤ v
(1)
i ≤
t
2
In both cases, v(1)i can only have t different values. As we saw before, in
case of t odd we need to perform ⌈log2(q/t)⌉+ 1 oracle decryption queries;
in case of t even, we need to perform extra oracle decryption queries (at
most n− 1) in order to understand which sign are given the coefficients
of the secret key. Therefore, the total number of queries to the decryption
oracle is at most ⌈log2(q/t)⌉+ n. If we use the actual bound B given on
the coefficients si by the distribution χ, we have that the total number of
queries to the decryption oracle is at most ⌈log2(B/t)⌉+ n.
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5.10.2 Detailed Attack in three Cases
Case 1: t is odd
Step 1: select c(x) = 1
Select “ciphertext" c(x) = 1 and submit it to the decryption oracle. Since
t is odd and v(1)i = u
(1)
i , ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, we obtain the polynomial D(c =
1) = u(1)0 +u
(1)
1 x+u
(1)
2 x
2+ · · ·+u(1)n−1xn−1, where
⌈
− t2
⌉
≤ u(1)i ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
. Every
u
(1)
i can have only t different values and can be written as u
(1)
i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ki,1,
with ki,1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}. Now, it is easy to see that
u
(1)
i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,1 ⇔ −q2 +
q
t
ki,1 < fi < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,1 + 1)
The polynomial obtained from the decryption oracle can therefore be
written as
D(c(x) = 1) = u(1)0 +u
(1)
1 x+u
(1)
2 x
2+ · · ·+u(1)n−1xn−1 =
n−1∑
i=0
(⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,1
)
xi
Each fi belongs to the interval (−q/2, q/2). But after this our first
query we learn values ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t− 1], 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, such that
− q2 +
q
t
ki,1 < fi < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,1 + 1) (F(0,1))
We have − q2 + qt (ki+1 + 1)−
(
− q2 + qtki+1
)
= q
t
. Therefore, we know each
integer coefficient fi with an error up to qt . The idea now is to keep
submitting ’ciphertext’ to the decryption oracle and obtain values ki,j,
with 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1 and increasing integers j = 1, 2, 3, . . ., in such a way
that we keep reducing the interval in which fi lies until we know fi with
an error smaller than 1, which determines each fi completely.
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Step 2: select c(x) = 2
Select now “ciphertext” c(x) = 2 = 2+ 0x+0x2+ · · ·+0xn−1. Decryption
oracle computes and return the polynomial
D(c = 2) =
[⌊
t
q
· [f · 2]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
·
(
[2f0]q + [2f1]qx+ [2f2]qx2 + · · ·+ [2fn−1]qxn−1
)⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
f
(2)
0
⌉
+
⌊
t
q
f
(2)
1
⌉
x+ · · ·+
⌊
t
q
f
(2)
n−1
⌉
xn−1
]
t
where we have put f (2)i := [2fi]q, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1; of course we have
− q2 < f (2)i < q2 . Now,
• if −q/4 < fi < q/4, then − q2 < 2fi < q2 and therefore f (2)i = [2fi]q =
2fi
• if −q/2 < fi < −q/4, then −q < 2fi < − q2 and therefore f (2)i =
[2fi]q = 2fi + q
• if q/4 < fi < q/2, then q2 < 2fi < q and therefore f (2)i = [2fi]q =
2fi − q
So we have
f
(2)
i = [2fi]q =

2fi if − q4 < fi < q4
2fi + q if − q2 < fi < − q4 , and in this case 0 < f (2)i < q2
2fi − q if q4 < fi < q2 , and in this case − q2 < f (2)i < 0
(5.9)
Let u(2)i :=
⌊
t
q
· f (2)i
⌉
. Then
D(c = 2) =
[
u
(2)
0 + u
(2)
1 x+ u
(2)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(2)n−1xn−1
]
t
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As before, u(2)i can have only t different possible values, and can be
written as u(2)i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,2, with ki,2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t − 1}, and also
u
(2)
i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,2 ⇔ − q2 + qtki,2 < fi < − q2 + qt (ki,2 + 1). As before, since
−q/2 < f (2)i < q/2 and t is odd, we have
⌈
− t2
⌉
≤ u(2)i ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
, and therefore
we can simply write D(c = 2) = u(2)0 + u
(2)
1 x+ u
(2)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(2)n−1xn−1 =∑n−1
i=0
(⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,2
)
xi. So now, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, we know ki,1, ki,2
such that 
− q2 + qtki,1 < fi < − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 1)
− q2 + qtki,2 < [2fi]q < − q2 + qt (ki,2 + 1)
There are 3 cases to distinguish, where 3 = 22 − 1.
(1/3)[c=2]. If − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 1) ≤ − q4 ∧ − q2 + qtki,1 ≥ − q2 , which says that
0 ≤ ki,1 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
, then we are sure that fi ∈ (− q2 ,− q4). Therefore,
by condition (5.9), we expect f (2)i = [2fi]q = 2fi + q. Therefore,
−3q4 + q2tki,2 < fi < −3q4 + q2t(ki,2 + 1)
(2/3)[c=2]. If − q2+ qt (ki,1+1) ≤ q4∧− q2+ qtki,1 ≥ − q4 , which says that
⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,1 ≤⌊
3t
4 − 1
⌋
, then we are sure that fi ∈ (− q4 , q4). Therefore, by condition
(5.9), we expect f (2)i = [2fi]q = 2fi. Therefore, − q4 + q2tki,2 < fi <
− q4 + q2t(ki,2 + 1)
(3/3)[c=2]. If − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 1) ≤ q2 ∧ − q2 + qtki,1 ≥ q4 , which says that
⌈
3t
4
⌉
≤
ki,1 ≤ t−1, then we are sure that fi ∈ ( q4 , q2). Therefore, by condition
(5.9), we expect f (2)i = [2fi]q = 2fi − q. Therefore, q4 + q2tki,2 < fi <
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
Now, we remark that there are values of ki,1 for which is not clear to
which of the previous cases we are falling in. For instance, if ki,1 is such
that − q4 ∈
(
− q2 + qtki,1,− q2 + qt (ki,1 + 1)
)
, then we are not sure whether
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we are in Case (1/3)[c=2] or in Case (2/3)[c=2]. This uncertainty happens
when @ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t − 1] such that − q2 + qtki,1 = − q4 , i.e. such that
ki,1 = t/4. So, if @ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t − 1] such that ki,1 = t/4, i.e. if 4 - t,
then − q4 ∈
(
− q2 + qt
⌊
t
4
⌋
,− q2 + qt
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
. So, if ki,1 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N,
we have that
fi ∈
(
−q2 +
q
t
⌊
t
4
⌋
,−q2 +
q
t
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I
It is easy to see that
− q2 +
q
t
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
)
≤ 0,∀1 < t < q (5.10)
There are two cases:
1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (−q/2,−q/4). Then condition (5.9) implies that
f
(2)
i = [2fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (−q/4, 0). Then f (2)i = [2fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,1 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N, then
• if f (2)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (−q/2,−q/4) and apply Case (1/3)[c=2]
• if f (2)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (−q/4, 0) and apply Case (2/3)[c=2]
Similarly to what just discussed, if ki,1 is such that
q
4 ∈
(
−q2 +
q
t
ki,1,−q2 +
q
t
(ki,1 + 1)
)
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then we are not sure if we are in Case (2/3)[c=2] or in Case (3/3)[c=2] This
uncertainty happens when @ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t− 1] such that − q2 + qtki,1 = q4 ,
i.e. such that ki,1 = 3t/4. So, if @ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t−1] such that ki,1 = 3t/4,
then q4 ∈
(
− q2 + qt
⌊
3t
4
⌋
,− q2 + qt
(⌊
3t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
. So, if ki,1 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N,
we have that fi ∈
(
− q2 + qt
⌊
3t
4
⌋
,− q2 + qt
(⌊
3t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I. It is easy to see
that
− q2 +
q
t
⌊3t
4
⌋
≥ 0,∀t, q (5.11)
There are two cases:
1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (0, q/4). Then f (2)i = [2fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (q/4, q/2). Then condition (5.9) implies that f (2)i =
[2fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,1 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N, then
• if f (2)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (−q/4, q/4) and apply Case (2/3)[c=2]
• if f (2)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (q/4, q/2) and apply Case (3/3)[c=2]
We can write now all the 3 cases in a more complete way:
(1/3)[c=2]. Suppose that
0 ≤ ki,1 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,1 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
,with t4 /∈ N ∧ f
(2)
i ∈ (0, q/2)
)
(K(1,1))
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Then
fi ∈
(
−q2 ,−
q
4
)
, −3q4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi < −
3q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
(F((1,1))
(2/3)[c=2]. Suppose that
⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,1 ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,1 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (2)i ∈ (−q/2, 0)
)
∨
∨
(
ki,1 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (2)i ∈ (0, q/2)
)
(K(1,2))
Then
fi ∈
(
−q4 ,
q
4
)
, −q4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi < −
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) (F(1,2))
(3/3)[c=2]. Suppose that
⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,1 ≤ t− 1 ∨
(
ki,1 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (2)i ∈ (−q/2, 0)
)
(K(1,3))
Then
fi ∈
(
q
4 ,
q
2
)
,
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi <
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) (F(1,3))
In all cases, we end up by knowing fi with an error up to q2t .
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Step 3: select c(x) = 4
Select now “ciphertext” c(x) = 4 = 4+ 0x+0x2+ · · ·+0xn−1. Decryption
oracle computes and return the polynomial
D(c = 4) =
[⌊
t
q
· [f · 4]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
·
(
[4f0]q + [4f1]qx+ [4f2]qx2 + · · ·+ [4fn−1]qxn−1
)⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
f
(3)
0
⌉
+
⌊
t
q
f
(3)
1
⌉
x+ · · ·+
⌊
t
q
f
(3)
n−1
⌉
xn−1
]
t
where we have put f (3)i := [4fi]q, for every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1; of course we have
− q2 < f (3)i < q2 .
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Now,
• if −q/8 < fi < q/8, then
−q2 < 4fi <
q
2
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi
• if −q/4 < fi < −q/8, then
−q < 4fi < −q2
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi + q
• if q/8 < fi < q/4, then
q
2 < 4fi < q
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi − q
• if −3q/8 < fi < −q/4, then
−3q2 < 4fi < −q
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi + q
• if q/4 < fi < 3q/8, then
q < 4fi <
3q
2
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi − q
• if −q/2 < fi < −3q/8, then
−2q < 4fi < −3q2
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi + 2q
• if 3q/8 < fi < q/2, then
3q
2 < 4fi < 2q
and therefore
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q = 4fi − 2q
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So we have
f
(3)
i = [4fi]q =

4fi if − q8 < fi < q8
4fi + q if − q4 < fi < − q8 , and in this case 0 < f (3)i < q2
4fi − q if q8 < fi < q4 , and in this case − q2 < f (3)i < 0
4fi + q if − 3q8 < fi < − q4 , and in this case − q2 < f (3)i < 0
4fi − q if q4 < fi < 3q8 , and in this case 0 < f (3)i < q2
4fi + 2q if − q2 < fi < −3q8 , and in this case 0 < f (3)i < q2
4fi − 2q if 3q8 < fi < q2 , and in this case − q2 < f (3)i < 0
(5.12)
Let u(3)i :=
⌊
t
q
· f (3)i
⌉
. We have
D(c = 4) =
[
u
(3)
0 + u
(3)
1 x+ u
(3)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(3)n−1xn−1
]
t
As before, u(3)i can have only t different possible values, and can be written
as
u
(3)
i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,3, with ki,3 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}
As before, we have
u
(3)
i =
⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,3 ⇔ −q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < fi < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
As before, since −q/2 < f (3)i < q/2 and t is odd, we have
− t2 <
⌈
− t2
⌉
≤ u(3)i ≤
⌊
t
2
⌋
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and therefore we can simply write
D(c = 4) = u(3)0 + u
(3)
1 x+ u
(3)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(3)n−1xn−1 =
n−1∑
i=0
(⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,3
)
and therefore we learn integers ki,3, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. Now, for each
0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, we know ki,1, ki,2, ki,3 such that

− q2 + qtki,1 < fi < − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 1)
− q2 + qtki,2 < [2fi]q < − q2 + qt (ki,2 + 1)
− q2 + qtki,3 < [4fi]q < − q2 + qt (ki,3 + 1)
There are 7 = 23 − 1 cases to distinguish.
(1/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (1/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
condition (K(1,1)) and fi satisfies condition (F((1,1)):
fi ∈
(
−q2 ,−
q
4
)
, −3q4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi < −
3q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
If
−3q4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤ −
3q
8 ∧ −
3q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥ −
q
2
which says that ⌈
t
2
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
then we are sure that fi ∈ (− q2 ,−3q8 ). Therefore, by condition (5.12),
we expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi + 2q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi + 2q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
−5q8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
5q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
128 Key-Recovery Attacks against Existing SHE Schemes
(2/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (1/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
again condition (K(1,1)) and fi satisfies condition (F((1,1)). If
−3q4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤ −
q
4 ∧ −
3q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥ −
3q
8
which says that ⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤ t− 1
then we are sure that fi ∈ (−3q8 ,− q4). Therefore, by condition (5.12),
we expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi + q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi + q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
−3q8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
(3/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (2/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
condition (K(1,2)) and fi satisfies condition (F(1,2)):
fi ∈
(
−q4 ,
q
4
)
, −q4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi < −
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
If
−q4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤ −
q
8 ∧ −
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥ −
q
4
which says that
0 ≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
then we are sure that fi ∈ (− q4 ,− q8). Therefore, by condition (5.12),
we expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi + q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi + q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
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−3q8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
(4/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (2/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
again condition (K(1,2)) and fi satisfies condition (F(1,2)). If
−q4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤
q
8 ∧ −
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥ −
q
8
which says that ⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
then we are sure that fi ∈ (− q8 , q8). Therefore, by condition (5.12),
we expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
−q8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
(5/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (2/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
again condition (K(1,2)) and fi satisfies condition (F(1,2)). If
−q4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤
q
4 ∧ −
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥
q
8
which says that ⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤ t− 1
then we are sure that fi ∈ ( q8 , q4). Therefore, by condition (5.12), we
expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi − q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi − q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
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q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
(6/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (3/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
condition (K(1,3)) and fi satisfies condition (F(1,3)):
fi ∈
(
q
4 ,
q
2
)
,
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 < fi <
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
If
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤
3q
8 ∧
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥
q
4
which says that
0 ≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
then we are sure that fi ∈ ( q4 , 3q8 ). Therefore, by condition (5.12), we
expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi − q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi − q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
(7/7)[c=4]. Suppose that at Step 2, we were in case (3/3)[c=2], i.e. ki,1 satisfies
again condition (K(1,3)) and fi satisfies condition (F(1,3)). If
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1) ≤
q
2 ∧
q
4 +
q
2tki,2 ≥
3q
8
which says that ⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
2 − 1
⌋
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then we are sure that fi ∈ (3q8 , q2). Therefore, by condition (5.12), we
expect f (3)i = [4fi]q = 4fi − 2q. Therefore,
−q2 +
q
t
ki,3 < 4fi − 2q < −q2 +
q
t
(ki,3 + 1)
3q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1)
We remark that, similarly as what we discussed in Step 2, there are values
of ki,2 for which is not clear immediately to which of the previous cases we
are falling in. For instance, if in Step 2 we were in case (1/3)[c=2], and if
ki,2 is such that
−3q8 ∈
(
−3q4 +
q
2tki,2,−
3q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
)
then we are not sure if we are in Case (1/7)[c=4] or in Case (2/7)[c=4]. This
uncertainty happens when @ki,2 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t− 1] such that
−3q4 +
q
2tki,2 = −
3q
8
i.e. such that ki,2 = 3t/4. So, if @ki,2 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t−1] such that ki,2 = 3t/4,
i.e. if 4 - 3t, i.e. if 4 - t, then
−3q8 ∈
(
−3q4 +
q
2t
⌊3t
4
⌋
,−3q4 +
q
2t
(⌊3t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
So, if ki,2 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N, we have the following.
fi ∈
(
−3q4 +
q
2t
⌊3t
4
⌋
,−3q4 +
q
2t
(⌊3t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I
There are two cases:
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1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (−q/2,−3q/8)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (−3q/8,−q/4)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,2 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N, then
• if f (3)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (−q/2,−3q/8) and apply Case (1/7)[c=4]
• if f (3)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (−3q/8,−q/4) and apply Case (2/7)[c=4]
Similarly to what just discussed, if in Step 2 we were in case (2/3)[c=2],
and if ki,2 is such that
−q8 ∈
(
−q4 +
q
2tki,2,−
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
)
then we are not sure if we are in Case (3/7)[c=4] or in Case (4/7)[c=4]. Again,
reasoning in similar way as before, if ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N, we have the
following.
fi ∈
(
−q4 +
q
2t
⌊
t
4
⌋
,−q4 +
q
2t
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I
It is easy to see that
− q4 +
q
2t
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
)
≤ 0,∀t, q (5.13)
There are two cases:
1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (−q/4,−q/8)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
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2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (−q/8, 0)
Then f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N, then
• if f (3)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (−q/4,−q/8) and apply Case (3/7)[c=4]
• if f (3)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (−q/8, 0) and apply Case (4/7)[c=4]
Similarly, if in Step 2 we were in case (2/3)[c=2], and if ki,2 is such that
q
8 ∈
(
−q4 +
q
2tki,2,−
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
)
then we are not sure if we are in Case (4/7)[c=4] or in Case (5/7)[c=4]. Again,
reasoning in similar way as before, if ki,2 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N, we have the
following.
fi ∈
(
−q4 +
q
2t
⌊3t
4
⌋
,−q4 +
q
2t
(⌊3t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I
It is easy to see that
− q4 +
q
2t
⌊3t
4
⌋
≥ 0,∀t, q (5.14)
There are two cases:
1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (0, q/8)
Then f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (q/8, q/4)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,2 =
⌊
3t
4
⌋
, with 3t4 /∈ N, then
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• if f (3)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (0, q/8) and apply Case (4/7)[c=4]
• if f (3)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (q/8, q/4) and apply Case (5/7)[c=4]
Similarly, if in Step 2 we were in case (3/3)[c=2], and if ki,2 is such that
3q
8 ∈
(
q
4 +
q
2tki,2,
q
4 +
q
2t(ki,2 + 1)
)
then we are not sure if we are in Case (6/7)[c=4] or in Case (7/7)[c=4]. Again,
reasoning in similar way as before, if ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N, we have the
following.
fi ∈
(
q
4 +
q
2t
⌊
t
4
⌋
,
q
4 +
q
2t
(⌊
t
4
⌋
+ 1
))
=: I
There are two cases:
1/2: fi ∈ I1 := I ∩ (q/4, 3q/8)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (0, q/2)
2/2: fi ∈ I2 := I ∩ (3q/8, q/2)
Then condition (5.12) implies that f (3)i = [4fi]q ∈ (−q/2, 0)
So, to sum up we have that if ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
, with t4 /∈ N, then
• if f (3)i ∈ (0, q/2) then fi ∈ (q/4, 3q/8) and apply Case (6/7)[c=4]
• if f (3)i ∈ (−q/2, 0) then fi ∈ (3q/8, q/2) and apply Case (7/7)[c=4]
(1/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,1)) holds and(⌈
t
2
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
0, q2
))) (K(2,1))
Then
fi ∈ (−q2 ,−
3q
8 ), −
5q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
5q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,1))
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(2/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,1)) holds and(⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤ t− 1 ∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))) (K(2,2))
Then
fi ∈ (−3q8 ,−
q
4), −
3q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,2))
(3/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,2)) holds and(
0 ≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
0, q2
))) (K(2,3))
Then
fi ∈ (−q4 ,−
q
8), −
3q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,3))
(4/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,2)) holds and[ ⌈ t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))
∨
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
0, q2
)) ] (K(2,4))
Then
fi ∈ (−q8 ,
q
8), −
q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi < −
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,4))
(5/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,2)) holds and(⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤ t− 1 ∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))) (K(2,5))
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Then
fi ∈ (q8 ,
q
4),
q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,5))
(6/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,3)) holds and(
0 ≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
0, q2
))) (K(2,6))
Then
fi ∈ (q4 ,
3q
8 ),
q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,6))
(7/7)[c=4]. Suppose that
Condition (K(1,3)) holds and(⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,2 ≤
⌊
t
2 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,2 =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (3)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))) (K(2,7))
Then
fi ∈ (3q8 ,
q
2),
3q
8 +
q
4tki,3 < fi <
3q
8 +
q
4t(ki,3 + 1) (F(2,7))
In all cases, we end up by knowing fi with an error up to q4t .
Generalization and complexity
At each step, we keep submitting “ciphertexts" c(x) := 2h, for increasing
values h = 0, 1, 2, . . ., i.e. at step h + 1 we submit ciphertext c(x) = 2h.
Suppose we are at step h+ 1. Then we submit to the decryption oracle
the ’ciphertext’ c(x) = 2h, and the decryption oracle will return us a
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polynomial
D(c = 2h) = u(h+1)0 + u
(h+1)
1 x+ · · ·+ u(h+1)n−1 xn−1 =
n−1∑
i=0
u
(h+1)
i x
i
=
n−1∑
i=0
(⌈
− t2
⌉
+ ki,h+1
)
∈ Rt
from which we learn values ki,h+1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. So, at this point, we
know ki,j, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and 1 ≤ j ≤ h+ 1. These values allow us to
distinguish between mh := 2h+1− 1 cases: for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, we know
that integer fi belongs to one of the cases:
(a/2h+1 − 1)[c=2h]. Suppose that
[Condition (C(h, a, 1)) holds] ∧ [Condition (C(h, a, 2)) holds] (K(h,a))
Then
fi ∈ (xa,h, ya,h), ∆h,a + q2htki,h+1 < fi < ∆h,a +
q
2ht(ki,h+1 + 1)
(F(h,a))
where a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2h+1 − 1}. Since
∆h,a +
q
2ht(ki,h+1 + 1)−
(
∆h,a +
q
2htki,h+1
)
= q2ht ,
this allows us to recover, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, the integer fi with an
error up to q2ht . Therefore, we keep submitting ’ciphertexts’ c(x) = 2
h
for increasing values h = 0, 1, 2, . . . until h is such that q2ht < 1, i.e. h ≥
⌈log2(q/t)⌉. So, we have to repeat our attack, submitting ciphertexts c(x) =
1 = 20, 21, 22, 23, . . . , 2H , where H := ⌈log2(q/t)⌉. Se we repeat our attack
H+1 times. Now, the secret key is f(x) = f0+f1x+ · · ·+fn−1xn−1, where
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fi ∈ (−q/2, q/2], ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1. So fi can have q different values. The
decryption oracle reveals a polynomial m(x) = m0+m1x+ · · ·+mn−1xn−1,
where mi ∈ (−t/2, t/2], ∀0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. So mi can have t different values.
Each fi can be described with at most ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋ + 1 bits. So f(x)
can be described with n · (⌊log2(q − 1)⌋+ 1). Oracle decryption reveals
n · (⌊log2(t− 1)⌋+ 1) bits. So the minimum number of oracle queries to
determine f(x) is given by n·(⌊log2(q−1)⌋+1)
n·(⌊log2(t−1)⌋+1) . In order to finish our attack for
t odd, we need to give complete description of ∆h,a, Condition C(h, a, 1)
and Condition C(h, a, 2), for each 0 ≤ h ≤ ⌈log2(q/t)⌉ = H and for each
1 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1. Fix 0 ≤ h ≤ ⌈log2(q/t)⌉. For a given 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1
put
δh,a :=

2h−1 if a = 2h⌊
a
2
⌋
if 1 ≤ a < 2h⌈
a
2
⌉
if 2h < a ≤ 2h+1 − 1
, ∆h,a := −
(
1
2 +
1
2h+1 −
δh,a
2h
)
· q
Also, put
η(h, a) :=

⌈
a
2
⌉
if 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h⌊
a
2
⌋
if 2h < a ≤ 2h+1 − 1
Then
Condition (C(h, a, 1)) = Condition (K(h− 1, η(h, a)))
Remark that, if h = 0 or h = 1, then Condition (C(h, a, 1)) = ∅ i.e., we
don’t put any condition at all, vacuous condition.
For Condition C(h, a, 2), remark that if h = 0 then Condition (C(0, a, 2)) =
∅ i.e., we don’t put any condition at all, vacuous condition. One can see
that, at step h+ 1, condition C(h, a, 2) is only one among the following 5:
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1. V3,h := U2,1 = U1,1 ∧ (r is even) = U3,1 ∧ (r is odd):
0 ≤ ki,h ≤
⌊
t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,h =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
0, q2
))
(V3,h)
2. V5,h := U2,2:
⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,h ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,h =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))
∨
∨
(
ki,h =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
0, q2
)) (V5,h)
3. V2,h := U2,3 = U1,2 ∧ (r is odd) = U3,2 ∧ (r is even):
⌈3t
4
⌉
≤ ki,h ≤ t− 1 ∨
(
ki,h =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))
(V2,h)
4. V1,h := U1,1 ∧ (r is odd) = U3,1 ∧ (r is even):
⌈
t
2
⌉
≤ ki,h ≤
⌊3t
4 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,h =
⌊3t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
0, q2
))
(V1,h)
5. V0,h := U1,2 ∧ (r is even) = U3,2 ∧ (r is odd):
⌈
t
4
⌉
≤ ki,h ≤
⌊
t
2 − 1
⌋
∨
(
ki,h =
⌊
t
4
⌋
∧ f (h+1)i ∈
(
−q2 , 0
))
(V0,h)
So, suppose we are in case (a/2h+1 − 1)[c=2h]. Then we see that we have
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Therefore, we have
C(h, a, 2) =

V1,h if 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h − 2 ∧ a ≡ 1 mod 4 or
2h + 2 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1 ∧ a ≡ 0 mod 4
V2,h if 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h − 2 ∧ a ≡ 2 mod 4 or
2h + 2 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1 ∧ a ≡ 1 mod 4 or
a = 2h + 1
V3,h if 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h − 2 ∧ a ≡ 3 mod 4 or
2h + 2 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1 ∧ a ≡ 2 mod 4 or
a = 2h − 1
V0,h if 1 ≤ a ≤ 2h − 2 ∧ a ≡ 0 mod 4 or
2h + 2 ≤ a ≤ 2h+1 − 1 ∧ a ≡ 3 mod 4
V5,h if a = 2h
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Case 2: t is even but not 2
Step 1: select c(x) = 1
Select ”ciphertext” c(x) = 1 and submit it to the decryption oracle. We
obtain the polynomial D(c(x) = 1) = v(1)0 + v
(1)
1 x+ v
(1)
2 x
2+ · · ·+ v(1)n−1xn−1.
Suppose there exists v(1)i = t/2. This means that either u
(1)
i = t2 or
u
(1)
i = − t2 . We want to find out which one among the two above cases
holds.
1. If we are in case u(1)i = t2 , then we have
⌊
t
q
fi
⌉
= t2 ⇔ q2 − q2t < fi < q2
2. If we are in case u(1)i = − t2 , then we have
⌊
t
q
fi
⌉
= − t2 ⇔ − q2 < fi <
− q2 + q2t
To find out which one is the case, we have to wait for the next step.
Now, let’s focus on all the other v(1)i ≠ t2 . We have in this case,
v
(1)
i = u
(1)
i . Now, similarly as before, we have − t2 + 1 ≤ u(1)i ≤ t2 , and
every u(1)i can have only t different values; it can be written as u
(1)
i =
− t2 + 1 + ki,1, with ki,1 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}. Now, it is easy to see that
u
(1)
i = −
t
2 + 1 + ki,1 ⇔ −
q
2 +
q
t
(ki,1 +
1
2) < fi < −
q
2 +
q
t
(ki,1 +
3
2)
The polynomial obtained from the decryption oracle can therefore be
written as D(c(x) = 1) = ∑n−1i=0 (− t2 + 1 + ki,1)xi. Each fi belongs to
the interval (−q/2, q/2). But after this our first query we learn values
ki,1 ∈ [0, 1, . . . , t − 1], 0 ≤ i ≤ n − 1, such that − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 12) < fi <
− q2+ qt (ki,1+ 32)We have that− q2+ qt (ki+1+3/2)−
(
− q2 + qt (ki+1 + 1/2)
)
= q
t
.
Therefore, we know each integer coefficient fi with an error up to qt .
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The idea now is to keep submitting ’ciphertext’ to the decryption
oracle and obtain values ki,j, with 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 and increasing integers
j = 1, 2, 3, . . ., in such a way that we keep reducing the interval in which
fi lies until we know fi with an error smaller than 1, which determines
each fi completely.
Step 2: select c(x) = 2
Select now ”ciphertext” c(x) = 2 = 2+0x+ · · ·+0xn−1. Decryption oracle
computes and return the polynomial
D(c(x) = 2) =
[⌊
t
q
· [f · 2]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
·
(
[2f0]q + [2f1]qx+ · · ·+ [2fn−1]qxn−1
)⌉]
t
Now, let’s focus on
[⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
t
xi for each i such that, in the previous step,
v
(1)
i = t2 .
1. We have
q
2 −
q
2t < fi <
q
2 ⇔ q −
q
t
< 2fi < q ⇔ −q
t
< [2fi]q < 0
⇔ −1 < t
q
[2fi]q < 0
⇔ −1 ≤
[⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
t
≤ 0
⇔
[⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
t
=

0 or − 1 if t > 2
0 or 1 if t = 2
2. We have analogously − q2 < fi < − q2 + q2t ⇔
[⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
t
= 0 or 1.
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From now on we assume t > 2; we will consider later the case in which
t = 2. Let v(2)i =
[⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
t
. We have that
1. if v(2)i = −1, then u(1)i = t2 and q2 − q2t < fi < q2
2. if v(2)i = 1, then u
(1)
i = − t2 and − q2 < fi < − q2 + q2t
3. if v(2)i = 0, then we can’t conclude right now the exact interval in
which fi belongs; this will be considered in the next step.
Remark 6. Suppose we are in the above case 3, i.e. v(2) =
⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= 0.
Then
1. We have
q
2 −
q
2t < fi <
q
2 ∧
⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= 0⇔ q2 −
q
4t < fi <
q
2
2. Similarly, we have
−q2 < fi < −
q
2 +
q
2t ∧
⌊
t
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= 0⇔ −q2 < fi < −
q
2 +
q
4t
We will use this remark in the next step to investigate further the interval
in which fi lies. Now, let’s focus on all of the other coefficients. Using the
same arguments as in section 5.10.2, the decryption oracle computes and
return the polynomial
D(c(x) = 2) =
[⌊
t
q
· [f · 2]q
⌉]
t
=
[⌊
t
q
f
(2)
0
⌉
+
⌊
t
q
f
(2)
1
⌉
x+ · · ·+
⌊
t
q
f
(2)
n−1
⌉
xn−1
]
t
=
[
u
(2)
0 + u
(2)
1 x+ u
(2)
2 x
2 + · · ·+ u(2)n−1xn−1
]
t
:= v(2)0 + v
(2)
1 x+ · · ·+ v(2)n−1xn−1
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As before, suppose there exists v(2)i = t/2. This means that either u
(2)
i = t2 ,
or u(2)i = − t2 . We can easily understand which case we are by considering
the known value v(1)i ̸= t2 . All the other v(2)i correspond to values u(2)i ̸= −t2 .
These u(2)i can then have only t different possible values, and can be written
as u(2)i = − t2 + 1 + ki,2, with ki,2 ∈ {0, 1, . . . , t− 1}, and also
u
(2)
i = −
t
2 + 1 + ki,2 ⇔ −
q
2 +
q
t
(ki,2 +
1
2) < fi < −
q
2 +
q
t
(ki,2 +
3
2)
So now, for each 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1 such that v(1)i ≠ t2 ∨ (v(1)i = t2 ∧ v(2)i = 0),
we know ki,1, ki,2 such that

− q2 + qt (ki,1 + 12) < fi < − q2 + qt (ki,1 + 32)
− q2 + qt (ki,2 + 12) < fi < − q2 + qt (ki,2 + 32)
There are 3 cases to distinguish. These cases can be computed in an
analogous way to what seen for the case t odd. We omit the details.
Generalization
We continue in this way, following the blueprint for t odd and taking care
of all the coefficients for which v(1)i = t2 and all subsequents v
(j)
i = 0 (when
we finally find a j ≥ 2 such that v(j)i = 1 or −1, then we can deduce
the original value of u(1)i = t2 or − t2). If at the last step m we still get
v
(m)
i = 0, then all the values u
(1)
i remain undetermined, which also say that
all the corresponding coefficients fi can have only two possible values. At
this point, the strategy is to submit to the decryption oracle ’ciphertexts’
in order to determine whether fi · fj < 0 or fi · fj > 0 holds among all
the non-zero coefficients fi, fj, in a way similar to what we have already
discussed for the attack on the [55] SHW scheme. We omit the details; we
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will give a description of how to do this in the case t = 2; the general case
t > 2 is then easy to obtain. We study now the case t = 2.
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Case 3: t = 2
Step 1: select c(x) = 1
Choose and submit to the decryption oracle the polynomial c(x) = 1. It
will compute and return the polynomial
D(c(x) = 1) =
[⌊
2
q
· [f · 1]q
⌉]
2
=
[⌊
2
q
f0
⌉
+
⌊
2
q
f1
⌉
x+ · · ·+
⌊
2
q
fn−1
⌉
xn−1
]
2
For every 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, u(1)i :=
⌊
2
q
fi
⌉
is such that −1 ≤ u(1)i ≤ 1, and so
v
(1)
i := [u
(1)
i ]2 = 0 or 1. We have two cases to distinguish:
1) v(1)i = 0. We have v
(1)
i = 0 ⇔ u(1)i = 0 ⇔
⌊
2
q
fi
⌉
= 0 ⇔ −12 < 2qfi <
1
2 ⇔ − q4 < fi < q4
2) v(1)i = 1. We have
v
(1)
i = 1 ⇔ u(1)i = −1 or u(1)i = +1
⇔
⌊
2
q
fi
⌉
= −1 or
⌊
2
q
fi
⌉
= +1
⇔ −32 <
2
q
fi < −12 or
1
2 <
2
q
fi <
3
2
⇔ −q2 < fi < −
q
4 or
q
4 < fi <
q
2
Step 2: select c(x) = 2
Choose and submit to the decryption oracle the polynomial c(x) = 2. It
will compute and return the polynomial
D(c(x) = 2) =
n−1∑
i=0
[⌊
2
q
[2fi]q
⌉]
2
xi =:
n−1∑
i=0
[
u
(2)
i
]
2
xi =:
n−1∑
i=0
v
(2)
i x
i
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We have two cases to distinguish:
1) v(2)i = 0. We have
v
(2)
i = 0 ⇔ u(2)i = 0⇔
⌊
2
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= 0⇔ −12 <
2
q
[2fi]q <
1
2
⇔ −q4 < [2fi]q <
q
4
⇔ −q4 < 2fi <
q
4 or −
5q
4 < 2fi < −
3q
4 or
3q
4 < 2fi <
5q
4
⇔ −q8 < fi <
q
8 or −
q
2 < fi < −
3q
8 or
3q
8 < fi <
q
2
We have three cases to distinguish, according to which known interval
fi lies at the end of step 1:
1.1) If − q4 < fi < q4 , then − q8 < fi < q8
1.2) If − q2 < fi < − q4 , then − q2 < fi < −3q8
1.3) ] If q4 < fi <
q
2 , then
3q
8 < fi <
q
2
2) v(2)i = 1. We have
v
(2)
i = 1 ⇔ u(2)i = −1 or u(2)i = +1
⇔
⌊
2
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= −1 or
⌊
2
q
[2fi]q
⌉
= +1
⇔ −32 <
2
q
[2fi]q < −12 or
1
2 <
2
q
[2fi]q <
3
2
⇔ −3q4 < [2fi]q < −
q
4 or
q
4 < [2fi]q <
3q
4
⇔ −3q4 < 2fi < −
q
4 or
q
4 < 2fi <
3q
4
⇔ −3q8 < fi < −
q
8 or
q
8 < fi <
3q
8
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Now, again we have three cases to distinguish, according to which known
interval fi lies at the end of step 1:
2.1) If − q4 < fi < q4 , then − q4 < fi < − q8 or q8 < fi < q4
2.2) If − q2 < fi < − q4 , then −3q8 < fi < − q4
2.3) ] If q4 < fi <
q
2 , then
q
4 < fi <
3q
8
Generalization and the last step
We continue in this way, and in the end we will know each coefficient fi up
to the sign. Therefore, we will know a polynomial f ′(x) = f ′0 + f ′1x+ · · ·+
f ′n−1x
n−1, with f ′i = |fi| for every i. We proceed similarly to what we have
seen for the attack on the [55] scheme, i.e. we query the decryption oracle in
order to find out the relations fi ·fj < 0 or fi ·fj > 0 among the coefficients
fi of the secret key f(x). Suppose that the two consecutive coefficients fi,
fi−1 are both non-zero. We know their absolute values f ′i , f ′i−1. Choose
and submit to the decryption oracle the polynomial c(x) = α|fi−1|+α|fi|x,
with α ∈ (−q/2, q/2] such that [2α|fi−1 · fi|]q ∈
[
q
4 ,
q
2
]
(it is always possible
to find such an α). Now, the decryption oracle will compute and return
the polynomial
D(c(x)) =
[⌊
2
q
[α|fi−1|f0 − α|fi|fn−1]q
⌉]
2
+
n−1∑
j=1
[⌊
2
q
[α|fi−1|fj + α|fi|fj−1]q
⌉]
2
xj
Let’s focus on the i-th coefficient
[⌊
2
q
[α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1]q
⌉]
2
. We have
two cases:
1) If fi, fi−1 have different signs, then
α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1 = 0
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and therefore the i-th coefficient is zero:
[⌊
2
q
[α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1]q
⌉]
2
= 0
2) If fi, fi−1 have the same positive sign, then
[α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1]q = [2α|fifi−1|]q ∈
[
q
4 ,
q
2
]
In case fi, fi−1 are both negative, we have that
[α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1]q = [−2α|fifi−1|]q ∈
[
−q2 ,−
q
4
]
)
In both cases, it easy to see that
[⌊
2
q
[α|fi−1|fi + α|fi|fi−1]q
⌉]
2
= 1
So we can distinguish whether two consecutive non-zero coefficients fi, fi−1
have the same sign or not. Exactly as we saw for the attack on the [55]
scheme, this leads us to two possible candidates for the secret key; to
determine which one is the correct one, it is enough to submit an extra
appropriate query to the decryption oracle.
Remark 7. As we saw for the attack on the [55] scheme, we have to be
careful in case one of the coefficient fi is zero. In this case in fact, no
information can be given about the sign of fi−1 if we compare it to fi. To
solve this problem, we have to choose and submit to the decryption oracle
a polynomial in the form c(x) = a+ bxj, for appropriates a, b, j. We omit
the details, which are straightforward from what we have just discussed
and from the attack on the [55] scheme.
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5.10.3 A Remark
Parallel to our work, Dahab, Galbraith and Morais [26] have also proposed
similar attacks for [9, 55] but only for specific parameter settings at ICITS
conference 2015. In comparison, our attacks apply to all parameter settings
and are more efficient than theirs.
The key recovery attacks by Dahab, Galbraith and Morais [26] work for
arbitrarily-tailored parameters for the LTV12 and BLLN13 SHE schemes.
For example, they require 6(t2+t) < q and B2 < q36t2 while these conditions
are not assumed in [55, 9]. On the other side, we hereby present attacks
that work for all parameter settings. Moreover, our attacks are more
efficient than theirs, see the following table. Note that n is defined as
an integer of power of 2, B is a bound on the coefficient size of error
distribution and is much smaller than q, t ≥ 2 is an integer that partially
determines the message space size. More detailed definitions for these
parameters can be found in the following sections.
Our Attacks Attacks from [26]
[55] ⌊log2B⌋+ n n · ⌈log2B⌉+ n
[9] (t is odd) ⌈log2(B/t)⌉ n · ⌈log2B⌉
[9] (t is even but not 2) ⌈log2(B/t)⌉+ n n · ⌈log2B⌉
[9] (t = 2) ⌈log2(B/t)⌉+ n n · ⌈log2B⌉+ n
Chapter 6
Attacks to the modified LTV12 SHE
scheme
We are going to analyze a line of attacks towards a modified version of the
[55] SHE scheme. We refer to Section 5.9 for the details of the scheme.
As we already mentioned in Section 5.9, in [55], the authors do not
explicitly state how the decryption behaves if µ mod 2 is not a constant.
We can consider three scenarios: (1) output directly µ mod 2; (2) output
the constant of µ mod R2; (3) output an error. We have shown in Section
5.9 a key-recovery attack for scenario (1). We will see in this chapter how
to extend this attack to scenario (2). It is likely that we can adapt our
attack to scenario (3), but we have not succeeded so far. However, we there
are good indicators that scenario (3) can resist to key-recovery attacks,
and we are going to discuss this scenario in what follows.
6.1 Key-Recovery Attack: Scenario (2)
As we remarked earlier, the [55] SHE scheme only encrypts 1-bit plaintexts
m ∈ {0, 1}, but decryption actually reveals a polynomial µ′(x) = µ(x) mod
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2 = µ′0+µ′1x+ · · ·+µ′n−1xn−1 ∈ R2. Therefore, if the ciphertext is honestly
generated, we would expect µ′(x) ∈ {0, 1} ⊂ R2. Hence, a natural idea
of preventing our attack would be to only output the coefficient µ′0, since
anyway µ′i = 0, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, if ciphertext is honestly generated. SHE
scheme is the same as before, except the following alternative decryption
step:
Decrypt′(sk1, . . . , skM , c):
• parse ski = fi for i ∈ [M ]
• let µ = f1 · · · fM · c ∈ Rq
• µ′(x) := µ(x) mod 2 = µ′0 + µ′1x+ · · ·+ µ′n−1xn−1 ∈ R2
• output µ′0 ∈ {0, 1}
We show that, even in this case, our attack works with few modifications.
Instead of recovering all coefficients si of the polynomial s(x) = s0 +
s1x + · · · + sn−1xn−1 ∈ Rq at once, we are going to recover in sequence
s0, s1, . . . , sn−1.
Recovering s0
It is clear that, by performing the same attack as described above, we
recover coefficient s0 with at most N oracle queries; but no information
will be leaked about si, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1.
Recovering s1
In order to recover s1, we repeat the same attack as before, with the
following modifications:
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Preliminary step: submit to the decryption oracle the ’ciphertext’ c =
−xn−1 ∈ Rq. This way,
µ(x) mod 2 = s · (−xn−1) mod 2 =
= (s1 mod 2) + (s2 mod 2)x+ · · ·+
· · ·+ (sn−1 mod 2)xn−2 − (s0 mod 2)xn−1
since xn = −1 in Rq. So µ′0 = s1 mod 2.
Similarly,
Step k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, with m = ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋: Submit to the decryp-
tion oracle the ’ciphertext’
c = 2k · (−xn−1) ∈ Rq
These modifications lead to a full recovery of s1 (the final step is the same
as in the original key-recovery attack).
Recovering si, for 0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Similarly, and more generally, we are going to recover si ∈ [0, q− 1], for all
0 ≤ i ≤ n− 1. Steps are as follows:
Preliminary step: submit to the decryption oracle the ’ciphertext’ c =
−xn−i ∈ Rq.
Step k, for 1 ≤ k ≤ m, with m = ⌊log2(q − 1)⌋: Submit to the decryp-
tion oracle the ’ciphertext’
c = 2k · (−xn−i) ∈ Rq
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Final step: same as in the original key-recovery attack.
6.2 Key-Recovery Attack: Scenario (3)
We are going here to investigate the modified [55] SHE scheme with
ciphertext-validity check; is this possibly IND-CCA1-secure? Let’s consider
the following modified version of the SHE scheme in [55], where we tweak
the decryption step. We focus here on a way of preventing our key-recovery
attack, and possibly to make the [55] SHE scheme secure under key-recovery
attacks. Decryption step is modified in order to perform a ciphertext-
validity check before revealing the bit µ0. Secret key sk is f = 2f ′ + 1 as
in the original scheme.
Decrypt′′(sk = f, c):
• let µ(x) := (f · c ∈ Rq) mod 2 = µ0+µ1x+ · · ·+µn−1xn−1 ∈ R2
• if µ(x) /∈ {0, 1} ⊂ R2, return ⊥
• else, output µ′(x) = µ′0 ∈ {0, 1}
This simple ciphertext-validity check makes the scheme resistant to above
key-recovery attack, and we could not yet find a working key-recovery
attack against this modified SHE scheme. We tried to attack the scheme
in such a way to gather the maximum possible information of the bits of
the secret keys through repeted oracle decryption queries. Let’s see the
details.
Let f ′ = f ′0 + f ′1x+ f ′2x2 + · · ·+ f ′n−1xn−1 ∈ R. We have
−
⌊
q
2
⌋
≤ |f ′i | ≤
⌊
q
2
⌋
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Since f ′ is B-bounded, we have in particular that
|f ′i | ≤ B ≪ q
And we have
f = 2f ′ + 1 = (2f ′0 + 1) + 2f ′1x+ 2f ′2x2 + · · ·+ 2f ′n−1xn−1
Since B ≪ q, we still have 2B ≪ q.
Choose ’ciphertext’ c = 1. We have
Dec(2c) = 2c ∗ f = 2f ∈ Rq
= (4f ′0 + 2) + 4f ′1x+ 4f ′2x2 + · · ·+ 4f ′n−1xn−1
=: g0 + g1x+ g2x2 + · · ·+ gn−1xn−1
Since |fi| ≤ B and B ≪ q, we have |fi| ≤ q2 . So it is easy to see that
Dec(2c) = 2f mod 2 = 0.
Let’s gradually increase the value c ∈ N. Let c0 ∈ N be the smallest
integer greater than 1 such that
Dec(2c0) := g0 + g1x+ g2x2 + · · ·+ gn−1xn−1 ̸= 0
Then, this means that ∃i ∈ [0, 1, . . . , n− 1] such that |gi| >
⌊
q
2
⌋
. Also, we
have Dec(2(c0 − 1)) = 0, where
Dec(2(c0−1)) = [(4c0−4)f ′0+(2c0−2)]+(4c0−4)f ′1x+· · ·+(4c0−4)f ′n−1xn−1
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And
Dec(2c0) = [4c0f ′0 + 2c0] + 4c0f ′1x+ 4c0f ′2x2 + · · ·+ 4c0f ′n−1xn−1
So we have
1) Dec(2(c0 − 1)) = 0
2) Dec(2c0) ̸= 0:
2.1) Dec(2c0) = 1
2.2) Dec(2c0) =⊥
From this we have that
1)⇒

∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ⌊ q−18(c0−1)⌋
|f ′i | ≤
⌊
q−1
8(c0−1)
⌋
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
2.1)⇒

∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≥ ⌈ q+18c0 ⌉
|f ′i | ≤
⌊
q−1
8c0
⌋
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
2.2)⇒

∃1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1s.t. |f ′i | ≥
⌈
q+1
8c0
⌉
∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ⌊ q−18c0 ⌋ or ∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≥ ⌊ q+18c0 ⌋
(Notice that there may be more than one such coefficient f ′i .) So, to sum
up:
First Step
• submit to the decryption oracle increasing integer values c = 1, 2, 3, . . .
• let c0 ∈ N be the smallest integer s.t. Dec(2c0) ̸= 0. We have:
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Dec(2(c0 − 1)) = 0⇒

∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ⌊ q−18(c0−1)⌋
|f ′i | ≤
⌊
q−1
8(c0−1)
⌋
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Dec(2c0) = 1⇒

∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≥ ⌈ q+18c0 ⌉
|f ′i | ≤
⌊
q−1
8c0
⌋
∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1
Dec(2c0) =⊥⇒

∃1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1s.t. |f ′i | ≥
⌈
q+1
8c0
⌉
∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≤ ⌊ q−18c0 ⌋ or ∣∣∣f ′0 + 12 ∣∣∣ ≥ ⌊ q+18c0 ⌋
(Again, there may be more than such a coefficient f ′i)
Second Step
Define the intervals
I+0 :=
[⌈
q + 1
8c0
⌉
,
⌊
q − 1
8c0 − 8
⌋]
I−0 :=
[
−
⌊
q − 1
8c0 − 8
⌋
,−
⌈
q + 1
8c0
⌉]
J+0 :=
[
0,
⌊
q + 1
8c0
⌋]
J−0 :=
[
−
⌊
q + 1
8c0
⌋
, 0
]
Notice that
⌊
q−1
8c0−8
⌋
≤ B. We have
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• Case 2.1) ⇔ |f ′0 + 12 | ∈ I+0 and |f ′i | ∈ J+0 , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ n− 1;
• Case 2.2) ⇔ ∃is.t. |f ′i | ∈ I+0
Therefore, in Case 2.1) there is exactly one coefficient that overflows, but
in Case 2.2) there may be more than one. Our next question is to compute
the probability that such a case happens.
Question: In Case 2.2), what is the probability p0 that ∃!i ∈ [1, n− 1]
s.t. |f ′i | ∈ I+0 , and also |f ′0 + 12 | ∈ J+0 ?
Remember that the coefficients are chosen from the Gaussian normal
distribution χ given by the function
f(x) = 1
σ
√
2π
e−
x2
2σ2
where σ is the variance of the Gaussian distribution. We have, for a given
1 ≤ j ≤ n− 1, j ̸= i:
Pj := Prob(|f ′j| ∈ J+0 ,∃j ̸= i) =
2
σ
√
2π
∫ ⌊ q−1
8c0−8
⌋
0
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
Then, we have that the probability that every 1 ≤ j ≤ n−1, j ̸= i, belongs
to J+0 is given by
Ptot := Prob(|f ′j| ∈ J+0 ,∀j ̸= i) = P n−2j
Finally, we have
P0 := Prob(|f ′0 +
1
2 | ∈ J
+
0 ) ≈ Pj, for some j
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In total,
p0 = Ptot ∗ P0 ≈ P n−1j =
 2
σ
√
2π
∫ ⌊ q+1
8c0
⌋
0
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
n−1 (6.1)
The probability p0 ≈ P n−1j depends on the parameters σ, q, c0.
a) If it is the Case 2.2) and at least two coefficients overflow, then it is
difficult to continue the attack.
b) If it the Case 2.1) we have isolated the (only) coefficient which
overflows (it is |f ′0|)
c) If it is the Case 2.2) and we have only one coefficient |f ′i | overflowing,
then we still don’t know which one is it. However, it is easy to isolate
which coefficient is it by simply query the decryption oracle with
’ciphertexts’ 2c0xj , for j = 0, 1, 2, . . .. This simply shifts the position
of the coefficient, until the coefficient |f ′i | will be brought to position
0. More in particular, if the overflowing coefficient is |f ′i |, then
Dec(2c0xj) =⊥ for j = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1− i and Dec(2c0xj) = 1 for
j = n−1−i+1. So if j is the first value for which Dec(2c0xj) = 1, we
know that i = n− j and we have isolated the overflowing coefficient.
Therefore, if we are in cases b) or c) we can continue by submitting to the
decryption oracle increasing values of c1 = c0+1, c0+2, . . .. Unfortunately,
if we are in case a) we have no idea how to proceed: the ciphertext validity
check in our tweaked decryption seems to make the scheme invulnerable
to this line of key-recvoery attacks, which was successful for all the other
SHE schemes.
Now, the probability that case 2.1) happens is given by p0. In order to
compute such probability, we need to compute formula 6.1, which depends
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on parameters σ, q, c0 and B. If this probability is close to 1, then the
proposed line of attack can be considered to a viable key recovery attack
(we succeed in fact to isolate only one overflowing parameter with high
probability and we can continue our attack). However, in order to actually
compute this probability, we need concrete parameters to plug in in formula
6.1. Unfortunately, literature does not provide such concrete parameters,
therefore we can only try to estimate them.
In [55], the authors state that ”Using the same security proof as in [74],
we can base the security of the scheme [LTV12] on the DSPR assumption
and the RLWE assumption. With the choice of parameters stated below,
this yields security under the DSPR assumption and the hardness of
approximating shortest vectors on ideal lattices to within a factor of 2nϵ ,
which is believed to be hard.”
In the paper [55], the authors require that:
• n = n(λ), where λ is the security parameter
• n is a power of 2
• q = 2nϵ , for ϵ ∈ (0, 1)
• r = poly(n)
• B = poly(n)
Parameter Selection in the NTRU-FHE
For these reasons, it would be interesting to understand what concrete
parameters to use in the [55] SHE scheme. Unfortunately There currently
do not exist definitive, up to date works on these parameters.
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We can consider then some parameters suggested for NTRU-FHE.
Stehle and Steinfeld have shown that the DSPR problem is hard even
for unbounded adversaries with their parameter selection. However, the
new NTRU-FHE scheme will require different parameters to support
homomorphic evaluation. The impact of the new parameter settings to the
security level is largely unknown and requires careful research. However,
even if we assume that the DSPR problem is hard for typical NTRU-FHE
parameter selection, concrete parameters are still hard to chose. The
RLWE problem is still relatively new and lacks thorough security analysis.
A common approach is to assume that RLWE follows the same behavior
as the LWE problem [43]. Under this assumption only, we can select
parameters. If we omit the noise, given the prime number q and λ-bit
security level, the dimension is bounded as in [43] as n ≤ log(q)(λ+110)/7.2.
For example, given a 256-bit prime q, an 80-bit security level will require
dimension n = 6756. ([31]).
To sum up, we can try to use the following parameters:
• λ = 80
• n = 6756
• q = 2nϵ should have 256 bits. We can therefore take q = 2256. Now
since ϵ ∈ (0, 1) and q has 256 bits, we can take ϵ such that nϵ ≈ 256,
i.e. ϵ ≈ log6756(256) ≈ 0.629.
• c0 is such that B ≤ q−18c0−8 and B ≥ q+18c0 . From this, we get that
q
8B ≤ c0 ≤ q−8B8B . We can assume that c0 is in the middle of this
interval, hence we can take c0 = q−4B8B .
• B = poly(n) = n = 6756 (totally arbitrary)
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• r = poly(n) = n = 6756 (totally arbitrary)
Using these parameters, we obtain
p0 =
 2
σ
√
2π
∫ ⌊ q+1
8c0
⌋
0
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
n−1 ≈ 7.412860139583738 ∗ 10−1121
which basically is 0 probability. However, if we use as parameter B the
following one
• B = poly(n) = n2 = 67562 = 45, 643, 536
we obtain
p0 =
 2
σ
√
2π
∫ ⌊ q+1
8c0
⌋
0
e−
x2
2σ2 dx
n−1 ≈ 1
Hence, until we don’t obtain more concrete real parameters, nothing can
be said about the the real potential of our line of attacks, since by tweaking
parameters as we can in the given range, we can obtain both a working
and a not working key recovery attack. This leaves us material to consider
for an interesting future work.
Chapter 7
Conclusion and Future Work
Fully (and somewhat) homomorphic encryption is an interesting topic with
potentially many useful applications. Current FHE schemes are far from
being of any practical use, even though - as we have seen in Chapter 2 -
there are already several real-world applications which make use of SHE
schemes, and any implementer should keep in mind the threats of malicious
attackers who can mount key-recovery attacks to these SHE schemes.
It is therefore important to have a clear and precise idea of what level
of security is offered by the existing SHE and FHE schemes. This was the
main goal of this dissertation: in Chapter 5 we have developed complete and
efficient key-recovery attacks for most of the existing SHE schemes. More in
particular, we showed that the SHE schemes from [15, 14, 12, 11, 44, 55, 9]
suffer from key recovery attacks when the attacker is given access to the
decryption oracle. Combining the results from [54, 76], we now know that
most1 existing SHE schemes suffer from key recovery attacks, and so they
1The only exception is the variation of [71] SHE scheme as shown in [54]. The
authors use the notion of valid ciphertexts, and obtain an IND-CCA1 scheme. But as
we already mentioned, this is obtained under a strong non-standard lattice knowledge
assumption, and moreover they also show their scheme is not secure under a natural
adaptive attack based on a ciphertext validity oracle. It would be desirable to have a
IND-CCA1 secure SHE scheme which does rely on standard assumptions only.
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are not IND-CCA1 secure. In Chapter 6 we have considered the SHE
scheme from [55] - for which we developed an efficient key recovery attack
in Chapter 5 - and we have tweaked its decryption step in two ways, leading
to scenarios (2) and (3) as explained in that chapter. We successfully
showed a key-recovery attack for scenario (2); however, scenario (3) seems
to resist any attempt to show a key-recovery attack. We have shown that
our usual strategy for key-recovery attacks does not lead to a successful
attack, and our variation of the [55] SHE scheme seems therefore to be the
a good candidate for being IND-CCA1 secure. As an interesting future
work, one can look for a security proof of this scheme.
Our work sheds more light on the security of SHE schemes, and more
importantly can be of great help to potential implementers who want to
use a given SHE scheme for a real-world application. At the same time,
our results encourage us and other researchers to investigate more on the
IND-CCA1 security of SHE and FHE schemes, with the ultimate goal of
obtaining a SHE scheme which offers this level of security, and relying on
standard assumptions.
We now raise attention on some interesting future work and directions.
7.1 Future Directions
During our research on FHE, we crossed several interesting and important
points which are worth of future investigation. We list here a few interesting
future works, some of which are a natural direct continuation of our work.
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Making IND-CCA1 secure SHE schemes based on standard as-
sumptions
A major open problem is protect levelled homomorphic encryption from
adaptive attacks that allow an adversary to learn the private key. Therefore,
a natural next step is to investigate whether it is possible to enhance these
SHE schemes to avoid key recovery attacks and make them IND-CCA1
secure. One thing we should keep in mind is to preserve their homomorphic
properties. Following the work of [54], one could think of tweaking the
decryption step of a SHE scheme by including a ciphertext validity check
in order to make sure that, with some high probability, the ciphertext
is honestly generated by the attacker and not specifically chosen for the
purpose of recovering a given bit (or bits) of the secret key. Unfortunately,
we cannot directly apply the techniques from [54] due to the fact that the
SHE scheme from [54] enjoys some particular algebraic properties which
do not exist in other schemes. So, we need to treat each SHE scheme
individually.
At this moment it is still not clear whether we can adapt our key-
recovery attack to the scenario (3) of the SHE scheme [55], but as noted
in Chapter 6 we have good indicators that this can be. An interesting
future work related to the above mentioned tweaked version of the [55]
SHE scheme is to find a proof of its IND-CCA1 security.
Key recovery attacks and existing work on partial recovered se-
cret key
Obtaining a SHE scheme which is IND-CCA1 secure has proved to be
a difficult task, and so far no such scheme has been found. All the key-
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recovery attacks that we have developed, can completely determine each
bit of the secret key sk. For the way they have been developed, these
attacks work by querying the decryption oracle in such a way that for each
oracle reply, a new bit of the secret key is determined. The secret key is
then fully recovered once a given amount of oracle queries is performed.
(In general, these key recovery attacks require a number of oracle queries
approximatively equal to the number of bits of the secret key.)
An interesting future direction would therefore be to focus our attention
to a more practical way of preventing key recovery attacks. Consider the
scenario in which we consider a malicious attacker allowed to submit
only a limited number of queries to the decryption oracle, and therefore
he’s unable to recover fully the secret key of the SHE solely relying on
oracle decryption queries. (See also Remark 3.) We could thus address the
question on how many bits of the secret key can be leaked, while preserving
the IND-CCA1 security of a given SHE scheme; i.e. to what extent a given
SHE scheme is secure under this attack, which we call partial key-recovery
attack. How can we extract the secret key in case we can recover only
a limited number of bits of the secret key through direct queries to the
decryption oracle?
More precisely, let n ∈ N be the number of the bits of sk. Let r ≤ n
be the number of bits of sk determined by the attacker after each oracle
query, and let t be the number of oracle queries needed by the attacker to
recover all the bits of sk. In most of the attacks that we previously, we
have r = 1 and t ≈ n, so that after approximatively n queries the attacker
can fully determine sk. In our new scenario, we have to solve the following
problem:
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Problem. Consider a given SHE scheme E whose secret key sk has n
bits; in binary notation, we write sk := s = (sn−1sn−2 · · · s1s0)2. Consider
an attacker A who wants to break its IND-CCA1 security by recovering
sk. Let’s assume that with each oracle query Qi, for i = 1, 2, . . ., A is
learning a single different bit si of sk. Let t′ ≤ n be the maximum number
of queries that A can submit to the decryption oracle.
Determine what is the minimum value 0 ≤ t′ ≤ n allowing A to recover
sk without extra queries.
Other directions
Among other interesting open problems, we can consider the following one
recently proposed by S. Galbraith et al. in [53]. The authors investigated
a different countermeasure to our key recovering attack by considering
how key recovery attacks could be prevented in a scenario in which a SHE
scheme has more than one valid secret key, and for every decryption a
different secret key is used. More in particular, the idea is to generate a
”one-time” private key every time the decryption algorithm is run, so that
even if an attacker can learn some bits of the one-time private key from
each decryption query, this does not allow them to compute a valid private
key. They show an implementation of their idea on the [44] SHE scheme.
This new approach is trying to achieve security against adaptive attacks
which does not rely on a notion of ”valid ciphertexts” (see also Remark 2).
This way, key recovery attacks (in the style we developed them in this
thesis, i.e. recovering the secret key fully bit-by-bit) seem to fail in some
particular cases.
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